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ABSTRACT
Essays on Household Economics in Kenya
by
Jessica Blumer Hoel
Co-Chairs: David Lam and Je↵rey Smith
This dissertation uses original data collected by the author in rural Kenya to study
household economics. Data collection occurred September-November 2011, surveying 415
couples in Siaya County.
The first and second chapters of the dissertation use laboratory experimental methods
to test features of household bargaining models. Using variations of the dictator game, the
first chapter demonstrates that 97% of choices in the spouse dictator games are ine cient.
While people give more on average when their decisions will be revealed to the spouse, average
behavior obscures important heterogeneity: 37 percent of people give more when their choice
will be revealed to their spouse, 50 percent do not respond to asymmetric information, and
13 percent are actually more generous in the secret game. Together these results suggest that
models of the household should allow for heterogeneous responses to imperfect information,
by both an agent and his spouse, and policy makers should consider that information might
not always increase e ciency.
The second chapter develops a model that incorporates inequity aversion with monetary
utility, allowing for additional discomfort with inequality in the spouse games and when
x
the respondent’s actions are made public to his spouse. Numerical methods are used to
measure the relative importance of limited contracting, information problems, and the value
of spouse’s monetary utility in explaining ine cient behavior between spouses. Surprisingly,
limited contracting and information problems are not the primary causes of ine ciency, and
instead that the variation in the value of spouse’s monetary utility relative to own monetary
utility is the most important driver of e ciency in the games and transfers between spouses
in real life.
The final chapter demonstrates that husbands and wives report di↵erent numbers of ma-
terial assets such as livestock, consumer durables, and grain stores, and that these di↵erences
have substantial impacts on traditional measures of poverty. Were social programs to be tar-
geted with either a predicted expenditure poverty score card or principal component score,
di↵erent households would receive services if husbands’ reports were used instead of wives’.
For the most consistent measure of asset ownership, it is suggested that practitioners take
asset reports from a couple jointly.
xi
CHAPTER I
Heterogeneous Households: Laboratory Tests of
E ciency and Information between Spouses in Kenya
1.1 Abstract
Most tests of household models examine average statistics, but households may be het-
erogeneous. Using dictator games played between married couples, I test the assumptions of
e ciency and perfect information between spouses in rural Kenya. Using a within-subject
(panel data) design, I test each assumption for each individual and provide a unique mea-
sure of the distribution of behavior across households. I find that 97 percent of choices are
ine cient, with respondents sacrificing an average of 16 percent of potential income. While
respondents on average give more when their decisions will be revealed to their spouse, I
find that the mean obscures important heterogeneity: 37 percent of people give more when
their choice will be revealed to their spouse, 50 percent do not respond to asymmetric in-
formation, and 13 percent are actually more generous when their decision remains hidden. I
confirm that this heterogeneity in behavior in the games is important in the interpretation
of survey measures of information between spouses: for those who do not respond to asym-
metric information in the games, better information in real life is associated with greater
e ciency in the games; for those who do respond to asymmetric information in the games,
better information in real life is correlated with less e ciency in the games and is likely due
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to spousal monitoring. Together these results suggest that models of the household should
allow for heterogeneous responses to imperfect information by both an agent and his spouse,
and policy makers should consider that information might not always increase e ciency.
1.2 Introduction
Basic economic models of decision-making examine the choices of individuals, but be-
cause individuals most often live and make choices within families, individuals rarely make
truly independent decisions. Empirical studies have shown that family structure, relative
economic status, and bargaining a↵ect many outcomes, including savings (Anderson and Bal-
land (2002), Schaner (2012)), business investment (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodru↵ (2009)),
agricultural investment (Udry (1996), Duflo and Udry (2004)), educational investment (Qian
(2008)), health investment (Thomas (1990), Ho↵man (2009)), nutrition (Haddad and Hod-
dinott (1994), Duflo (2003), Dubois and Ligon (2010)), and time use (Shultz (1990), Chen
(2013)). Models of the household have been used to design public policy programs, most ob-
viously cash transfer programs. Cash transfers today are most often given to women, based
on the thinking that the income stream will increase her bargaining power, and transfers are
usually distributed with the full knowledge of both wife and husband.
While the literature has recognized that households may have di↵erent incomes, di↵erent
preferences, and make di↵erent choices, tests between models of how those choices are de-
termined have implicitly assumed that all households make decisions in the same way. With
rare exception, tests between models of household decision-making have examined only av-
erage statistics. There are two limitations in this strategy. First, means cannot measure
heterogeneity. Mean statistics cannot tell us if there are di↵erent types of households in
the population, and cannot tell us what fraction of households conform to one model or
another. Second, it is possible that a minority of households could be so strongly di↵erent
as to generate a misleading average statistic. In some cases, the mean of a distribution may
obscure what is in fact true for most of the population.
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In this study of household decision-making, I explicitly look for heterogeneity across in-
dividuals in which features of household models fit them best. I use laboratory games played
between spouses to identify whether an individual adheres to di↵erent household model
assumptions, allowing a classification of not only the average behavior in the population
but also a count of how many people are best fit by each assumption. I focus on allowing
for heterogeneous levels of e ciency between spouses and testing for di↵erent responses to
asymmetric information. I also look for di↵erent behaviors across the genders.
Specifically, I play dictator games between spouses in rural Kenya. I first test for e ciency
by setting the value of tokens passed to the spouse at 30 KSH while tokens kept for self are
worth 20 KSH. This asymmetric payo↵ structure allows me to clearly observe how much
household income players are willing to forgo to maintain control over personal income. I
observe that most people do not maximize household income from these one-o↵ transfers.
The e cient option is chosen in fewer than three percent of observations. Individuals forgo
an average of sixteen percent of possible household earnings to maintain personal control
over half the realized pot. This behavior violates the e ciency assumption that defines the
Collective model of household decision making, and is observed nearly universally in the
sample.
The assumption of e ciency is often justified by the ideas that spouses must have com-
plete and perfect information about each others’ preferences and choices, and must be able
to agree upon and enforce perfect contracts. In households in which we observe ine ciency,
do we also observe violations of these underlying implicit assumptions? Further, we ob-
serve ine cient behavior nearly universally in the sample. Do we observe similarly universal
evidence of imperfect information or limited contracts?
I test for an e↵ect of imperfect information by playing two types of dictator game, one in
which the respondent’s decisions remain secret and another in which his choices are revealed
to his spouse. While on average respondents give more when their decision will be revealed
to their spouse, I find that the mean obscures important heterogeneity. On average, men
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give 9.2 percentage points more in the public game than in the secret game, while women
increase their giving by 6.9 percentage points when their choices will be revealed. These
average di↵erences are statistically di↵erent from zero and robust to a variety of controls.
This average statistic indicates that the perfect information assumption does not hold in
the sample. However, half of people do not respond to asymmetric information. Men give
the same amount in public and secret in 49 percent of games, and women give the same
in 50 percent of games. I also find that some people respond to asymmetric information in
an unexpected way. Some people give more in the secret game than in the public game,
precisely when their generosity cannot be observed. This happens in fourteen percent of all
observations, and many of those people are consistently generous in secret: eight percent of
individuals give more in secret for at least two of the three stakes o↵ered in the games. These
“Secret Benefactors” are a reminder that allowing for heterogeneous responses sometimes
uncovers unexpected behavior.
That I do not observe heterogeneity in e ciency behaviors but do observe significant
heterogeneity in responses to asymmetric information in the games suggests that information
problems are not the driving cause of ine ciency, and that the relationship between e ciency
and information is complex. To confirm that the heterogeneous information responses I
find in the games are meaningful to real world behavior, I use survey data on information
between spouses to explore the relationship between information in real life and e ciency
in the games. Again I find that allowing for heterogeneity is important. When I pool
Opportunists (those who give more in the public game than in the secret game) with Non-
Responders (those who do not respond to asymmetric information in the games), I find that
better information in real life is correlated with greater e ciency in the games. The average
statistic indicates that better information is associated with better cooperation. However,
when I split the sample, I find that better information indicates better cooperation only
for Non-Responders, while for Opportunists, better information is correlated with greater
non-cooperative behaviors and is likely indicative of closer monitoring by a suspicious spouse.
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What is causing ine cient behavior in these games? My data hint at a specific form
of limited contracting: transaction level sharing rules. While the Collective model suggests
that households have a sharing rule that applies to total family income over time, with a set
fraction of income over a week or month ending up with each member (Chiappori (1992)), my
respondents are dividing money nearly evenly in every transaction. Rather than maximizing
total income from the games and reallocating to a contracted sharing arrangement later,
individuals seem to have a strong preference for a fair allocation in every choice. This is a
form of limited contracting, and appears to be a driving force of ine ciency in these games.
Together these results have implications for both theory and policy. First, these data
indicate the Collective model of household decision-making is inappropriate for the vast
majority of this sample. Second, in new non-cooperative models of the household, theorists
should consider that agents may have heterogeneous responses to information and that their
spouses may react accordingly. Third, new models should also consider a specific form of
limited contracting: transaction level sharing rules. Finally, people designing and studying
cash transfer programs should consider that information may have heterogeneous e↵ects
and that information may not always improve e ciency. Future work should allow for
heterogeneity in tests of the relationship between information and e ciency in the field.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 1.3 I review the theoretical and empirical
literature on household decision-making and describe some relevant studies in the experi-
mental literature; Section 1.4 describes the ethnographic setting for this study and explains
the experimental design; Section 1.5 presents results of tests of e ciency and information
in the games; Section 1.6 explores the link between information and e ciency using survey
data and game behavior; Section 1.7 discusses and concludes.
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1.3 Relevant Literature
1.3.1 Household Models: Theory, Tests, and Heterogeneity
The Collective model is currently the most popular model of the household.1 E ciency
is the defining characteristic of the Collective model. The model assumes two agents that
make choices that a↵ect each other, and through some form of bargaining, arrive at decisions
that are Pareto optimal.2 In the words of those who defined the model, “the cooperative
approach does recognize that the allocation of resources within the household may (and
generally will) depend on the members’ respective ‘weights’; it simply posits that however
resources are allocated, none are left on the table” (Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2011)).
The Collective model then implies, for income streams that do not change bargaining weights,
the e cient household will maximize total household income.
Note that testing for household income maximization is not simply a test of income
pooling, or a test between the Unitary and Collective models of the household. Income
pooling suggests that regardless of the fraction of income earned by each household member,
income is spent in the same way. The Collective model instead allows for the income balance
to influence bargaining weights, which can also be interpreted as a sharing rule (Chiappori
(1992)). The sharing rule is then used to divvy up total income that comes to the household
over time.3 Because income from this experiment is surely too small and idiosyncratic to
change bargaining weights, we should not expect it to a↵ect the sharing rule for total income.
An e cient respondent will maximize household income in the games because she knows that
the fraction of total income (from the games and from other sources) that ends up in her
hands will be the same regardless of what she chooses to do with this one small stream.
1Note that the unitary model is a special case of the Collective model in which the bargaining weights are
una↵ected by external factors. The unitary model is not discussed here because it has been widely dismissed
by the empirical literature (Alderman et al. (1995)).
2The Collective model concludes that the household acts as if it is maximizing a weighted utility function,
with utility weights a function of the bargaining weights. Bargaining weights are determined by external
factors like wages and legal structures. The canonical form of the Collective model was developed in Manser
and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), and solidified in Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori (1992).
3We can think of households “settling up” over a period of time such as a week or a month.
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The assumption of e ciency is justified by the idea that because spouses interact fre-
quently, they must know each other’s preferences, resources, and choices, and they must also
be able to come to binding agreements that at the very least do not leave money on the table.
While formally the assumption of e ciency is what defines the Collective model, practically
the notion of e ciency rests on the assumptions of complete and perfect information and
perfect contracts between spouses.
Models that do not assume e ciency at the outset are classified as non-cooperative
models. These models allow for asymmetric information about choices or preferences, limited
commitment, or both. Misinformation and the possibility of cheating are especially relevant
in dynamic settings; thus, non-cooperative models are more common in models of decisions
across periods.4 The theoretical literature has not yet settled on a canonical form of the non-
cooperative model, in part because we do not know which assumptions better approximate
the non-cooperative household: imperfect or incomplete information, limited commitment,
or some combination of these elements.
Tests of household models typically come in one of two forms. Many studies test for inef-
ficiency in household decisions directly, often by testing for household income maximization
or e cient expenditures, with ine ciency taken as evidence against the Collective model.
Other studies test to see if people behave di↵erently when their spouse will or will not find
out their choices, with households responding to asymmetric information classified as non-
cooperative households.5 To test one model against another in a sample, the econometrician
will generally sum the responses to asymmetric information or the extent of ine ciency
across households, calculate the mean response or ine ciency, and test to see if that mean
is statistically distinguishable from zero.
4Representative non-cooperative models include Lundberg and Pollak (1993) (limited commitment; static
setting), Bloch and Rao (2002) (incomplete information; static setting), Chen (2013) (imperfect information
and limited commitment; static setting), and Ligon (2002) (limited commitment; dynamic setting).
5It is more di cult to test for limited commitment directly in households because there are few things
that can vary commitment exogenously. For example, one may think that split-migrant families (in which
the husband and wife live in di↵erent locations) may find it more di cult to enforce contracts. However,
the choice to live separately is surely not exogenous to other factors relevant to household decision making.
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Economists in several literatures have recognized the importance of heterogeneity,6 so
why have studies of the household looked almost exclusively at average behavior? I see two
reasons. First, data about household decisions are usually available only in cross-section (also
known as between-subject) formats. Each respondent is usually observed in the dataset only
once, in one state of the world or treatment condition. We do not observe the individual
in the counter-factual situation, thus we rely on large and randomly assigned samples in
each state of the world or treatment group to di↵erence away individual fixed e↵ects on
average. Because it is di cult to construct a proper counter-factual for an individual using
cross-section data, we rely on group averages to draw conclusions about mean treatment
e↵ects.7
Second, even if we were to able observe households more than once, standard tests of
household model assumptions are complex, thus measurement of the test statistics di cult,
and the variables used to construct the tests are often noisy. We would need to observe each
household many times to make inferences about an individual household specifically. For
example, a common test of e ciency in the household is the test of collective rationality,
or e ciency in expenditure decisions. The test statistic is constructed by comparing the
ratios of the derivatives of Engel curves for two goods across the two members of the cou-
ple. Measuring the components of this test statistic is di cult. Expenditures and incomes
are often highly variable, thus respondents’ reports of them prone to measurement error.
It’s also likely that people make small, random deviations from perfect e ciency in their
real-world decisions. We require large sample sizes to mitigate these random measurement
and optimization errors. The need for large samples is compounded because even perfectly
measured and perfectly e cient expenditures are an inherently high-variance outcome, so
especially large samples are needed to generate statistical power. It is usually necessary to
6For examples, Blundell and Stoker (2005) discuss issues of “heterogeneity and aggregation” in consumer
demand, consumption and savings, and wages and labor participation.
7In principal, it would be possible to use quantile regression, matching, or sub-group analyses to test for
heterogeneous behavior, but these techniques require strong assumptions and still fundamentally estimate
average behavior for more narrowly defined groups.
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pool observations across individuals even if panel data are available, thus leading to measures
of only average behavior.
Measuring heterogeneity across households is di cult using standard methods, but is
straight-forward using experimental techniques. Laboratory games are attractive for two
reasons. First, laboratory games can be designed to force choices between starkly di↵erent
options, allowing clean tests of household model assumptions. Large sample sizes are then not
necessary to construct strong tests. Second, each individual can be measured several times
in di↵erent treatment conditions, creating a panel (or within-subject) dataset and allowing
conclusions to be drawn about each individual distinctly. This allows a classification of not
only the average behavior in the population but also detailed measurement of the distribution
of individual behavior.
1.3.2 Household Models: Empirical Evidence
In the developing world, evidence on household model assumptions from average statistics
is mixed.8 Bobonis (2009) tests the e ciency of consumption decisions in households in
Mexico, using the PROGRESA transfer and rainfall shocks to instrument for bargaining
power and income. Examining the average statistic, Bobonis cannot reject e ciency in static
decisions. By contrast, Robinson (2012) tests for e ciency in risk sharing between spouses
in Kenya by experimentally varying income shocks, finding that on average, couples do not
share risk e ciently. Duflo and Udry (2004) test for e ciency in consumption decisions
in households in Cote d’Ivoire by using rainfall to instrument for income shocks to male
or female income. Duflo and Udry conclude that on average, households do not behave
e ciently. Using laboratory games, Kebede et al. (2011) play voluntary contribution games
between spouses in Ethiopia using a between-subject design in which each respondent is
assigned to either receive information about their spouse’s decisions or not, but no individual
8In general, average statistics suggest that households in the developed world behave collectively in both
static and dynamic decisions. See Bergstrom (1997) and Chiappori and Donni (2009) for reviews of the
literature.
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makes choices under both information treatment conditions.9 They find that on average,
respondents do not play the games e ciently. In a study of dynamic decisions, Udry (1996)
studies agricultural investment decisions in households in Burkina Faso, finding that on
average households do not invest resources e ciently. In a test of perfect information in the
household, Chen (2013) finds evidence of asymmetric information on average in split-migrant
households in China in which the husband and wife live in separate locations. In the Kebede
et al. (2011) study, the authors also test for an e↵ect of asymmetric information, finding
that revealing the respondent’s decision to their spouse improves e ciency in some games
while having no e↵ect in others; the authors conclude that the role of information is context
dependent.
Most studies that test household model assumptions do not allow for heterogeneity across
households, but there are important exceptions. Ashraf (2009) tests for the e↵ect of asym-
metric information between spouses in the Philippines, finding that on average, men are
more selfish when their decisions will not be revealed to their wives. To allow for some
heterogeneity, Ashraf splits the sample into households in which the woman or man is the
primary financial decision maker, and finds that the average behavior of these two groups
is di↵erent. Schaner (2012) and Lich-Taylor (2001) use the same strategy to allow for het-
erogeneity in their studies. Schaner splits her sample of couples in Kenya into those that
are well-matched in their time preferences and those that are mis-matched, and finds that
the mis-matched couples make more ine cient decisions on average than do well-matched
couples. Lich-Taylor splits his sample of couples in the United States into those with and
without children, finding that the average behavior of these groups is best fit by di↵erent
models of decision-making.
The study of households that is closest in design to my own is Mani (2010). She plays
9“Between-subject” is a term often used in the experimental literature. It is analogous to cross-section
data in which each respondent is observed in one treatment condition. By contrast, “within-subject” means
that each respondent plays several games in several di↵erent treatment conditions. The term is analogous
to panel data, in which each respondent is observed in more than one situation such that individual fixed
e↵ects can be di↵erenced out of the final measure.
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voluntary contribution games between spouses in India, testing for both e ciency and asym-
metric information between spouses. Mani uses a within-subject design to test for e ciency,10
measuring each respondent in each treatment condition. The within-subject design allows an
examination of the distribution of behavior in the sample. She finds that men do not maxi-
mize household income in 31-51% of decisions while women behave ine ciently in 9-28% of
decisions. Mani also varies the information the respondent’s spouse receives to test for an ef-
fect of asymmetric information on e ciency. The test of information uses a between-subject
design, with respondents making decisions in only one information condition, allowing only
an analysis of the change in mean behavior with information. Mani finds that information
does not improve e ciency on average.
1.3.3 The Experimental Literature
In the non-household experimental literature, there are two studies that are similar in
design to my own. Leider et al. (2009) play a variety of dictator games between friends at
Harvard University. To test for an e↵ect of information, some games are played in secret,
while in others the respondent’s decision will be revealed to their game partner. The study
uses a within-subject design, with each respondent making decisions in each type of games,
which allows a description of heterogeneity in the population. While the authors do exam-
ine some heterogeneous e↵ects, showing that people who are more generous to anonymous
strangers are likely to be friends with other altruists, they mostly examine di↵erences in
average behavior across treatment groups, finding that people are more generous in public
games.
Ligon and Schecter (2012) play dictator games between neighbors in rural Paraguay,
varying both whether the respondent’s choices were revealed to his game partner, and also
varying whether the respondent knew and was able to choose who his game partner was.
10Mani’s primary goal in using a within-subject design to test e ciency is to test for di↵erences in e ciency
across allocation rules. For example, she finds that men contribute less to pots over which their wives make
allocation decisions than they do to pots that men control.
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Ligon and Schechter use a within-subject design, with each respondent playing each type
of game, and thus are able to speak to the distribution of behavior. Heterogeneity is not a
main theme of the paper, but the authors briefly discuss demographic, financial, and social
network correlates of behavior and motives for behavior in the games. They find that people
are more generous when their decisions are public.
1.4 Experimental Setting and Design
1.4.1 Ethnography
The study takes place in Siaya, homeland to Kenya’s third largest ethnic group, the
Luo. In the Nilotic language group, the Luo are thought to have migrated from South
Sudan through Uganda to settle around Lake Victoria in Kenya and Tanzania about 350
years ago, first settling in Siaya.11 Traditionally, the Luo were polygynous and virilocal,
with multiple wives migrating to their husband’s family’s land. In the early 20th century,
it was most common for each co-wife to be assigned her own piece of the family’s land.
Women were largely independently responsible for their plots, able to decide what to plant
and maintaining control over the harvest.12 The husband had a separate field, and while he
was expected to share some of his harvest if his wives experienced a shortfall, the crops that
came from his field were his alone.13 Men achieved status by converting grain to cattle and
using cattle for the bridewealth payments of new wives. Because their interests were often
11“Siaya, today a rural area involved in maize-growing, with small numbers of cattle associated with
dispersed households, was the transit and settlement zone of the earliest Luo-speakers to enter what is
today Kenya, some three and a half centuries ago. Groups and lineages that have maintained settlements
in Siaya are the ‘parents’ of an expanding and dispersing Luo population. ... It is an ennobled landscape,
for groups elsewhere refer in their histories to sacred or original sites in what is today Siaya” (Cohen and
Atieno Odhiambo (1989)).
12“JoKoguta who grew up before the 1930s agreed that a married woman was wuon puodho (the person
in charge of the field). She could decide what to plant in her own fields and she had control over the crops
coming from those fields, including any surplus” (Francis 2000).
13“A husband also had his own field, mondo. His wives did most of the work on the mondo, and he was
expected to use the crops to make good any shortfall in their supplies of food. Otherwise, he could dispose
of crops from the mondo as he saw fit” (Francis (2000)).
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at odds, historically husbands and wives tried to keep their financial a↵airs separate.14
British colonization brought three important forces that influenced Luo culture. First,
the introduction of Christianity encouraged marriages to remain monogamous and men to
assert greater authority as patriarchal heads.15 Second, the British provided opportunities
for men to migrate to commercial centers and participate in the new cash economy. Because
women were largely excluded from the cash economy, they became more dependent on their
husbands. Finally, a growing native population and British appropriation of land led each
new generation to split ever smaller plots, and because more families were monogamous
and men more frequently away, many families merged their formerly gender separated plots
into one. Where before it was clear that a woman had rights to her own crop income,
ownership over the merged family field was less clear.16 By the late 1980s, husbands most
often controlled the family farm and its income.17
In pilot work for this project, my study team did qualitative interviews with married
respondents in rural villages in Siaya in January 2011. Of ten women asked, only two
reported that they had their own plot of land. However, about half the respondents said
that if a woman sells farm produce, she will keep the money for herself. Most interestingly,
some said it depended on the relationship: “they use money together as there is a good
understanding [between the couple]. If there is no understanding, then everyone will keep
their earnings/produce.” Another woman said “if they have mutual agreement, they sit
14“Like many other peoples practicing mixed farming and herding in Africa south of the Sahara, Luo have
had in the past a hierarchy of values whereby men seek to convert grain to small stock, small stock to large
stock, and large stock to wives (and thus also to children) when their circumstances permit. ... Most cattle
are considered male or male-overseen property, and a form of saving and investment for the future of the
individual and lineage. They are the center of a prestige system fundamental in the Luo social order: men
seek to consolidate their interests as against those of women” (Shipton (2007)).
15Fenske (2012) documents the decline in polygamy across Africa.
16“Growing land shortage [in the 1930’s-1950s] meant that the field system became simplified. Men who
wanted to have a separate crop income, and who had enough land, continued to keep the mondo separate
from other fields. Where there was less land, households began to amalgamate continuous land into one field
(or one field for each wife, if there were several wives). These farms might look similar - a single field - but
the status of the field was an important issue. Was it all mondo, or had the mondo disappeared? These were
important issues, because they were also questions about rights to labor and crop income” (Francis (2000)).
17“[A single field] became the most common arrangement in monogamous households, although a few
men still had a mondo in the late 1980s. Male control of land and crop income because most common in
households where farming was the main source of income for the husband” (Francis (2000)).
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down and decide what to do with the money together. If they don’t agree, the woman
spends it on her own.” When a di↵erent set of respondents was asked “when you get money,
are you supposed to give it to your spouse? Does it matter if the money is earned (like from
a business or selling vegetables) or if the money is won or given as a gift (like the money I
will give you today to thank you for participating)?” seven of nine men said that they were
supposed to share with their wives, and eight said it didn’t matter where the money came
from. One respondent said “he is supposed to give her money since he is the husband.”
When women were asked the same question, only three of sixteen said they were supposed
to share with their husbands, and ten agreed that it did not matter where the money came
from. One woman said “it is her money and she spends it the way she thinks is appropriate.
It doesn’t matter how she got the money, it belongs to her and the husband has no say.”
In sum, because the Luo were historically polygynous, husbands and wives used to keep
their financial a↵airs separate. After British colonization, more families remained monog-
amous, men claimed more authority in the household, and most merged their plots into a
single family farm. It is not clear from historical ethnography if we should expect respon-
dents to keep all game tokens for themselves, share with their spouse, or for one gender to
turn money over to the other. Qualitative interviews revealed that most women think of
income that comes to them as theirs alone, while men feel they must share with their wives.
In many ways, while an economist would be surprised if a woman didn’t give all tokens to
her husband to maximize household income, an ethnographer may be surprised if she gave
him anything at all.
1.4.2 Sample Selection
The sample was drawn from five rural towns in southwestern Kenya’s Nyanza Province.
Maps of the area are shown in Figure 1.1. Two of the towns (Ugunja and Sega) are on the
main paved road that runs through all of Kenya from Mombasa to Uganda. The other three
towns (Ukwala, Sigomere, and Siaya) are on major dirt roads o↵ the main paved road. Three
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of the towns (Ugunja, Siaya, and Ukwala) are former district headquarters.18 Subjects were
married (either formally or informally),19 currently living with their spouse, over the age of
18, and available to participate in two interviews a week apart in September or October of
2011. Polygamous families were not eligible to participate.20
To identify the sample, the survey team asked local administrators (village elders) to
compile a list of all couples meeting the eligibility criteria in several villages within walking
distance of the five towns.21 The village elders were asked to record the names of both
husband and wife and a contact phone number if possible. Of the 786 couple records collected
by the village elders, 82 percent included a contact phone number. Couples were then
assigned a random number to determine the order in which they were contacted to be
scheduled for an interview, stratified by town. Couples that listed a phone number were
scheduled for interviews by phone if possible. Couples that did not have a phone number
listed, or were unable to be contacted by phone, were contacted through the village elder.
Tracking lists were distributed to the elders and they were asked to invite the selected couples
to arrive for an interview on the selected day. In total, 53 percent of the 786 couples provided
by the village elders participated in the study. 415 couples were interviewed at baseline, and
406 couples met all of the study criteria (monogamous, living together, both partners over
the age of 18). Of these, 392 had complete game records.22
18A new constitution adopted in late 2010 created administrative units known as “counties” to take the
place of the former “districts.” All towns and districts in this study now fall into Siaya county. However,
at the time of the study old district o ces were still serving many of their old o cial roles, and the towns
remained important centers of commerce and government.
19A couple is considered “married” if they are considered by the village elder to be a long-term romantic
couple. The beginning of the “marriage” is defined as the time the couple moved in together.
20Polygamous families were excluded because the household bargaining structures between three or more
adults are likely to be very di↵erent from traditional models of two adult households. Table 1.2 shows the
fraction of the 18+ population in Siaya by marital status in 1999.
21While a full census by the survey team would have been a preferable method of compiling the eligible
couple list, budget constraints were limiting.




Couples arrived at the survey site together,23 but completed their individual surveys
separately. The survey began with a questionnaire about demographics, family finances,
material wealth, expenditures, transfers, savings and loans, and decision making in the
household. The survey was executed in Dhuluo, the most common native language in the
study area.24 Table 1.1 shows demographic and other summary statistics from the baseline
survey. The table also shows averages for Siaya District from the 1999 Kenya Census, showing
that the sample is similar to the larger population. An English version of the survey can
be found on my website25 and in the appendix and the Dhuluo translation is available on
request.
The interview continued with a series of dictator games. The games were played one-on-
one with a trained field assistant reading from a script in the respondent’s native language.
The respondent was asked questions to confirm their understanding at every stage. An En-
glish version of the game scripts can be found in the appendix. Each respondent played
four dictator games in total, each over three stakes. Two of the games were between the
respondent and his spouse, and the other two were selected from three other possible dic-
tator games.26 The order of the games was randomized.27 In the Secret Spouse game, the
respondent was told that his decisions would remain secret from his spouse and could be
revealed only to the project leader. In the Public Spouse game, the respondent was told
that his spouse would be told of his decisions. The respondent was given tokens (bottle
caps) to divide between himself and his spouse. The respondent indicated his choice by
23The study sites were a Town Council Hall, a boarding house for handicapped children, a polytechnic
university, and a small resort.
24All subjects in the sample speak Dhuluo. The survey was forward and back translated by the study
team.
25www.umich.edu/⇠jesshoel
26Other games include the Secret Stranger game (the traditional dictator game in which a subject divides
money between himself and an anonymous stranger), the Spouse Stranger game (in which the subject divides
money between his spouse and an anonymous stranger), and the Stranger Stranger game (in which the subject
divides money between two anonymous strangers). Results from these games are not discussed here.
27The spouse games were always played consecutively, with the starting game (secret or public) random-
ized. The order between the spouse games and the other two games selected was also randomized.
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placing the bottle caps in cups labeled “Self” and “Spouse” in Dhuluo. Each game was
played over 5, 10, and 25 tokens. Tokens were worth 20 shillings (about $0.22) if kept and 30
shillings ($0.32) if given away. The value of the token was increased if given away to allow
the easy observation of ine ciency in the household. To assist respondents in understanding
the monetary consequences of their choices, the respondent was given a sheet showing the
value of a number of tokens if given or kept. A copy of this sheet can be found in Figure
1.2. After the respondent had made his choice, the field assistant repeated the choice and
its monetary consequences to the respondent, and asked if that was the division he wanted.
The respondent was allowed to change his choice as many times as he liked.
Respondents were informed that all of their choices in the games (12 in total) would be
entered into a computer at the o ce and one would be chosen at random to come true. The
computer would also pick random strangers for the stranger games. It was emphasized that
because respondents could win any game for themselves, and could receive money from their
own, their spouse’s, or a stranger’s game, they could be sure that their choices in the Secret
Spouse game would remain secret. Winnings from the games were distributed one week later
at the end of the follow-up interview.28 Respondents were not informed of which game they
or their spouse won unless one won a Public Spouse game. If a respondent or their spouse
won a Public Spouse game, both were informed of the token amount, its division, and the
amounts of money taken home by each. Respondents were not informed by the study team
how much their spouse took home from the games in total; however, because respondents
were required to attend with their spouses and likely returned to their home together, it is
likely that respondents discussed their winnings with their spouse. Payouts from the games
ranged from 0 to 1270 shillings. The average payout per respondent was 316 KSH. As a
point of reference, the mean payout was 20% of baseline reported weekly male income, and
49% of weekly female income.
28The endline survey contained questions about expenditures, transfers, savings and loans, marital quality,
and the respondent’s responses to the study. An English copy of this survey can be found on my website





Table 1.3 shows average play in the spouse games, broken out by game and gender.29
Because tokens passed to the spouse are worth 30 KSH while tokens kept for self are worth
only 20 KSH, a respondent could maximize the total income for their household by giving
all tokens to their spouse. Giving 40 percent of tokens results in an even distribution of final
payments (i.e. 60% of tokens*20 KSH=120 KSH, 40 percent of tokens*30 KSH=120 KSH).
The first column of Table 1.3 shows the percentage of tokens passed to the spouse in each
game. The table shows that far from giving everything, the mean behavior is to give a bit
more than half of the money. This behavior is ine cient because by keeping some tokens for
themselves, respondents are leaving money on the experimental table. On average, subjects
do not maximize household income and instead forgo some earnings to retain control over
some of the pot.
Result 1: On average, people do not maximize household income.
The second column of Table 1.3 shows the distribution of final earnings between the
subject and his spouse. This column is a simple transformation of the first column (if the
respondent gives x% of tokens, he gives x*30/(x*30+(1-x)*20) percent of the total realized
pot), and emphasizes that respondents are on average not maximizing household income.
Result 2: On average, people give a bit more than half to their spouse in the public
game.
29Further breakouts by token amount and whether the secret game was played before or after the public
can be found in Table 1.10. Behavior across the stakes is quite stable. Men give 46-47 percent in the secret
games regardless of token amount, and give 55-56 percent in the public games. The di↵erence in average
giving across the stakes is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Women give between 40-43 percent in
the secret games, and give 47-50 percent in the public games. If there is any trend it is that women give less
in the higher stakes games, but these di↵erences are not statistically di↵erent from zero. Men give more in
the game they play first, in both the secret and public games. The di↵erence is marginally significant in the
public game, but not in the secret game. Women also give more in the game they play first. The di↵erence
is not significant in the secret game, but is significant in the public game.
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The third column of Table 1.3 quantifies how much money the subject foregoes by keep-
ing some tokens for himself. The percentage of money left unclaimed is calculated as the
percentage of tokens the individual kept for himself ((1-x)) multiplied by the price di↵eren-
tial between giving and keeping (10 KSH) and scaled by the total amount of money possible
from one token (30 KSH). This is a measure of the extent of ine ciency in each choice. In
the public game, men sacrifice an average of 15 percent of the total possible pot by choosing
to keep some tokens for themselves. Women give up 17 percent on average in the public
games. This is clear evidence of ine ciency in the household on average.
Result 3: Respondents give up substantial sums of potential household income on average
to maintain control over some income.
The decision to keep some tokens in the public game is ine cient for three reasons. First,
because decisions in the public game will be revealed to the spouse, there is no incentive
to keep some money in the hopes of hiding it from the spouse. Second, income from the
experiment is a one-o↵, idiosyncratic shock, so it is unlikely to change bargaining weights
in the household. There is no incentive to keep money in the public game hoping to alter
the bargaining weights theorized in the Collective model. Third, income from the games is
a small fraction of monthly or yearly income, and most households transfer money between
husband and wife frequently, especially from husband to wife. Therefore if the respondent
passed all the tokens to his spouse expecting his spouse to give some money back to him
outside the game, but was surprised when his spouse did not pass back some money after the
games, he could simply alter his future transfers to even out the total distribution of money.
Thus, a respondent in an e cient household should give all tokens to his spouse. That
respondents leave potential experimental income unclaimed is evidence against e ciency in
the household on average.
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1.5.1.2 Distribution of Behavior
Figure 1.3 shows histograms of men’s behavior in the games, showing the percentage of
tokens passed to his spouse broken out by information treatment and token amount. Panels
on the left show the public games, while panels on the right show the secret games. The
first row shows the 5 token games, the second shows the 10 token games, and the last row
shows the 25 token games. These figures show that there is bunching in the middle of the
distribution for all games, with mass points around 40, 50, and 60 percent of tokens passed.
Most men seem to be dividing money roughly evenly between themselves and their wives.
These figures show that very few men maximize household income by giving 100 percent of
tokens to their wives. In the public game men give all tokens to their wives in 4.8 percent of
observations. These figures also show that very few men maximize personal income by giving
0 percent of tokens to their wives. In the public game men keep all tokens for themselves in
0.7 percent of observations.
Panel a of Figure 1.5 shows the same information displayed as overlapping CDFs. This
figure demonstrates that the distribution of giving is mostly similar across token amounts.
A Pearson’s chi-squared test for the independence of distributions reveals that though the
distributions look similar and do not have di↵erent means, they are statistically distinct.
More men choose to give 40-59% in the 10 and 25 token games than in the 5 token game,
while more choose to give 50-59% in the 10 token game than the 25 token game. This is
likely due to di↵erent focal points in each distribution (e.g. giving 5 tokens or 50% is a focal
point in the 10 token game, while giving 12 or 13 tokens is not a focal point in the 25 token
game). See Table 1.11 and its notes for details.
Figure 1.4 shows the analogous histograms for women. Again we see bunching in the
middle of the distribution, with strong mass points around 40, 50, and 60 percent. Women
also rarely maximize household or their own income. In the public game women give all
tokens to their husbands in 2.1 percent of observations and keep all tokens in 1.3 percent of
public games. Panel b of Figure 1.5 shows overlapping CDFs for women, confirming that
20
the distribution of giving across token amounts look mostly similar for women, while Table
1.12 again shows that the distributions are statistically distinct, with di↵erent focal points
for each token amount.
Pooling choices across the three token amounts, Table 1.4 shows the percentage of ob-
servations in the public games fit into each e ciency category: extremely ine cient (giving
0-20 percent), very ine cient (giving 21-40 percent), mostly ine cient (giving 41-60 per-
cent), mildly e cient (giving 61-80 percent), and almost e cient (giving 81-100 percent).
These summary statistics confirm the patterns seen in the histograms. Very few people
maximize household income.
Because the assumption of household income maximization is so resoundingly rejected in
this study, the reader may be concerned that respondents did not understand the structure
or consequences of the game. This hypothesis can be rejected for several reasons. First,
the games scripts were developed in close collaboration with the enumerators. All of the
enumerators were native Dhuluo speakers, and many grew up in towns demographically
similar to those included in the study. With feedback from the enumerators, the language
used in the games scripts was greatly simplified both in vocabulary and in structure so that
even relatively less-educated people could understand the games. Second, the enumerator
explained many times that tokens passed were worth more than tokens kept, and respondents
were asked questions at every stage to check their understanding. If the respondent answered
a check question incorrectly, the instructions were repeated until the respondent could answer
the check correctly.30 Third, respondents were given a sheet that showed the value of tokens
passed or kept so the respondent did not have to actually compute the multiplication for
himself.31 Fourth, after the respondent had placed the tokens in the cups to indicate his
choice, the enumerator repeated back his decision both by stating the allocation of tokens
and stating the monetary consequences of his choice. Respondents were then given the
opportunity to reallocate if they liked. Finally, ine ciency in games between spouses has
30See the games scripts in the appendix.
31A copy of this sheet can also be found in the Figure 1.2.
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been observed in other studies. Kebede et al. (2011), Mani (2010), and Iverson et al. (2011)
are representative examples.
Result 4: Very few people maximize household income. This is strong evidence against
e ciency in the majority of households in this sample.
1.5.1.3 Consistency of Behavior
As a robustness check, we can observe how consistent people are in the e ciency of their
choices across the three stakes of the game. That is, it is possible for a person to play one
token amount very e ciently and the two others less e ciently, and we might like for this
person to be counted by their majority play. Table 1.5 shows counts and the percentage of
the sample that played the games perfectly consistently (all 3 stakes in the same e ciency
category), mostly consistently (2 stakes in one e ciency category, and the third stake in an
adjacent category), and not consistently across the token amounts.
41 percent of men played all three token amounts with the same level of e ciency, while
37 percent of women played perfectly consistently. The next section of the table shows how
many people played two stakes at one e ciency level and one stake at an adjacent e ciency
level. If we classify these people by their majority play, then we are able to classify 88.3
percent of men and 89.3 percent of women.
When classified by their majority type, 1.8 percent of men play the games at the lowest
level of e ciency in the public game. 23.7 percent give 21-40 percent of tokens, 44.9 percent
give 41-60 percent of tokens, 13.5 percent give 61-80 percent, and 4.3 percent come close to
the e cient choice. The distribution across e ciency types is similar for women, but shifted
to the left. 3.8 percent of women give 0-20 percent, 37.0 percent give 21-40 percent, 41.8
percent give 41-60 percent, 5.4 percent give 61-80 percent, and only 1.3 percent come close
to the e cient choice.
Result 5: Most people are consistently ine cient, and consistent in the extent of ine -
ciency, across the three token amounts o↵ered.
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1.5.1.4 E ciency: Summary
E ciency in household decisions is the defining characteristic of the Collective model,
the most popular model in the current literature. The vast majority of respondents in this
sample behave ine ciently, and are consistent in their ine cient choices, suggesting that the
Collective model is inappropriate for this sample.
What is causing household to behave ine ciently? Imperfect information between spouses
is commonly suggested as a mechanism that causes ine ciency between spouses. Next we
move on to tests of the e↵ect of asymmetric information between spouses.
1.5.2 Information
1.5.2.1 Average Behavior
Table 1.3 shows average behavior across information conditions in the spouse dictator
games. In the first column, the average percentage of tokens passed in each game is shown
by gender and game, along with the standard deviation. On average, both genders give more
in the public game than in the secret game. Men give on average 9.2 percentage points more
in the public game, while women give 6.9 percentage points more.
Table 1.6 shows these patterns in a regression framework. The first column shows esti-
mates of the model (without controls)
ti = I(male) + I(secret) + I(male) ⇤ I(secret) + I(10 token) + I(25 token)
+I(secret first) + I(secret) ⇤ I(secret first) + {controls} + ✏i
where ti is the percentage of tokens passed by individual i and I(.) is the indicator function.
The coe cients of interest are those on I(secret) and I(secret) ⇤ I(secret first), but the
regression also controls for gender, the stakes of the game, and whether the secret game was
played before or after the public game. These results show that the di↵erence in average
giving between the secret game and public game is 8.5 percentage points, and this di↵erence
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is highly significant. While men give 7.2 percentage points more on average in both games,
the di↵erence between public and secret giving is the same across the genders.
We may expect giving in the dictator game to be correlated with observed characteristics,
and perhaps the di↵erence in giving across information conditions can be primarily explained
by covariates. The second column shows this is not the case. The second column of Table
1.6 shows the same regression model with the addition of control variables, including age,
education, number of children, age of youngest child, who is the primary financial decision
maker, and own weekly total income. Including covariates changes the point estimate on
I(secret) very little, and does not change the conclusion that on average, people give more
in the public game. If we were to look only at averages, we would conclude that spouses in
this sample respond to asymmetric information. We may further suggest that information
problems are a driving cause of ine ciency in this sample.
Result 6: On average, men and women give more in the public game than in the secret
game.
1.5.2.2 Distribution of Behavior
Table 1.3 clearly shows that on average people give more to their spouses when their
decisions are public. However, averages sometimes obscure modal behavior. It is possible
that while some people change their behavior between games, others may choose the same
response in both games. To calculate the number of people who give more when their
decisions are public, I calculate the linear di↵erence between games as the percentage of
tokens passed in the Public Spouse game minus the percentage of tokens passed in the
Secret Spouse game. A positive linear di↵erence then indicates that the respondent keeps
more when their actions remain hidden.
Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of linear di↵erences by gender and token amount. The
left panels show distributions for men and the right panels show distributions for women.
The first row shows di↵erences in the 5 token games, the second shows the 10 token games,
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and the final row shows di↵erences in the 25 token games. This figure makes clear that
while the average di↵erence between the public and secret games is positive and statistically
di↵erent from zero, most people do not change their behavior between games. Figure 1.7
shows the same information as overlapping CDFs across token amounts, showing that the
distribution of the linear di↵erence is similar across token amounts.
Subjects who give more in the public game than in the secret game will be called “Op-
portunists,” while those who give the same amount in both games will be called “Non-
Responders.” Figure 1.6 also reveals that some people give less in the secret game than the
public game. I will call these people “Secret Benefactors.”
Table 1.7 presents the percentage of observations that give more in the public game than
in the secret game (Opportunists), the percentage who make identical decisions in the public
and secret games (Non-Responders), and the percentage of observations that give more in
the secret game than in the public game (Secret Benefactors). The table shows results for
all token amounts pooled. In 49 percent of observations, men do not change their behavior
between games, while in only 38 percent of observations do men behave opportunistically.
In 13 percent of observations, men give more in the secret game than in the public game.
Similar patterns hold for women. 50 percent of observations of women do not change their
behavior between the public and secret games, while only 35 percent play opportunistically.
15 percent of female observations are Secret Benefactors. Table 1.13 shows similar statistics
broken out for each token amount separately. Men and Women play the games similarly
across the stakes, with a stable fraction of people playing as Opportunists, Non-Responders,
and Secret Benefactors across the three stakes.
While it is simplest to categorize linear di↵erences as strictly greater than, equal to, or
less than zero, Figure 1.6 shows that there are some respondents that change their behavior
by only 1 or 2 tokens between games. It’s possible that these small changes are simply
mistakes. The second panel of Table 1.7 shows the percent of the sample that can be
considered Opportunistic, Non-Responderic, and Secret Benefactors after recoding small
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deviations. Specifically, if a respondent changes their behavior by ten percentage points or
less between the public and secret games,32 they are classified as Non-Responders. With
this recoded classification, we see that 25 percent of men behave Opportunistically while 20
percent of women do so. Six percent of both men and women behave as Secret Benefactors.
1.5.2.3 Consistency of Behavior
In addition to accounting for small deviations within games, we can also account for small
deviations across games. That is, it is possible for a person to play one token amount as
an Opportunist and the two others as a Non-Responder, and we might like for this person
to be counted only as a Non-Responder. We might also wonder if those who give more
in the secret game than the public game could have done so by mistake, and might have
only made that mistake in one stake of the three o↵ered. Table 1.8 shows counts and the
percentage of the sample that played the games perfectly consistently, mostly consistently,
and not consistently across the token amounts. 24 percent of men played all three token
amounts as Opportunists, 35 percent played all three as Non-Responders, and 4 percent
played all three as Secret Benefactors. The next section of the table shows that many people
played two stakes as one type and one stake as a di↵erent type. If we classify these people
by their majority play, then we classify 33 percent of men as Opportunists, 46 percent as
Non-Responders, and 9 percent as Secret Benefactors. The final section shows individuals
whose behavior is inconsistent with any type: for example, some people play two games as
an Opportunist and one as a Secret Benefactor, while others play each game as a di↵erent
type. 12 percent of men behave inconsistently. When I classify women by their majority
play, 26 percent play as Opportunists, 49 percent play as Non-Responders, and 7 percent
play as Secret Benefactors. 18 percent of women cannot be classified by their majority play.
Result 7: There is statistically and substantively significant heterogeneity across people,
with most behaving as Non-Responders, a sizable minority behaving as Opportunists, and a
32i.e. by only 1 token in the 5 or 10 token game, or by 1 or 2 tokens in the 25 token game
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small number consistently giving more in secret.
1.6 Correlation between E ciency in Games and Information in
Surveys
The relationship between e ciency and information in the games is nuanced: while
nearly everyone behaves ine ciently, fewer than half respond to experimentally induced
asymmetric information. What is the relationship between e ciency and information in
real life? Is heterogeneity also important in the real world? This section uses survey data
on information between spouses about income and expenditures to explore the relationship
between information in real life and e ciency in the games.
In the laboratory information about transfers can be varied experimentally, but in the
real world, spouses are able to choose the level of information between them. That is, the
perfection or imperfection of information is endogenous to the household decision-making
process. For example, suppose a respondent receives an income stream that she could poten-
tially hide. The respondent may choose to disclose the income to her spouse if she believes
the revelation will bring household consumption decisions closer to her preferences, either
by increasing her bargaining power or because her and her spouse’s preferences are aligned.
Castilla (2013) writes such a model. Under this idea, better information between spouses
may reflect more cooperation, and thus be associated with higher e ciency in the games. On
the other hand, if the respondent typically hides the income and behaves non-cooperatively,
the respondent’s spouse may choose to monitor her more closely to prevent the income hid-
ing. Chen (2013) writes such a model, including costly monitoring and cooperative and
non-cooperative types. In this framework, better information between spouses may reflect
less cooperation, and thus be associated with lower e ciency in the games. Is better infor-
mation associated with better or worse cooperation between spouses? Which explanation
dominates is an empirical question.
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To explore these ideas, I compare behavior in the games to survey measures of information
in the household. The baseline survey contains detailed income and expenditure modules.33
To measure income, respondents were asked if they received any money on each of the
preceding seven days. They were asked for up to two transfers for each day. In addition to
the size of the transfer, the respondent was asked who the transfer was from, what it was
for, and if their spouse knew about it. With these data, I construct the fraction of income
each respondent said their spouse was aware of.34
I construct a similar measure of spousal knowledge of expenditures. For 49 items, the
respondent was asked if they purchased the item over the previous week, how much they
spent, who benefited from the purchase, and whether their spouse was aware of the purchase.
From these responses, I construct the fraction of the respondent’s total expenditures that
the respondent says his spouse knows about.35
Figure 1.8 shows histograms of these survey measures of information between spouses.
The top row shows histograms of information about income while the bottom row shows
histograms of information about expenditures. Panels on the left are husbands’ reports
while the panels on the right are wives’ reports. 61% of men and 59% of women report that
their spouses know about every income stream over the previous week. A sizable minority
reported that their spouse was aware of none of their income streams, with 29% of men and
33% of women reporting complete privacy in their income. 56% of men and 49% of women
say their spouse is aware of every expenditure over the past week. In contrast to income,
very few respondents say their spouse is completely unaware of their purchases. Because the
distribution of knowledge is so lumpy, I collapse the variable to a binary indicator variable to
compare means between information groups. To examine the relationship between reports of
information in survey data to e ciency behavior in the games, I code a person as reporting
33The English version of the survey can be found in the appendix on my website at
umich.edu/⇠jesshoel/surveys.html
34Transfers from the spouse were excluded from the numerator and denominator.
35Education expenditures were excluded from the calculation because education expenditures are very
lumpy, and generated extreme outliers.
28
high information if they report their spouse knows about 100% of their income streams or
expenditures.
Do people that report better information in their household behave more e ciently in
the games? Table 1.9 presents regressions of the percentage of tokens given in the games
on survey indicators of perfect information in the household. The first column of Table
1.9 shows a linear regression on a dummy variable indicating that the respondent reported
perfect information about their income.36 On average, information about income in the
real world is positively correlated with e ciency in the games. This suggests that better
information is associated with more cooperation. However, the game results suggest that
it may be important to look for heterogeneity across the sample. The second column al-
lows for di↵erential e↵ects of information about income in the surveys in each of the games
(public and secret) and for Opportunists and Non-Responders. The results show important
di↵erences between Opportunists and Non-Responders. For Non-Responders, reporting per-
fect information about income in the surveys is correlated with better e ciency in both the
public and secret games. That is, the behavior of Non-Responders is consistent with the
idea that more cooperative couples share information. For Opportunists, however, better
information in real life is associated with better e ciency in the public game, but much
worse e ciency in the secret game. In other words, extreme Opportunists are likely to say
that their spouses know about all of their income over the previous week, which is consistent
with the idea that their spouse knows they behave non-cooperatively and monitors them
accordingly. In contract, mild Opportunists are less likely to report that their spouse has
perfect information about their income. The behavior of Opportunists is consistent with
the idea that better information between couples can be explained by more monitoring of
non-cooperative spouses.
36These regressions includes observations from both the public and secret games, for all three token
amounts, for both men and women. The sample is restricted, however, to mostly consistent Opportunists
and Non-Responders. Controls for age, education, number of children, age of the youngest child, who is the
primary financial decision maker, and income over the previous week are also included, as are enumerator
and date fixed e↵ects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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The third and fourth columns show analogous tests for information about expenditures.
Here we see broadly similar patterns. When Non-Responders and Opportunists are pooled,
information about expenditures in the real-world is positively but statistically insignificantly
correlated with e ciency in the games. When we allow for di↵erential e↵ects in each game
and for Opportunists and Non-Responders, however, we see that better information about
expenditures is mildly positively associated with e ciency for Non-Responders, but only
extreme Opportunists are likely to report that their spouse has perfect information about
their expenditures.
In summary, on average survey measures of information between spouses are positively
correlated with e ciency in the games, but heterogeneity is important in the real world
too. For Non-Responders, better information between spouses is associated with greater
e ciency in the games, suggesting that better information reflects better cooperation. For
Opportunists, however, better information is associated with higher levels of opportunism,
suggesting that for non-cooperative couples, better information reflects more monitoring.
These results highlight the importance of allowing for heterogeneous types and suggest that
for di↵erent households, di↵erent models are needed.
1.7 Conclusion
Households are heterogeneous. However, because of the nature of our tests of household
models, and the variability of the data used to construct those tests, previous work has mostly
examined only average household behavior. Testing for heterogeneity with laboratory games,
however, is straightforward. Using dictator games played between married couples in the
Nyanza Province of Kenya, I test for heterogeneity across households in which assumptions
typical to household models fit each best. Because I use a within-subject (panel data) design,
I am able to say whether an individual adheres to each assumption, allowing me to examine
both the average behavior in the sample as well as detail the distribution of behavior.
First, I find that 97% of choices do not maximize household income, and instead forgo
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an average of 16% of potential income in order to maintain personal control over about half
of the realized pot. This is strong evidence of ine ciency in the household, and is observed
nearly universally in the sample. Households are nearly homogenous in that the Collective
model does not describe their behavior well.
When ine ciency is discovered or suggested between married couples, theorists often
start by assuming that either imperfect information or limited contracting is causing the
ine ciency. When I test the perfect information assumption, I find that allowing for het-
erogeneity across the population is important: while the average statistic suggests that
households su↵er from information problems, in fact half of the sample does not respond to
experimentally induced asymmetric information. This is an important reminder that when
testing between two models of the household, heterogeneity in the population can cause the
average statistic to hide what is true for most of the population.
Further, average statistics can lead us to accept simple explanations when more com-
plex theories are necessary. If we examined only average behavior in this sample, we would
conclude that households do respond to asymmetric information on average, thus informa-
tion problems are a probable cause of the observed ine ciency. However, when we allow
for heterogeneity in information responses, we come to a much di↵erent conclusion. First,
though the vast majority of this sample is ine cient, fewer than 50% of people respond to
experimentally induced asymmetric information. This fact alone suggests that information
problems cannot be the sole cause of ine ciency in this sample. Second, when I examine the
relationship between information between spouses as measured in survey data and e ciency
measured in the games, I find that better information means di↵erent things for di↵erent
couples. For Non-Responders, better information in real life is associated with greater e -
ciency in the games, indicating better cooperation within the couple. For Opportunists, on
the other hand, better information is associated with higher levels of opportunism, indicating
less cooperation between the spouses. For these couples, it seems that better information is
being driven by more monitoring, not more trust.
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If information problems are not the driving cause of ine ciency, what is? My data hint
at a specific form of limited contracting: transaction level sharing rules. While the Collective
model suggests that households have a sharing rule that applies to total family income over
time, with a set fraction of income over a week or month ending up with each member
(Chiappori (1992)), my respondents are dividing money nearly evenly in every transaction.
The histograms shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show large mass points on 40, 50, and 60% of
tokens passed. Rather than maximizing total income from the games and reallocating to a
contracted sharing arrangement later, individuals seem to have a strong preference for a fair
allocation in each transaction. This is a form of limited contracting, and appears to be a
driving force of ine ciency in these games. The next generation of models of the household
should consider this specific friction, and also consider that di↵erent households may respond
to information di↵erently, with some perhaps even responding to asymmetric information in
surprising ways.
These results also have implications for public policy. Government sponsored cash trans-
fer programs often go to great lengths to ensure that money is delivered only to the wife,
hoping that she will retain control over it, but also deliver the funds very publicly so her
husband is sure to know about the existence, amount, and timing of the transfer. Stan-
dard models of household decision-making suggest that information will improve e ciency
in household decisions. This study suggests that for half of households, information does not
improve e ciency, and in some households, better information is related to lower levels of
e ciency. Other studies have suggested that cash transfers to women that are distributed
via technologies that make income more private from their husbands are spent di↵erently
than transfer given in public (Aker et al. (2012)). To inform policy, the e↵ect of information
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Maps of Study Site











































Figure 1.2: Token Value Sheet
KEEP Tokens GIVE
0 ksh 0 0 ksh
20 ksh 1 30 ksh
40 ksh 2 60 ksh
60 ksh 3 90 ksh
80 ksh 4 120 ksh
100 ksh 5 150 ksh
120 ksh 6 180 ksh
140 ksh 7 210 ksh
160 ksh 8 240 ksh
180 ksh 9 270 ksh
200 ksh 10 300 ksh
220 ksh 11 330 ksh
240 ksh 12 360 ksh
260 ksh 13 390 ksh
280 ksh 14 420 ksh
300 ksh 15 450 ksh
320 ksh 16 480 ksh
340 ksh 17 510 ksh
360 ksh 18 540 ksh
380 ksh 19 570 ksh
400 ksh 20 600 ksh
420 ksh 21 630 ksh
440 ksh 22 660 ksh
460 ksh 23 690 ksh
480 ksh 24 720 ksh
500 ksh 25 750 ksh
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Figure 1.3: Histograms of Game Play: Men
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Figure 1.4: Histograms of Game Play: Women
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Figure 1.5: CDFs of Game Play


















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent of Tokens Given
c.d.f. of  5 token game c.d.f. of  10 token game 
c.d.f. of  25 token game 
CDF Public Game, Men


















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent of Tokens Given
c.d.f. of  5 token game c.d.f. of  10 token game 
c.d.f. of  25 token game 
CDF Secret Game, Men


















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent of Tokens Given
c.d.f. of  5 token game c.d.f. of  10 token game 
c.d.f. of  25 token game 
CDF Public Game, Women


















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent of Tokens Given
c.d.f. of  5 token game c.d.f. of  10 token game 
c.d.f. of  25 token game 
CDF Secret Game, Women
40
Figure 1.6: Linear Di↵erence between Public and Secret Games
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
MCDM Sample Siaya District
Men Women Men Women
Age
46.04 36.62 44.30 36.32
(16.15) (13.97) (16.67) (14.78)
Years of Education
7.950 6.460 5.850 4.750




Age of the Youngest Child⇤
7.420 7.250 4.440 4.030
(8.790) (8.430) (4.810) (4.430)


















Weekly Income from Work, Indicator⇤⇤
0.53 0.33 0.92 0.90
(0.50) (0.47) (0.26) (0.30)
Transfer from Spouse, Indicator
0.05 0.41
(0.23) (0.49)
Transfer from Spouse, No Zeros, KSH
561.0 470.0
(1469) (1145)
Weekly Transfer to Spouse, Indicator
0.46 0.05
(0.50) (0.23)




Notes: Table shows means and standard deviations in parentheses. Data for the MCDM
sample taken from the baseline survey. Data for Siaya District are from the 1999 Kenya
Census, complements of IPUMS-International. The census sample is restricted to those
18 years or older and in a non-polygamous union Financial data for the MCDM sam-
ple covers income, transfers, and expenditures over the week before the baseline survey.
*For the Census sample, age of youngest child in the household.
**For MCDM sample, indicator that the respondent reported some income from work over
the past week. For the Census sample, an indicator that the respondent is employed.
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Table 1.2: Fraction of the 18+ Population by Marital Status, Siaya District
Men Women
Single 0.30 0.10
Married, monogamous 0.53 0.48




Notes: Data are from the 1999 Kenya Census, complements of IPUMS-
International.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics: Games
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Money
Tokens Passed Money Given Left on the Table
Public Spouse: Men 55.87 65.51 14.71
(18.26) (24.66)
Public Spouse: Women 48.66 58.71 17.11
(16.64) (24.98)
Secret Spouse: Men 46.67 56.76 17.78
(20.92) (24.89)
Secret Spouse: Women 41.77 51.83 19.41
(18.93) (24.32)
Notes: The first column shows the mean percentage of tokens passed. Call this value x.
The second column shows the mean percentage of total realized income given to the spouse
( 30x30x+20(1 x) ). The third column shows the mean amount of money left unclaimed, scaled
by the total potential pot ( 10(1 x)30 ). Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics: E ciency
Percent of tokens passed Percent of Observations
Men
Extremely Ine cient: x <= 20 0.04
Very Ine cient: 20 < x <= 40 0.28
Mostly Ine cient: 40 < x <= 60 0.46
Mildly Ine cient: 60 < x <= 80 0.16
Almost E cient: 80 < x <= 100 0.06
Women
Extremely Ine cient: x <= 20 0.07
Very Ine cient: 20 < x <= 40 0.39
Mostly Ine cient: 40 < x <= 60 0.45
Mildly Ine cient: 60 < x <= 80 0.07
Almost E cient: 80 < x <= 100 0.02
Notes: tokens passed to the spouse are worth more than tokens kept for self, so the
household income maximizing choice is to give 100% of the tokens to the spouse. The
table shows the percentage of male and female observations that fit into di↵erent
e ciency categories.
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Table 1.5: Consistency: E ciency
Men Women





Extremely Ine cient: x <=
20
2 0.51 9 2.3
Very Ine cient: 20 < x <=
40
51 13.01 58 14.8
Mostly Ine cient: 40 < x <=
60
81 20.66 67 17.09
Mildly Ine cient: 60 < x <=
80
15 3.83 7 1.79
Almost E cient: 80 < x <=
100
13 3.32 4 1.02
Perfectly Consistent 162 41.33 145 37
Mostly Consistent
Extremely Ine cient: x <=
20
5 1.28 6 1.53
Very Ine cient: 20 < x <=
40
42 10.71 87 22.19
Mostly Ine cient: 40 < x <=
60
95 24.23 97 24.74
Mildly Ine cient: 60 < x <=
80
38 9.69 14 3.57
Almost E cient: 80 < x <=
100
4 1.02 1 0.26
Mostly Consistent 184 46.93 205 52.29
Perfectly and Mostly
Consistent
Extremely Ine cient: x <=
20
7 1.79 15 3.83
Very Ine cient: 20 < x <=
40
93 23.72 145 36.99
Mostly Ine cient: 40 < x <=
60
176 44.9 164 41.84
Mildly Ine cient: 60 < x <=
80
53 13.52 21 5.36
Almost E cient: 80 < x <=
100
17 4.34 5 1.28
Consistent 346 88.27 350 89.3
Not Consistent 46 11.73 42 10.7
Notes: Table shows how consistent people are in their e ciency behavior across the token amounts of
the games. The first panel shows the number and fraction of people who play all three token amounts
with the same e ciency behavior type. The second panel shows those who play the three games
mostly consistently, by playing two of three games as one type, and the third as a proximate type.
The third panel sums those who are perfectly and mostly consistent across the three stakes. The
final panel shows the number and fraction of people who do and do not play the games consistently
across the three stakes.
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Table 1.6: Regression: Percent of tokens passed on Information
Percentage of tokens passed (With Controls)




Male x Secret Game -2.236 -2.052
(1.395) (1.528)
Ten Token Game -0.319 -0.378
(0.430) (0.469)
Twenty Five Token Game -0.788* -0.684
(0.473) (0.506)
Secret Game First -2.098* -2.297**
(1.077) (1.157)







Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regression includes pooled observations for men and
women, public and secret games, and 3 token amounts. Female, public game, five token, public game
played first is the base category. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are shown in parentheses,
clustered at the individual level. Controls include age, education, number of children, age of youngest
child, who is the primary financial decision maker, and income over the previous week.
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Notes: The first column shows the fraction of people who give
more in the public game than secret game (Opportunists), the frac-
tion that give the same in both games (Non-Responders), and the
fraction that give less in the public game than secret game (Se-
cret Benefactors). The table shows information for all three token
amounts pooled. The first panel shows a classification based on
the simple di↵erence. To account for small deviations that may
be errors, the second panel shows the classification after collapsing
observations for which the di↵erence between public and secret was
less than or equal to ten percentage points to the Non-Responder
category.
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Opportunist 93 23.72 60 15.31
Non-Responder 139 35.46 117 29.85
Secret Benefactor 15 3.83 13 3.32
Perfectly Consistent 247 63.01 190 48.48
Mostly Consistent
Opportunist 35 8.93 43 10.97
Non-Responder 43 10.97 77 19.64
Secret Benefactor 19 4.85 13 3.32
Mostly Consistent 97 24.85 133 33.93
Perfectly and Mostly
Consistent
Opportunist 128 32.65 103 26.28
Non-Responder 182 46.43 194 49.49
Secret Benefactor 34 8.67 26 6.63
Consistent 344 87.85 323 82.4
Not Consistent 48 12.24 69 17.6
Notes: Table shows how consistent people are in their information response across the token amounts
of the games. “Opportunists” are people who give more in the public game than secret game,
“Non-Responders” are people who give the same in both games (Non-Responders), and “Secret
Benefactors” are people who give less in the public game than secret game. The first panel shows
the number and fraction of people who play all three token amounts with the same behavior type.
The second panel shows those who play the three games mostly consistently, by playing two games
as one type and the third game as a proximate type. The third panel sums those who are perfectly
and mostly consistent across the three stakes. The final panel shows the number and fraction of
people who do and do not play the games consistently across the three stakes.
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Table 1.9: Regression: Percentage of Tokens Given on Information about Income or Expen-
ditures
Info about Info about Info about Info about
Income Income Expenditures Expenditures
Info 3.128** 4.909** 0.713 3.166*
(1.518) (1.979) (1.376) (1.835)
Info x Secret Game 1.155* 0.717
(0.699) (0.480)
Info x Opportunist -0.246 -0.978
(3.402) (2.876)
Info x Opportunist x -10.98*** -8.663***
Secret Game (3.174) (2.968)
Opportunist 7.733*** 7.789***
(2.803) (2.300)
Secret Game -1.491*** -1.070***
(0.571) (0.266)
Opportunist x -20.88*** -23.99***
Secret Game (2.174) (2.239)
Constant 45.47*** 46.75*** 47.09*** 48.85***
(4.919) (5.111) (4.048) (4.096)
Observations 2,016 2,016 3,102 3,102
R-squared 0.117 0.378 0.100 0.352
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table shows linear regressions of the
percentage of tokens given in the public and secret games, and includes observations
for all three token amounts. The sample is restricted to only Opportunists and Non-
Responders. “Info” is a dummy variable indicating that the respondent reports their
spouse is aware of 100% of their income (columns 1 and 2) or expenditures (columns 3
and 4). “Opportunist” is a dummy variable indicating that the respondent gave more
in the public than secret game for two of three stakes o↵ered. All regressions include
demographic and financial control variables (age, education, number of children, age
of youngest child, who is the primary financial decision maker, and income over the
previous week) as well as enumerator and date fixed e↵ects. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.
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1.11 Additional Tables
Table 1.10: Detailed Summary Statistics: Games
Percentage of tokens
passed
All 5 token 10 token 25 token First Last
Secret Spouse: Men 46.67 46.63 46.45 46.93 47.61 45.92
(20.92) (20.85) (19.97) (22.03) (20.24) (21.43)
Public Spouse: Men 55.87 55.20 55.84 56.55 56.69 54.83
(18.26) (18.08) (17.05) (19.58) (18.04) (18.5)
Secret Spouse: Women 41.77 42.96 42.14 40.19 42.44 41.18
(18.93) (19.28) (18.12) (19.3) (19.48) (18.44)
Public Spouse: Women 48.66 49.64 48.72 47.61 49.73 47.41
(16.64) (17.86) (14.64) (17.23) (16.73) (16.47)
Percentage of Money
Given
All 5 token 10 token 25 token First Last
Secret Spouse: Men 56.76 56.72 56.54 57.02 57.68 56.02
(24.89) (24.89) (24.87) (24.91) (24.94) (24.83)
Public Spouse: Men 65.51 64.89 65.48 66.13 66.26 64.55
(24.66) (24.73) (24.66) (24.57) (24.55) (24.77)
Secret Spouse: Women 51.83 53.05 52.21 50.2 52.52 51.22
(24.32) (24.5) (24.38) (24.04) (24.43) (24.22)
Public Spouse: Women 58.71 59.65 58.76 57.68 59.74 57.49
(24.98) (25) (24.98) (24.94) (25) (24.93)
Money Left on the
Table
All 5 token 10 token 25 token First Last
Secret Spouse: Men 17.78% 26.69 KSH 53.55 KSH 132.68 KSH 17.46% 18.03%
Public Spouse: Men 14.71% 22.40 KSH 44.16 KSH 108.63 KSH 14.44% 15.06%
Secret Spouse: Women 19.41% 28.52 KSH 57.86 KSH 149.53 KSH 19.19% 19.61%
Public Spouse: Women 17.11% 25.18 KSH 51.28 KSH 130.98 KSH 16.76% 17.53%
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Table 1.11: Distribution Tests, Men
a. Men, compare to 5 token game
Public Game Secret Game
Percent Given,
Left-Hand End












0 4 3 5 21 23 42
20 12 22 28 47 71 53
40 136 180 158 150 174 142
60 184 140 120 141 97 107
80 34 31 63 21 20 43
100 22 16 18 12 7 5
Pearson’s Chi Squared 8.14 15.35 8.11 11.34
b. Men, compare to 10 token game
Public Game Secret Game
Percent Given,
Left-Hand End
10 token 25 token,
Collapsed
to 10
10 token 25 token,
Collapsed
to 10
0 3 1 14 25
10 0 4 9 17
20 4 22 38 35
30 18 6 33 18
40 78 126 77 119
50 102 32 97 23
60 88 108 69 100
70 52 12 28 7
80 26 57 16 39
90 5 6 4 4
100 16 18 7 5
Pearson’s Chi Squared 55.08 46.49
Notes: Table shows information to test for di↵erences in the distribution of giving across token
amounts. The first panel compares giving in the 10 and 25 token game to giving in the 5 token
game. The first column of each panel shows the raw distribution in the 5 token game. The second
and third columns show the distributions in the 10 and 25 token game collapsed to the categories
available in the 5 token game. The left-hand end of each category is shown in the column on the far
left. The final row shows Pearson’s chi-squared tests of the independence of distributions across token
amounts. The second panel shows analogous information for a comparison of the 10 to 25 token
distribution. Results show that the distributions are statistically distinct across token amounts,
mostly due to di↵erent focal points in each distribution (e.g. 5 tokens or 50% is a focal point of
the 10 token distribution, while 12 and 13 tokens are not focal points of the 25 token distribution)
rather than a shift in the entire distribution.
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Table 1.12: Distribution Tests, Women
a. Women, compare to 5 token game
Public Game Secret Game
Percent Given,
Left-Hand End












0 11 4 7 26 29 36
20 15 46 59 44 78 84
40 187 251 208 195 224 199
60 144 72 83 108 46 51
80 23 12 29 11 10 18
100 12 7 6 8 5 4
Pearson’s Chi Squared 28.57 23.63 18.67 18.81
b. Women, compare to 10 token game
Public Game Secret Game
Percent Given,
Left-Hand End
10 token 25 token,
Collapsed
to 10
10 token 25 token,
Collapsed
to 10
0 2 3 24 28
10 2 4 5 8
20 14 46 28 68
30 32 13 50 16
40 89 173 97 170
50 162 35 127 29
60 53 79 34 49
70 19 4 12 2
80 11 28 10 18
90 1 1 0 0
100 7 6 5 4
Pearson’s Chi Squared 78.58 64.48
Notes: Table shows information to test for di↵erences in the distribution of giving across token
amounts. The first panel compares giving in the 10 and 25 token game to giving in the 5 token
game. The first column of each panel shows the raw distribution in the 5 token game. The second
and third columns show the distributions in the 10 and 25 token game collapsed to the categories
available in the 5 token game. The left-hand end of each category is shown in the column on the far
left. The final row shows Pearson’s chi-squared tests of the independence of distributions across token
amounts. The second panel shows analogous information for a comparison of the 10 to 25 token
distribution. Results show that the distributions are statistically distinct across token amounts,
mostly due to di↵erent focal points in each distribution (e.g. 5 tokens or 50% is a focal point of
the 10 token distribution, while 12 and 13 tokens are not focal points of the 25 token distribution)
rather than a shift in the entire distribution.
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Table 1.13: Detailed Summary Statistics: Opportunism
Raw Percent
Men All 5 token 10 token 25 token
Opportunistic 0.38 0.34 0.4 0.39
Non-Responder 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.47
Secret Benefactor 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13
Women All 5 token 10 token 25 token
Opportunistic 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.37
Non-Responder 0.5 0.53 0.48 0.49
Secret Benefactor 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.14
Recoded Percent
Men All 5 token 10 token 25 token
Opportunistic 0.25 0.15 0.27 0.32
Same 0.7 0.82 0.67 0.59
SS 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.09
Women
Opportunistic 0.2 0.12 0.22 0.27
Same 0.74 0.85 0.72 0.64
SS 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09
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CHAPTER II
Motives for Sharing between Spouses: Experimental
Evidence from Kenya
2.1 Abstract
Ine cient behavior between spouses has been observed in laboratory experiments, field ex-
periments, and natural experiments all around the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
Because e ciency is the foundational assumption of the Collective model of household be-
havior, theorists are now asking what variety of non-cooperative model to first pursue: one
that incorporates information problems or limited contracting. The relative importance of
imperfect information and limited contracting in explaining ine ciency has not been mea-
sured empirically. I write a model that incorporates inequity aversion (a form of limited
contracting) with monetary utility of self and spouse, and allows for both intrinsic and ex-
trinsic motivations for fairness. I use laboratory game data from dictator games played
between spouses in rural Kenya to estimate parameters that measure the relative value of
own monetary utility, spouse’s monetary utility, inequity aversion in public, and inequity
aversion in secret. Contrary to expectation, I find that inequity aversion (limited contract-
ing) and information problems do not explain the majority of variance in e ciency in the
games; instead, variation in the value of spouse’s monetary utility is the best predictor of
e ciency for both men and women. I also find that the value of spouse’s monetary utility
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best explains real world transfers between spouses over the previous week. This evidence
suggest that rather than pursue non-cooperative models with limited contracting or infor-
mation problems, theorists should explore why some people more highly value their spouse’s
monetary utility than others.
2.2 Introduction
The most popular model of intra-household bargaining in the literature, the Collective model,
is defined by the idea of e ciency. According to a forthcoming textbook on household
economics by Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss, “if each partner knows the preferences of
the other and can observe their consumption behavior ... and the two interact on a regular
basis then we would expect that they would find ways to exploit any possibilities for Pareto
improvements. ... [the Collective model] simply posits that however resources are allocated,
none are left on the table.”
However, recent empirical evidence has suggested that husbands and wives do not behave
e ciently, and the evidence is especially clear in Africa. Ine ciency has been observed
in laboratory experiments (e.g. Hoel (2012), Iversen et al. (2011), Kebede et al. (2011),
Mani (2010)), field experiments (e.g. Robinson (2012), Schaner (2012), Ashraf (2009)), and
natural experiments (e.g. Udry (1996), Duflo and Udry (2004)). Because the assumption of
e ciency does not well fit these samples, and because the samples are so varied, researchers
must now ask: what should the next generation of household models look like?
The quote from Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2011) suggests that behind the explicit
assumption of e ciency, household modelers have implicitly assumed perfect and complete
information and perfect contracting. This leads to two natural empirical questions. First,
are information problems the cause of ine ciency? Perhaps respondents behave ine ciently
because they believe they can hide either their income or their decisions from their spouse,
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thereby increasing their own utility. Evidence in Ashraf (2009), Chen (2013), and Castilla
and Walker (2013) indicates that information tells part of the ine ciency story.
Second, does limited contracting explain ine ciency? In his seminal work, Chiappori (1988,
1992) defines e ciency in terms of a sharing rule that is attained over time; at any moment,
the balance of money or utility may not perfectly achieve the agreed upon sharing rule, but
over time, husbands and wives transfer resources to settle up on average. However, if a
person doesn’t believe that this settling up will happen, he may insist upon reaching the
sharing rule in each transaction. This transaction-level sharing rule is a form of limited
contracting, and is otherwise discussed under the heading of fairness norms. That so many
spouses split laboratory game winnings evenly suggests that transaction-level fairness norms
between spouses may cause ine ciency also. This has been suggested in Hoel (2012) and
Kebede et al. (2011).
Finally, implicit in all household bargaining models is the idea that husbands and wives work
together as a team, and care about the choices and utility of their spouse more than they
do about other people. We conclude that a respondent will maximize their spouse’s income
and happiness over that of other people. This hypothesis has not been often been tested
empirically, and there may be reason to think that in some households, spouses may not act
like any more of a team than any pair of anonymous strangers. There is much evidence to
suggest that men and women on average have di↵erent consumption preferences (e.g. Duflo
(2003), Browning et al. (1994)), and due to di↵erences in time preferences, beliefs, or risk
aversion, make di↵erent savings and investment decisions (e.g. Schaner (2012), Anderson
and Balland (2002), Qian (2008), de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodru↵ (2009), Ho↵man (2009)).
Further, because family structures are often larger and more diverse than the simple nuclear
family, men and women may rely more on their extended families than they do on their
spouses. For example, in an ethnography of the Luo tribe, the ethnic group represented in
this study, Shipton (2007) reports that husbands and wives often keep their financial a↵airs
separate, and more frequently make financial transfers with members of their own gender.
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For this reason, researchers may in e↵ect be studying the wrong relationships.
In sum, there are three potential reasons why a researcher may observe ine ciencies between
husbands and wives: imperfect information, limited contracting, and relationship definition
issues. As we develop the next generation of household models, theorists would not only like
to know which reasons are borne out in the data, but also the relative importance of each. It
is thus important to measure information, contracting, and relationship problems in a single
setting with a united methodology, and test the relative importance of each. This paper fills
that gap.
To gain insight into what form of non-cooperative model theorists should pursue, I designed a
set of laboratory games that measure how much a respondent cares about his spouse relative
to himself and relative to anonymous strangers; whether respondents care more about fair-
ness than monetary utility in an individual transaction; whether they care di↵erently about
fairness in games against their spouse than anonymous strangers; and whether respondents
care di↵erently about fairness when they can keep their choices secret from their spouse. I
played these games with 415 married couples in Siaya County, Kenya. Next, I write a model
that combines monetary utility with inequity aversion to define five parameters that govern
giving in the games. Using numerical optimization procedures, I minimize the squared errors
of the first order conditions from the model to estimate the five parameters for each respon-
dent individually. I am then able to describe both the di↵erence in measured parameters on
average, and also describe the distribution of motives across the sample. I also explore the
demographic correlates of each motivation.
I next examine the importance of each motive in explaining ine ciency in the games using
a decomposition of variance. I find that contrary to expectation, information problems
and limited contracting in the form of inequity aversion explain about the same fraction of
variance in giving in the games, but together explain less variation than does the relative
value of spouse’s monetary utility.
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Finally, I use detailed survey data about transfers over the previous week to correlate the
estimated parameters with real world behavior. I again find that, contrary to expectation,
the variation in the value of spouse’s monetary utility is best correlated with real world
transfers between spouses.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that rather than pursue models of limited contracting
or asymmetric information, theorists should explore why some people value their spouse’s
monetary utility more than others, and how best to measure that value.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.3 reviews the related literature; Section 2.4
describes the setting and experimental design; Section 2.5 outlines the model and numerical
optimization of parameters; Section 2.6 presents results, first of the simple game behaviors,
next of the parameter estimates, and finally of the correlations with demographic character-
istics and real world behaviors; Section 2.7 concludes.
2.3 Related Literature
There are several recent papers from which this study draws inspiration. Leider et al.
(2009) play anonymous and non-anonymous dictator games with Harvard undergraduates
of varying social closeness to measure baseline altruism (altruism in a standard anonymous
dictator game played against a stranger), directed altruism (additional giving to friends over
strangers), and the importance of future interactions (additional giving when the respon-
dent’s decision would be revealed to their friend). The authors find that on average, people
give 52% more to their friends than to strangers, and give 24% more when their decisions
will be revealed.
Ligon and Schechter (2012) build on this work by decomposing the motives to share between
households in rural Paraguay. Again using variations of dictator games, the authors mea-
sure baseline altruism, directed altruism, and further decompose the importance of future
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interactions into prospective reciprocity and sanctions. Using a linear model in which they
assume the four motives are additively separable, they find that baseline altruism accounts
for 85.8% of mean giving in the games, directed altruism adds 5.2%, reciprocity 6.4%, and
sanctions 2.5%. Ligon and Schechter also gather data on real world transfers are able to cor-
relate preferences as measured in the games with behavior measured in survey data. They
find that while the motives for reciprocity and sanctions may not account for much of the
mean transfers in the games, they are statistically significantly correlated with real world
gift giving.
DellaVigna et al. (2012) explore the motivations to give to door-to-door charity solicitation,
testing the relative importance of altruism and social pressure. They write a model that is
similar in flavor to the one in this paper. Utility is a weighted sum of utility from private
consumption, altruism from gift giving, and social pressure to give. Utility in private con-
sumption is assumed to be locally linear. Altruism is a non-linear function of gifts given.
Social pressure is modeled as the linear di↵erence between actual gift giving and expected
giving. The authors structurally estimate the model using data from a field experiment in
which respondents in Chicago were asked to give money to a local children’s hospital. The
study team randomized the delivery of flyers indicating when the solicitation would occur,
giving respondents the opportunity to adjust their schedules to avoid the social pressure of
an in-person solicitation. Structural estimates suggest that participants experience $3.80
worth of social pressure from an in-person solicitation.
Several sets of authors have also used experimental methods to examine sharing within
families and test features of household bargaining models. Peters et al. (2004) play voluntary
contribution games with families at Cornell and find that people contribute more when
playing with family rather than strangers. Unur et al. (2007) play dictator games with
couples, other relations, and strangers in Ohio, and find that spouses transfer more to each
other than to other family members or to strangers. Cochard et al. (2009) play prisoner’s
dilemma games with couples and strangers in Toulouse, France, finding a cooperation rate
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of 73% within couples and 42.5% between strangers. Chao and Kohler (2007) play triple
dictator games and trust games in Malawi between spouses, family members, neighbors, and
strangers. In the triple dictator games (a game in which the amount kept for self is valued at
parity but the amount given to the partner is tripled), the authors find the average percent
given to a partner is 35% while to spouses the percentage rises to 40%. Men transfer 8.7
percentage points more to their wives than women do to their husbands, but this di↵erence
is not statistically significant. These studies suggest that people have di↵erent preferences
for sharing with their spouse than with strangers. Exploring the role of information, Jakiela
and Ozier (2012) vary the degree of observability in trust games to examine the preference
to hide income from relatives. They find that women strategically hide income when playing
the game in the presence of their relatives instead of strangers. Their sample is not varied
enough to look for the e↵ect of the presence of the husband alone.
Other studies have used games to test the foundations of household bargaining models ex-
plicitly. Iversen et al. (2011) play a novel hybrid of the trust and dictator games with
couples in Southeastern Uganda to examine the assumptions of household decision models.
They find that respondents do not maximize household income and that respondents behave
opportunistically, giving more in public and behaving less e ciently in secret. This suggests
that the Collective model is inappropriate for the sample, and that information problems
may be a contributing factor. Mani (2010) also finds against e ciency in South India us-
ing voluntary contribution games played between couples. However, she does not find that
information matters, with respondents behaving similarly when their decisions are revealed
or kept secret. Mani also suggests that fairness norms are important, because some subjects
made choices that reduced their own income in order to also reduce their spouse’s. In a
study related to Iversen et al. (2011), Kebede et al. (2011) use a very similar set-up with
couples in Ethiopia, again finding against the e ciency assumption central to the Collective
model. Because respondents often contribute exactly half of their endowment, the authors




The sample was drawn from five rural towns in southwestern Kenya’s Nyanza Province.
Maps of the area are shown in Figure 2.1. Two of the towns (Ugunja and Sega) are on the
main paved road that runs through all of Kenya from Mombasa to Uganda. The other three
towns (Ukwala, Sigomere, and Siaya) are on major dirt roads o↵ the main paved road. Three
of the towns (Ugunja, Siaya, and Ukwala) are former district headquarters.1 Subjects were
married (either formally or informally),2 currently living with their spouse, over the age of
18, and available to participate in two interviews a week apart in September or October of
2011. Polygamous families were not eligible to participate.3
To identify the sample, the survey team asked local administrators (village elders) to compile
a list of all couples meeting the eligibility criteria in several villages within walking distance
of the five towns.4 The village elders were asked to record the names of both husband and
wife and a contact phone number if possible. Of the 786 couple records collected by the
village elders, 82 percent included a contact phone number. Couples were then assigned a
random number to determine the order in which they were contacted to be scheduled for
an interview, stratified by town. Couples that listed a phone number were scheduled for
interviews by phone if possible. Couples that did not have a phone number listed, or were
unable to be contacted by phone, were contacted through the village elder. Tracking lists
1A new constitution adopted in late 2010 created administrative units known as “counties” to take the
place of the former “districts.” All towns and districts in this study now fall into Siaya county. However,
at the time of the study old district o ces were still serving many of their old o cial roles, and the towns
remained important centers of commerce and government.
2A couple is considered “married” if they are considered by the village elder to be a long-term romantic
couple. The beginning of the “marriage” is defined as the time the couple moved in together.
3Polygamous families were excluded because the household bargaining structures between three or more
adults are likely to be very di↵erent from the traditional model of a two adult household. In the 1999 Kenyan
census, 12% of men and 20% of women over the age of 18 in the Nyanza Province reported that they were in
polygamous marriages. By contrast, 54% of men and 53% of women over 18 said they were in single-spouse
marriages.
4While a full census by the survey team would have been a preferable method of compiling the eligible
couple list, budget constraints were limiting.
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were distributed to the elders and they were asked to invite the selected couples to arrive
for an interview on the selected day. In total, 53 percent of the 786 couples provided by the
village elders participated in the study. 415 couples were interviewed at baseline, and 406
couples met all of the study criteria (monogamous, living together, both partners over the
age of 18). Of these, 371 men and 368 women had complete data for all variables used in
this study.5
2.4.2 Experimental Design
Couples arrived at the survey site together,6 but completed their individual surveys sepa-
rately. The survey began with a questionnaire about demographics, family finances, material
wealth, expenditures, transfers, savings and loans, and decision making in the household.
The survey was executed in Dhuluo, the most common native language in the study area.7
Table 2.2 shows demographic and financial summary statistics from the baseline survey. An
English version of the survey can be found in the appendix and on my website8 and the
Dhuluo translation is available on request.
The interview continued with a series of dictator games. The games were played one-on-one
with a trained field assistant reading from a script in the respondent’s native language. The
respondent was asked questions to confirm their understanding at every stage. An English
version of the script can be found in the appendix. Each respondent played four dictator
games in total, each over three stakes. In the two spouse games, the respondent was given
tokens (bottle caps) to divide between himself and his spouse. The respondent indicated
his choice by placing the bottle caps in cups labeled “Self” and “Spouse” in Dhuluo. In the
5Some individuals were excluded because one or more of the six spouse game decisions was missing or
recorded incorrectly.
6The study sites were a Town Council Hall, a boarding house for handicapped children, a polytechnic
university, and a small resort.




Secret Spouse game, the respondent was told that his decisions would remain secret from
his spouse and could be revealed only to the project leader. In the Public Spouse game,
the respondent was told that his spouse would be told of his decisions. The other two were
selected from three other possible dictator games. Other games include the Secret Stranger
game (the traditional dictator game in which a subject divides money between himself and
an anonymous stranger), the Spouse Stranger game (in which the subject divides money
between his spouse and an anonymous stranger), and the Stranger Stranger game (in which
the subject divides money between two anonymous strangers). The order of the games was
randomized.9 Each game was played over 5, 10, and 25 tokens. Tokens were worth 20
shillings (about $0.22) if kept and 30 shillings ($0.32) if given away. The value of the token
was increased if given away to allow the easy observation of ine ciency in the household.
To assist respondents in understanding the monetary consequences of their choices, the
respondent was given a sheet showing the value of a number of tokens if given or kept. A
copy of this sheet can be found in Figure 2.2. After the respondent had made his choice,
the field assistant repeated the choice and its monetary consequences to the respondent, and
asked if that was the division he wanted. The respondent was allowed to change his choice
as many times as he liked.
Respondents were informed that all of their choices in the games (12 in total) would be
entered into a computer at the o ce and one would be chosen at random to come true. The
computer would also pick random strangers for the stranger games. It was emphasized that
because respondents could win any game for themselves, and could receive money from their
own, their spouse’s, or a stranger’s game, they could be sure that their choices in the Secret
Spouse game would remain secret. Winnings from the games were distributed one week later
at the end of the follow-up interview.10 Respondents were not informed of which game they
9The spouse games were always played consecutively, with the starting game (secret or public) random-
ized. The order between the spouse games and the other two games selected was also randomized.
10The endline survey contained questions about expenditures, transfers, savings and loans, marital quality,
and the respondent’s responses to the study. An English copy of this survey can be found on my website
and in the appendix. The Dhuluo translation is available on request.
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or their spouse won unless one won a Public Spouse game. If a respondent or their spouse
won a Public Spouse game, both were informed of the token amount, its division, and the
amounts of money taken home by each. Respondents were not informed by the study team
how much their spouse took home from the games in total; however, because respondents
were required to attend with their spouses and likely returned to their home together, it is
likely that respondents discussed their winnings with their spouse. Payouts from the games
ranged from 0 to 1270 shillings. The average payout per respondent was 316 KSH. As a
point of reference, the mean payout was 20% of baseline reported weekly male income, and
49% of weekly female income.
2.5 Model
In any decision in these games, an individual must balance three motives: the monetary
interests of player 1, the monetary interests of player 2, and the individual’s desire for
fairness between the two. Based on the inequity aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), we then model utility as:





where x is the percentage of tokens given to player 2, ↵ is the monetary utility weight
on player 1,   is the monetary utility weight on player 2, and   is the weight on inequity
aversion. The utility function captures the idea that player 1 gains utility from the monetary
outcome of the game (↵(1   x)), as does player 2 ( (x ⇤ 32), where the percentage of tokens
given to player 2 is multiplied by 32 due to the rules of the game). In a game played between
the respondent and a stranger, we call placing weight on the monetary interests of player
2 baseline altruism. In a game between the respondent and his spouse, we call the weight
on player 2 direct altruism. The player may also be averse to monetary consequences that
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are uneven. This is modeled as aversion to inequity ( (25   x)
2,11 where 25 is the percentage
of tokens given that leaves both players with the same monetary reward, and the distance
from this allocation is penalized at in increasing rate). The balance between the monetary
utility incentives and inequity aversion is captured in  .
The first order conditions of this simple model are then





  x) = 0 (2.2)











where ↵ is dropped because ↵ +   is assumed to equal 1. 12
Table 2.1: Base Parameters to Model Parameters
















The model points to two factors that govern giving in any game:  , the relative weight of
the monetary utility of player 2, and  , the relative weight of inequity aversion. In each of
the five games played in this study,   and   are determined by five parameters, shown in
Table 2.1. The weight on monetary self interest is normalized to 1. A is the weight on an
anonymous stranger’s monetary interest relative to the weight on the self, and is akin to
baseline altruism. P is the weight on spouse’s monetary interest. Note that a respondent
may have many reasons why they place di↵erent weight on their spouse’s monetary income
11The di↵erence between the actual allocation and the fair allocation is squared as in Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) to allow for a penalty that increases with deviation.
12It is also possible to model utility over income in the log. I used linear utility for several reasons that
are detailed in Section 2.11. In short, we generally use log utility because we think the marginal utility of
income is decreasing. While the stakes of these games do vary, and the games are played over real money, the
stakes may not be large enough for the curvature in the utility function to be noticeable. This hypothesis is
borne out in the experimental data because people play the games remarkably consistently across the three
stakes. Finally, the predictions from the parameterized log model did not fit the data as closely.
66
than on a stranger’s. Perhaps the respondent enjoys the things his spouse purchases directly,
or gains utility from the utility his spouse or his children gain from his spouse’s purchases.
The respondent may even place more weight on his spouse’s income than on his own. In the
terminology of Ligon and Schechter (2012), the di↵erence between P and A is a measure of
directed altruism to the spouse.
In addition to monetary utility and the relative weights contained in  , the model also
includes  , the weight of inequity aversion relative to monetary utility. Importantly, re-
spondents may assign di↵erent fairness norms to di↵erent games. Konow (2000) shows that
respondents make di↵erent allocations in dictator games between self and stranger than
games in which the respondent makes an allocation between two strangers. Because the
stranger games (Secret Stranger, Spouse Stranger, and Stranger Stranger) are all played
against anonymous strangers who will not know of the respondent’s behavior, decisions in
these games should be governed by the respondent’s internal preference for fairness alone:
 A. A respondent may have di↵erent preferences over games played against his spouse, and
thus governed by a di↵erent preference parameter:  P . Finally, a respondent may behave
di↵erently when their spouse will find out about their choices, because in addition to their
own preferences for fairness, a respondent may want to curry favor, avoid sanction, or signal
to their spouse through their public choice. Decisions in the Public Spouse game are thus
governed by  Public. The di↵erence between  P and  Public is analogous to Leider et al.
(2009)’s value of the prospect of future interactions, or Ligon and Schechter (2012)’s motives
of sanctions and reciprocity.
2.5.1 Numerical Optimization
Numerical methods were used to choose the set of five parameters (P,A, A, P , Public) that
best fit the experimental data from the five games for each respondent: Public Spouse, Secret
Spouse, Secret Stranger, Spouse Stranger, and Stranger Stranger.
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Specifically, the loss function is specified as the sum of squared errors in the first order
conditions for each game over each token amount. For example, the loss in the 5 token







2), where x is the percent of tokens given.








To fit with the spirit of the model, all parameters were constrained to be greater than or
equal to zero. Because each parameter is a ratio of the importance of one factor to another,
all parameters were also constrained to be less than or equal to 5 so that extreme values
were avoided. The inequity aversion weights were also constrained to be greater than 0.1.
Minimization was performed using MATLAB’s fmincon function, using the interior point
algorithm, starting from 1 for each parameter. Results were nearly identical with the sqp
algorithm. The active-set algorithm provided similar, but less well-fitting results.
Figure 2.3 shows scatter plots of actual behavior in the games against model fitted values,
with correlation coe cients shown in the bottom left hand corner. The correlation between
predicted and actual behavior is 0.699 in the Stranger Stranger game, and ranges from 0.848
to 0.881 in the other four games.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Behavior in the Games
Table 2.3 shows basic summary statistics of giving across the five games for men and women
separately, presenting means, standard deviations, and t-statistics of the di↵erence between
genders. Figure 2.4 shows histograms of behavior in the 25 token games by game and
gender.13
First note that there are significant di↵erences in average giving across the genders for
13Behavior in the 5 and 10 token games is very similar to behavior in the 25 token game. See Section 2.11
for details.
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some games. There are no significant di↵erences in giving in the Secret Stranger game (the
standard dictator game) or Stranger Stranger game (in which the respondent divides money
between two strangers), but men give significantly less in the Spouse Stranger game (in
which the respondent divides money between his spouse and a stranger) and significantly
more in the Secret and Public Spouse games (in which the respondent divides money between
himself and his spouse). All further analysis will be split by gender because the raw summary
statistics suggest that the genders are behaving di↵erently.
Next notice two facts in Figure 2.4. First, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in behavior
in the games. Second, many people give exactly 40% in the games, especially in the stranger
games. Giving 40% of tokens is equivalent to an exactly even split of the final pot. This
suggests that for some, inequity aversion is important. While there isn’t as strong of a mass
point on 40% in the spouse games, the distribution is fullest in the middle. This suggests
that for transactions between spouses too, fairness may matter.
Table 2.4 shows game behavior summary statistics in greater detail, in a table similar to
Ligon and Schechter (2012)’s Table 2. Along the diagonal of the table, means and standard
deviations of male giving in each of the games are repeated. Above the diagonal, the table
shows F-statistics and p-values of a test of a di↵erence between mean giving in the row and
column games. For example, male giving in the Public Spouse game is significantly higher
than male giving in the Secret Spouse game, with an F-statistic of 73.11. Table 2.5 shows
the same is true for women, though the di↵erence is smaller. Below the diagonal, the table
provides information about the distributions of the di↵erences between the games. The top
line in each cell shows the number of observations in which the respondent gave less:the
same:more in the row game than in the column game. Men gave less in the Secret Spouse
game than in the Public Spouse game in 446 games, while they gave the same in 578 games,
and in 152 decisions, a man actually gave more in the secret game than in the public game.14
The second row of the cells below the diagonal show the conditional mean di↵erence between
14The table includes choices over all three token amounts o↵ered.
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the Public and Secret Spouse game giving, conditional on giving less:more in the row game
than column game.
These tables and figures illustrate why a non-linear model of behavior is necessary. For
example, both men and women give more than 40% on average in the Public and Secret
Spouse games. This suggests that the weight on the monetary utility of the spouse is greater
than the weight on self on average (i.e. P > 1). However, there is no di↵erence in mean
giving between the Secret Stranger and Spouse Stranger games, suggesting that respondents
value their own and their spouse’s utility equally (i.e. P = 1). To reconcile these two facts,
a non-linear model that incorporates monetary utility and inequity aversion is needed.
The mean di↵erences also hide potentially important heterogeneity. While mean giving is
statistically significantly higher in the Stranger Stranger game than the Secret Stranger game,
suggesting that people value their own monetary utility more highly than that of a stranger
(i.e. A < 1), 33% of male choices and 38% of female choices give the same amount in both
games, suggesting that for these individuals A = 1. Mean giving is statistically significantly
higher in the Public Spouse game than in the Secret Spouse game on average, suggesting
that incentive motives matter (i.e.  P 6=  Public). However, 49% of male choices and 50% of
female choices give the same in both games, indicating that for half of the sample, incentive
motives don’t matter. Examining heterogeneous behaviors may lead to di↵erent conclusions
about the correct model for a particular household. Further, because the parameters are
estimated for each respondent individually, the later sections can explore how potentially
heterogeneous parameters can explain heterogeneity in real world transfers.
2.6.2 Estimated Parameters
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show histograms of the estimated parameters, while Table 2.6 shows
numerical summary statistics.
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2.6.2.1 Basic Parameter Patterns
Hypothesis 1: Relationship Respondents care more about their spouses than they do
about anonymous strangers.
Panels a and b of Figure 2.5 show the distribution of the parameter P , the respondent’s
weight on his spouse’s monetary utility relative to his own. Parity is 1. Panels c and d show
the distribution of A, the respondent’s weight on an anonymous stranger’s monetary utility
relative to his own. Parity is again 1. The final row shows the distribution of the linear dif-
ference between P and A, how much more the respondent cares about his spouse’s monetary
utility than he does about a stranger’s. The di↵erence between P and A is analogous to
directed altruism as discussed in Ligon and Schechter (2012) and Leider et al. (2009). These
figures clearly show that most people care more about their spouse’s utility than a stranger’s,
and many care much more. The first three rows of Table 2.6 show this information numeri-
cally. 77% of men more heavily weight their spouse’s monetary utility than an anonymous
stranger’s, while 74% of women behave this way. The mean di↵erence between P and A is
0.62 for men and 0.29 for women. Both of these mean di↵erences are statistically di↵erent
from zero, and they are significantly di↵erent from each other. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
for equality of distributions across genders is rejected (D=0.20, p=0.0). However, note that
the relative weight of a stranger’s utility to own utility is not statistically di↵erent between
men and women (t-stat of di↵erence between means: -0.48; D-statistic for di↵erence between
distributions: 0.06). While men and women both weight strangers equally on average (and
significantly less than themselves), men on average put a higher weight on their spouse’s
utility than on their own, while women weight their husband’s utility equal to their own on
average. This di↵erence between men and women is statistically significant (t-statistic of
di↵erence between means: -5.82; D-statistic of di↵erence between distributions (0.18). While
49% of men weight their own utility more highly than they do their spouse’s, 63% of women
do.
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For household bargaining models, this means that the assumption that husbands and wives
treat each other more favorably than they do strangers is supported for most people. How-
ever, on average, this di↵erence is stronger for men than it is for women. Moreover, women
on average treat their husband’s utility as equal to their own, while men treat their wives
more favorably.
Hypothesis 2: Contracting Respondents do not care about transaction level fairness, and
instead maximize monetary utility.
To test this hypothesis we examine the parameter  P , the relative weight of inequity aversion
to monetary utility in the Secret Spouse game. If respondents cared only about monetary
utility, and had no inequity aversion at the transaction level, the parameter  P would very
close to zero. If a respondent places equal weight on monetary utility and fairness,  P would
be 1. If a respondent cares more about fairness than monetary utility in the games,  P
would be larger than 1. Panels c and d of Figure 2.6 show histograms of  P by gender
while Table 2.6 shows summary statistics for the estimated parameters. On average, both
men and women place a substantially higher weight on fairness than on monetary utility.
Specifically, the mean weight on inequity aversion relative to monetary utility is 2.42 for
both men and women, with t-statistics of a di↵erence between mean and parity of 16.34 and
15.95 respectively. 73% of men weight inequity aversion more highly than monetary utility,
while 71% of women do. There is no statistical di↵erence between the genders on average
(t-statistic -0.03) or in distribution (D-statistic: 0.05).
This is strong evidence that for the majority of the sample, people care more about inequity at
the transaction level than they do about maximizing the size of the pie. That is, respondents
seem to be acting as if they do not believe that they will be able to redistribute game winnings
between themselves later to achieve a fair allocation over time. Instead, they are insisting
on a certain allocation in each transaction. For household bargaining models, this suggests
that limited contracting is a problem for most couples.
72
Interestingly, there is no di↵erence in the mean weight on inequity aversion between the
Secret Stranger game and the Secret Spouse game. That is, on average, people care similarly
about fairness in games against their spouse as they do in game against a stranger. In fact,
43% of men and 40% of women care more about fairness in games played against their
spouse than they do in games played against strangers. This is further evidence that for
some people, limited contracting in the form of a transaction-level sharing rule is important.
Hypothesis 3: Information Respondents act as if their is perfect information in their
household, and behave similarly when their decisions will and will not be revealed to their
spouse.
To test this hypothesis we examine the di↵erence between  P , the relative weight of inequity
aversion to monetary utility in the Secret Spouse game, and  Public, the relative weight
of inequity aversion to monetary utility in the Public Spouse game. This is analogous
to measuring incentive motives (sanctions and reciprocity in Ligon and Schecheter (2012)
and prospect of future interactions in Leider et al. (2009)). Panels g and h of Figure 2.6
show histograms of this di↵erence for men and women, while the last row of Table 2.6
shows the information numerically. The mean di↵erence between  P and  Public positive and
statistically di↵erent from zero for both men and women.
However, the interesting test is not whether the average is di↵erent from zero, but rather how
many are di↵erent from zero. A deviation on either side of zero is suggestive of information
problems in the household, because both positive and negative deviations suggest that the
respondent behaves di↵erently when their spouse will not find out what they did. 34% of
men behave as if they have perfect information in their household, while 28% of women do.
39% of men weight inequity more heavily in the secret game than they do in the public game,
and 37% of women do. 22% of men weight inequity more heavily in the public game than
they do in the secret game, while 29% of women do. This suggests that for most people,
information problems are also important.
73
There is also an interesting correlation between symptoms of information problems (i.e. that
 P 6=  Public) and the weight on spouse’s monetary utility (P ). Figure 2.7 shows a scatter
plot of the linear di↵erence between  P and  Public by P . While the mean monetary utility
weight on the spouse is 1.92 for men with  P =  Public, it is 1.17 for men with  P >  Public
and 1.07 for men with  P <  Public.15 For women, the mean P for those with  P =  Public is
1.28, while it is 0.98 for those with  P >  Public, and 0.91 for those with  P <  Public.16 This
suggests that people who demonstrate information problems in their home also demonstrate
less interest in the monetary utility of their spouses.
2.6.2.2 Correlation with Demographics
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the demographic correlates of the estimated parameters for men and
women respectively. Each parameter is scaled by 100 for easy reading of the coe cients.
First, we examine the demographic correlates of P , the relative weight of spouse’s mone-
tary utility to own monetary utility. For men, age is positively and marginally statistically
significantly related to P until age 55, after which point P declines with age. The other
demographic correlates are not significantly correlated with P .
Increasing education is negatively correlated with A, the relative weight of a stranger’s
monetary utility to one’s own. Wife’s education is significantly negatively correlated with
altruism. This is interesting given that previous work has found that people are more
generous toward strangers in the dictator game when they are more highly educated (Jakiela
et al. (2012)). However, note that education and wife’s education are positively correlated
with  A, the weight of inequity aversion in the stranger games. The correlation is not
significant, but does suggest that additional education does not make one feel more altruistic




(t-statistics 6.95 and 7.15),
while the mean P is not statistically di↵erent between those with positive or negative deviations (t-statistic
0.82).





3.97) while the mean P is not di↵erent between those with positive or negative deviations (t-statistic 0.82).
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towards strangers, but rather increases the desire to treat them “fairly.”
Whether the respondent is working is positively correlated with A, and with the inequity
aversion parameters  A and significantly positively associated with  P . That is, working men
are more altruistic to strangers, and also care more about fairness with both strangers and
their spouses. Working men are however more likely to demonstrate information problems
in their household (i.e. it is less likely that  P =  Public), but not significantly so.
Women’s demographics are not strong predictors of their estimated parameters. The only
variable that is statistically significantly associated with female parameters is her number of
children. Women with more children have lower estimates of P and A, the relative weight of
spouse’s and stranger’s monetary utility to own. A woman’s husband’s education is positively
associated with information problems, but only marginally significantly so.
While the correlations are not statistically significant, women also display the same patterns
between education and stranger giving that men do. Women’s education and her husband’s
education are negatively correlated with A, the weight on a stranger’s monetary utility, but
positively correlated with  A, her weight on inequity aversion in the stranger games.
2.6.2.3 Analysis of Variance in Game Giving
To begin to answer the question of which motive explains most of ine ciency between
spouses, I examine which parameter explains most of the variance in giving in the games.
Specifically, we can think of giving in the Secret Spouse game as the best game measure
of e ciency between spouses. Because household income is maximized when a respondent
gives everything to their spouse in the Secret Spouse game, the e cient choice is to transfer
everything. Thus, explaining the variance in giving is analogous to explaining the variance
in e ciency.
Table 2.9 shows OLS regressions of the percentage of tokens given on demographic charac-
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teristics, token amount fixed e↵ects, and the estimated parameters for men. The order of
addition of the parameters was chosen to maximize the R2 in each round. P , the monetary
weight on spouse’s utility, explains far more of the variance than the other parameters, in-
creasing the R2 from 0.02 with just demographics and fixed e↵ects to 0.40. P is strongly
positively related to e ciency.  P enters next, increasing the R2 an additional 0.05. In-
creased weight on inequity aversion is negatively related with e ciency. Next, indicators for
a di↵erence between  P and  Public are entered (i.e. indicators of information problems),
both alone and interacted with an indicator for P > 1. These variables also add 0.05 to
the R2.17 Finally, an interaction term between  P and I(P > 1) was added, but without
increasing the R2.
In sum, for men, the weight put on his spouse’s monetary utility explains more of the variance
(38%) than do other motives. Inequity aversion and information problems each explain an
additional 5% of the variance.
Table 2.10 shows a similar procedure for women. For women also, P explains more of
the variance in giving in the Secret Spouse game than do other parameters, increasing the
R
2 from 0.01 to 0.34 over a model with demographic correlates and token amount fixed
e↵ects. For women, the information problem indicators were best added next, explaining an
additional 4% of the variance in e ciency. Finally,  P and its interaction with I(P > 1)
were added, explaining an additional 3% of the variance in giving.
This analysis of variance has interesting conclusions for household bargaining models. While
much of the literature has focused on non-cooperative models that include limited contracting
or imperfect information, neither of these factors explains much of the variance in e ciency in
the laboratory games. For women, information problems explain a bit more of the variance
than does inequity aversion, but both pale in comparison to the contribution of P , the
woman’s weight on her husband’s monetary utility. For men, information problems and
17Regressions were also run adding these sets of variables separately, with and without the interaction
with I(P > 1), and they were best added together.
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limited contracting explain the same fraction of variance in e ciency in the Secret Spouse
game, but again P explains far more.
2.6.2.4 Correlations with Real World Transfers
While the estimated parameters are interesting in and of themselves, and are further infor-
mative in the extent to which they explain e ciency in the laboratory games, the parameters
are most interesting in their relationship to real world transfers. In addition to the labora-
tory games each respondent played, they were also asked for information in a detailed survey.
Respondents were asked to report money that came into their hands and left their pockets
for each of the previous seven days. The survey included only the previous seven days and
no more to reduce recall error. Respondents could report up to two flows in and two out
for each day. For each transfer, respondents were asked who the money came from or went
to and why. With these data, I am able to construct measures of transfers between spouses
(for any reason) and transfers with other members of the community in the form of gifts and
loans.
Table 2.11 shows four specifications of the relationship between estimated parameters and
transfers from men to their wives over the previous week. We focus on transfers to the
spouse because transfers from women to men are more rare.18 All regressions include con-
trols for demographics (age, education, spouse’s education, number of children, and whether
the respondent is working) and total household non-education expenditures per household
member over the previous week.19
18In Table 2.2 we see that 47% of men made a transfer to their wife over the previous week while only 5%
received a transfer.
19In addition to transfers, respondents were asked to report their and their spouse’s expenditures over
the previous week. In individual regressions, I use the respondent’s report of total household expenditures.
Following the recommendations of Beegle et al. (2012), I used a 7-day recall subset list of items, including
28 food items and 21 non-food items. I started with the list of items included in their survey, and modified
for the local context. The MCDM surveys can be found on my website (umich.edu/⇠jesshoel) and in the
appendix. Education expenditures were excluded because they are very lumpy. 73% of respondents report
no educational expenditures over the previous week, while 5% of respondents report 2000 KSH or more spent
on education over the previous week. Average non-education expenditures over the previous week are only
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The first specification includes only P , the relative weight on spouse’s monetary utility,
and  P , the relative weight on inequity aversion in the Secret Spouse game. P is highly
significantly positively related to spouse transfers in this specification.  P is positively but
not significantly related to spouse transfers. The second column adds indicator variables
for whether  Public is larger or smaller than  P . Recall that any di↵erence between these
two parameters is indicative of information problems in the household.  P =  Public is the
omitted category. Neither indicator is statistically significantly related to spouse transfers,
but both are negatively related to spouse transfers, especially when the weight on inequity
aversion is larger in public than secret. The coe cient on P remains large and significant.
The third specification adds A, the relative weight of stranger’s monetary utility, and  A, the
weight of inequity aversion in the stranger games. We might think that transfers between
spouses and transfers in the external community could be either complements or substitutes,
thus these additional parameters may a↵ect transfers between spouses. Though neither is
significantly related to transfers from men to their wives, A is negatively correlated with
giving while  A is positively related. The coe cient on P remains large and highly significant
in this specification.
The final column adds interaction terms between the estimated parameters. We may expect
that  P , spousal inequity aversion, has a di↵erent e↵ect if the respondent values his spouse’s
monetary utility greater than his own (i.e. if P > 1). For example, if a respondent values
his spouse’s monetary utility less than his own (P < 1), he could tend to give more as his
preference for fairness increases. If he valued his spouse’s utility more than his own, he could
tend to give less as his preference for fairness increased. However, for male transfers with
male parameters, neither coe cient is statistically significant.
Taken together, these results suggest that P , the weight on spouse’s monetary utility, is the
2079 KSH. To avoid outliers due to lumpy education expenditures, education is excluded from the analysis.
The number of people in the household is defined as the number of people who ate from the cooking pot last
night.
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most predictive of transfers from men to women over the previous week. This is consistent
with the finding that P explained most of the variance in e ciency in the laboratory games.
Table 2.12 shows identical regressions for women’s reports of transfers from their husbands.
As with the male reports, P is associated with higher transfers between spouses, though
the relationship is weaker by female reports with female parameters. As in the male table,
 P is positively but not significantly correlated with higher transfers in all but the final
specification.
In the fourth column, we see that greater female inequity aversion in the spouse games is
significantly associated with higher transfers to women from their husbands, but only for
women with P < 1. For women with P > 1, or those who value their husband’s monetary
utility greater than their own, greater inequity aversion is not significantly related transfers
over the previous week. This is exactly the pattern we would expect: respondents who
value their spouse’s monetary utility less than their own and have low inequity aversion will
make fewer transfers; those with low value of spouse’s monetary utility but higher inequity
aversion will transfer more, until the spouse and self are even; those who value their spouse’s
monetary utility highly make high transfers regardless of their inequity aversion.
Deviations between  P and  Public are again negatively associated with giving, but not
significantly so in most specifications. In the final specification, we see that when women
care more about inequity in secret than public ( P >  Public) and they care less about
their spouse’s monetary utility than their own (P < 1), there are fewer or smaller transfers
between spouses.
In the female table, we start to see that there may be some complementarities between
spousal giving and community giving. A, the relative weight of stranger’s monetary utility,
is negatively associated with transfers to women from their husbands with a t-statistic of
-1.65.  A, the relative weight of inequity aversion in the stranger games, is also negatively
associated with spousal transfers, with a t-statistic of -1.84.
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Next we examine the relationship between the estimated parameters and transfers to other
people in the community. We should expect these relationships to be weaker because people
make transfers to others in the community far less often than they make transfers to their
spouses. While 47% of men transferred money to their wives over the previous week, only
8% received gifts from others, 10% gave gifts, 1% borrowed money, and 3% lent money. For
women, 40% received money from their husbands over the previous week, while 8% received
gifts, 12% gave gifts, 1% borrowed money, and 2% lent money. For this reason, we examine
logistic regression models of whether such a transfer occurred in the previous week, reporting
odds ratios for changes in the parameters.
Table 2.13 shows odds ratios from logistic regressions for men.20 To compare with the OLS
results reported earlier and logit results for other transfers, the first column shows results
for transfers from men to their wives. Note that some coe cients were dropped because
they perfectly determine success or failure. In smaller samples in which the mean outcome
variable is close to 0 or 1, this is to be expected.
While A, the relative weight of the monetary utility of strangers, is not statistically significant
for any transfer, men who have higher values of  A, the relative weight of inequity aversion
in the stranger games, are more likely to have received or given a gift in the past week. This
indicates that people who care about “fairness” are more likely to engage in gift exchange.
The relationship between  A and the likelihood of transfers is not di↵erent if A is greater than
1, further suggesting that “fairness” is the driving motive for transfers in the community.
P , the relative weight of the monetary utility of one’s spouse, is significantly positively asso-
ciated with receiving gifts, and is less strongly but still positively associated with borrowing
and lending money. While we wouldn’t necessarily expect that the spouse parameters would
be related to transfers with the larger community, it is not altogether surprising that there
may be interactions. Men who care more about their wives’ monetary utility are also more
20Table 2.15 shows OLS regressions of the amount of transfer on parameters.
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likely to engage with the financial community. If that engagement allows him to make larger
or more frequent transfers to his wife, then this pattern makes sense.
 P , the weight of inequity aversion in the Secret Spouse game, is significantly negatively
related to gifts received. It is significantly negatively related to gifts given for those with
P < 1 (those who value their own monetary utility more highly than their wife’s), but has an
indistinguishable e↵ect for those who value their spouse more highly (interacted odds-ratio:
1.06). This suggests that those who feel more strongly about “fairness” with their wives
engage in fewer transfers in their larger community.
Men who value inequity aversion more in secret than public are more likely to have received
a gift in the past week, but only if P < 1 (interacted odds-ratio: 1.65, p-value of test for
di↵erence from 1=0.55). That is, men who do not value their wives monetary utility as
highly as their own and display information problems in their house are more likely to have
received a gift from the wider community over the previous week.
Table 2.14 shows identical logistic regressions for women.21 Again, the table displays odds ra-
tios. Interestingly, the estimated parameters are highly significantly correlated with receiving
transfers from the spouse,22 but not with engaging in transfers with the larger community.
2.7 Conclusion
Using variations of the dictator game played between married couples in Siaya County,
Kenya, I measure the relative value of spouse’s and stranger’s monetary utility, the relative
value of transaction-level inequity aversion (a form of limited contracting) to monetary utility,
and whether inequity matters di↵erently in secret or when a respondent’s decisions will
be revealed to their spouse (a symptom of information problems). I write a model that
21Table 2.16 shows OLS regressions of the amount of transfer on parameters.
22The patterns seen in the logit regressions of the existence of spousal transfers are identical to the patterns
seen in the OLS regressions on the amount of spousal transfers.
81
incorporates monetary utility, inequity aversion, and the potential for inequity to matter
di↵erently in secret and public, and use numerical optimization techniques to estimate the
parameters of the model for each individual.
As in previous studies, I find evidence that both limited contracting and information prob-
lems are present in this sample. The value of inequity aversion is 2.42 times the value of
monetary utility in a secret dictator game played against the spouse. People play secret and
public spouse games di↵erently, with only 34% of men and 28% of women acting as if there
is perfect information in their households. However, that these problems exist is not news.
To explore the relative importance of each, I use a decomposition of variance to show that
inequity aversion and information problems account for about the same fraction of variance
in e ciency in the secret dictator game, together they account for a far smaller fraction of
variance than does the variation in the value of spouse’s monetary utility. That is, while
limited contracting and information problems are present in this sample, they do not matter
nearly as much as how much a person cares about his spouse’s income.
I correlate the estimated parameters with real world transfers between spouses over the
previous week, and again find that the value of spouse’s monetary utility is much more
highly correlated with transfers than are measures of limited contracting or information
problems.
For household bargaining models, this suggests that rather than focus on limited contracting
or information problems, theorists should explore why some people care more about their
spouse’s income than others.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Maps of Study Site











































Figure 2.2: Token Value Sheet
KEEP Tokens GIVE
0 ksh 0 0 ksh
20 ksh 1 30 ksh
40 ksh 2 60 ksh
60 ksh 3 90 ksh
80 ksh 4 120 ksh
100 ksh 5 150 ksh
120 ksh 6 180 ksh
140 ksh 7 210 ksh
160 ksh 8 240 ksh
180 ksh 9 270 ksh
200 ksh 10 300 ksh
220 ksh 11 330 ksh
240 ksh 12 360 ksh
260 ksh 13 390 ksh
280 ksh 14 420 ksh
300 ksh 15 450 ksh
320 ksh 16 480 ksh
340 ksh 17 510 ksh
360 ksh 18 540 ksh
380 ksh 19 570 ksh
400 ksh 20 600 ksh
420 ksh 21 630 ksh
440 ksh 22 660 ksh
460 ksh 23 690 ksh
480 ksh 24 720 ksh
500 ksh 25 750 ksh
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Figure 2.4: Histograms of Giving by Game and Gender, 25 token games
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Demographic and Financial Characteristics
Variable Men Women t-stat
Age 45.82 36.37 -8.55
(16.13) (13.8)
Education 8.01 6.50 -5.73
(3.63) (3.54)
Number of Children 3.78 3.76 -0.13
(2.56) (2.34)
Working? 0.54 0.34 -5.64
(0.5) (0.47)
Expenditures per capita 516.1 417.2 -2.02
(787.3) (517.1)
To Spouse 221.1 15.64 -9.11
(409.7) (139.9)
I(To Spouse>0) 0.47 0.05 -14.66
(0.5) (0.22)
From Spouse 31.70 151.8 4.76
(372.8) (310)
I(From Spouse>0) 0.05 0.40 12.4
(0.23) (0.49)
Gifts Received 24.03 11.83 -1.53
(141.9) (55.81)
I(Gifts Received>0) 0.08 0.08 0.03
(0.26) (0.27)
Gifts Given 18.53 12.3 -1.15
(83.94) (61.69)
I(Gifts Given>0) 0.10 0.12 0.87
(0.3) (0.32)
Borrowed 180.00 0.65 -1.24
(2778) (10.52)
I(Borrowed>0) 0.01 0.01 -0.37
(0.1) (0.09)
Lent 27.12 3.18 -1.62
(282.4) (29.52)
I(Lent>0) 0.03 0.02 -0.89
(0.18) (0.15)
N 371 368
Notes: Table shows summary statistics of demographic and financial characteristics for men and women. The first row shows
means and a t-statistic of the di↵erence between means by gender. The second line shows standard deviations. “Working”
is an indicator that the respondent reported positive earnings from work over the previous week. “Expenditures” is total
household non-education expenditures per household member over the previous week as reported by the respondent in
Kenyan Shillings. Household members are those who ate from the cooking pot last night. Transfers are over the previous
week in Kenyan Shillings. Gifts and lending do not include transfers between spouses.
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Table 2.3: Mean Giving by Game and Gender
Men Women t-stat
Secret Stranger 34.26 35.72 1.58
(17.09) (17.53)
Spouse Stranger 32.73 35.04 2.50
(17.03) (18.47)
Stranger Stranger 45.07 45.72 0.98
(12.51) (13.20)
Secret Spouse 46.49 42.08 -5.18
(21.16) (18.92)
Public Spouse 55.93 48.82 -9.57
(18.31) (16.65)
Notes: Tables show mean percentage of tokens given by game and
gender, along with standard deviations in parentheses. The third
column shows t-statistics of a test for mean di↵erences between
genders.












55.87 73.11 310.6 327.12 121.36
(18.26) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Secret Spouse
446:578:152 46.67 104.55 115.17 2.02
-
31.67:21.79
(20.92) (0) (0) (0.16)
Secret Stranger


























Notes: The cells on the diagonal show the mean and standard deviation of the percentage of tokens given in each
game. These means and standard deviations include all token amounts over which the respondent played. The cells
above the diagonal show F-tests and p-values for a test that the mean percentages given in the row and column games
are the same (errors clustered on ID). The first row of the cells below the diagonal show the number of observations in
which the respondent gave less (the same, more) in the row game than in the column game (respectively) for a token
amount. The second row of the cells below the diagonal show the mean di↵erence conditional on being less (more).
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-
28.10:19.39
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Notes: The cells on the diagonal show the mean and standard deviation of the percentage of tokens given in each
game. These means and standard deviations include all token amounts over which the respondent played. The cells
above the diagonal show F-tests and p-values for a test that the mean percentages given in the row and column games
are the same (errors clustered on ID). The first row of the cells below the diagonal show the number of observations in
which the respondent gave less (the same, more) in the row game than in the column game (respectively) for a token
amount. The second row of the cells below the diagonal show the mean di↵erence conditional on being less (more).
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Table 2.6: Summary Statistics: Estimated Parameters
Estimated Parameter Men Women t-stat




P 1.41 1.05 -5.82
Monetary Utility of Spouse relative
to Self. Parity is 1.
(0.96) (0.71)
49.49 : 2.04 : 43.11 63.01 : 2.04 : 28.83
8.29 1.36
A 0.8 0.76 -0.48
Monetary Utility of Stranger relative
to Self. Parity is 1.
(1.05) (0.99)
73.21 : 1.02 : 20.41 74.49 : 1.79 : 17.6
-3.76 -4.64
P-A 0.62 0.29 -3.78
Relative weight of Spouse minus
Stranger. Parity is 0.
(1.27) (1.07)
15.31 : 2.04 : 77.3 18.11 : 1.53 : 74.23
9.36 5.22
 A 2.44 2.41 -0.25
Relative weight of Inequity Aversion,
Stranger Games. Parity is 1.
(1.56) (1.64)
20.15 : 0 : 74.49 24.23 : 0 : 69.64
17.78 16.5
 P 2.42 2.42 -0.03
Relative weight of Inequity Aversion,
Secret Spouse Game. Parity is 1.
(1.68) (1.71)
21.43 : 0 : 73.21 22.7 : 0 : 71.17
16.34 15.95
 Public 1.87 1.94 0.59
Relative weight of Inequity Aversion,
Public Spouse Game. Parity is 1.
(1.57) (1.61)
32.65 : 0 : 61.99 32.4 : 0 : 61.48
10.72 11.24
 A    P 0.01 -0.01 -0.16
Inequity Aversion, Stranger v.
Secret Spouse. Parity is 0.
(2.19) (2.27)
43.11 : 0.26 : 51.28 40.05 : 0.77 : 53.06
0.1 -0.12
 P    Public 0.55 0.48 -0.34
Inequity Aversion, Secret v. Public
Spouse. Parity is 0.
(2.87) (2.87)
22.19 : 33.67 : 38.78 28.83 : 27.81 : 37.24
3.71 3.21
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 
A
: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 
P
: Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 
Public
: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: Table shows summary statistics of estimated parameters and di↵erences between estimated
parameters for men and women. The first row shows means and a t-statistic of the di↵erence between
means by gender. The second line shows standard deviations. The third line shows the percentage
of the sample with parameters less than : equal to : or greater than parity, where parity is either
0 or 1 for each variable. The fourth line shows a t-statistic of the di↵erence between the mean and
parity.
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Table 2.7: Demographic Correlates: Men
OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit, OR
P*100 A*100  A ⇤ 100  P ⇤ 100 I( P =  Public)
Age 4.002* 0.651 -0.344 -2.077 1.015
(2.088) (2.255) (3.364) (3.655) (0.0469)
Age Squared -0.0364* -0.0103 0.00487 0.0201 1.000
(0.0210) (0.0227) (0.0338) (0.0367) (0.000460)
Education 2.329 -2.608 3.865 0.0978 0.952
(1.744) (1.883) (2.809) (3.053) (0.0364)
Number of Chil-
dren
-1.708 2.017 -5.636 3.158 0.989
(2.177) (2.351) (3.506) (3.810) (0.0484)
Spouse Education -1.796 -3.830* 2.276 2.556 1.042
(1.852) (2.000) (2.983) (3.242) (0.0426)
Working? -2.959 22.61* 23.98 42.91** 0.804
(11.01) (11.89) (17.73) (19.27) (0.195)
Constant 44.86 99.93** 210.5*** 237.7*** 0.361
(46.95) (50.70) (75.62) (82.18) (0.379)
Observations 371 371 371 371 371
R-squared 0.020 0.038 0.035 0.023
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 A: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 P : Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 Public: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first four columns of the table
shows OLS regressions of estimated parameters (scaled by 100 for easy
reading) on demographic characteristics. The final column shows odds-







Table 2.8: Demographic Correlates: Women
OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit, OR
P*100 A*100  A ⇤ 100  P ⇤ 100 I( P =  Public)
Age 1.100 3.660 -2.239 0.732 1.088
(1.603) (2.231) (3.697) (3.863) (0.0559)
Age Squared -0.0132 -0.0415 0.0368 0.00734 0.999
(0.0186) (0.0259) (0.0429) (0.0448) (0.000598)
Education 1.127 -1.604 3.551 4.687 1.033
(1.397) (1.945) (3.222) (3.367) (0.0448)
Number of Chil-
dren
-3.750** -6.232** 6.011 -6.011 0.995
(1.826) (2.541) (4.211) (4.401) (0.0563)
Spouse Education -1.921 -1.207 0.390 -3.042 0.936*
(1.255) (1.746) (2.894) (3.024) (0.0362)
Working? -7.417 -4.503 -2.318 10.86 0.761
(7.944) (11.06) (18.32) (19.14) (0.191)
Constant 109.8*** 50.70 218.5*** 217.3*** 0.112**
(30.62) (42.61) (70.61) (73.78) (0.110)
Observations 368 368 368 368 368
R-squared 0.021 0.024 0.015 0.014
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 A: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 P : Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 Public: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first four columns of the table
shows OLS regressions of estimated parameters (scaled by 100 for easy
reading) on demographic characteristics. The final column shows odds-







Table 2.9: Relationship between E ciency in Games and Parameters: Men
0 1 2 3 4
P 13.70*** 12.88*** 9.707*** 9.867***
(0.522) (0.508) (0.622) (0.708)
 P -2.869*** -5.784*** -5.619***
(0.290) (0.497) (0.607)
I(P > 1) ⇤  P -0.346
(0.732)
I( P <  Public) -18.16*** -18.12***
(1.838) (1.841)
I( P >  Public) 1.872 1.217
(1.783) (2.259)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P <  Public) 20.95*** 21.08***
(2.361) (2.379)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P >  Public) -0.524 0.546
(1.768) (2.872)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Token Amount Fixed Ef-
fects
yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 35.05*** 28.18*** 35.51*** 47.59*** 47.49***
(6.116) (4.809) (4.670) (4.642) (4.648)
Observations 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113
R-squared 0.021 0.397 0.446 0.497 0.497
Added R-squared 0.376 0.049 0.051 0.000
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table shows OLS regressions of the percentage of tokens
given in the Secret Spouse game (a measure of e ciency) on demographic correlates, token amount
fixed e↵ects, and the estimated parameters. Demographic correlates include age, education, spouse’s
education, number of children, whether the respondent is working, and total non-education household
expenditures per household member. Parameters were added in the order that maximized R2 at
each stage.
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Table 2.10: Relationship between E ciency in Games and Parameters: Women
0 1 2 3




I(P > 1) ⇤  P -2.122***
(0.715)
I( P <  Public) -7.443*** -12.70***
(1.376) (1.524)
I( P >  Public) -6.290*** -2.060
(1.264) (1.708)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P <  Public) 12.94*** 19.28***
(1.982) (2.134)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P >  Public) -1.097 3.934
(1.844) (2.859)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes
Token Amount Fixed Ef-
fects
yes yes yes yes
Constant 40.17*** 23.28*** 30.24*** 34.60***
(4.767) (3.970) (4.044) (4.019)
Observations 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104
R-squared 0.013 0.339 0.382 0.413
Added R-squared 0.326 0.043 0.031
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table shows OLS regressions of the percentage of tokens
given in the Secret Spouse game (a measure of e ciency) on demographic correlates, token amount
fixed e↵ects, and the estimated parameters. Demographic correlates include age, education, spouse’s
education, number of children, whether the respondent is working, and total non-education household
expenditures per household member. Parameters were added in the order that maximized R2 at
each stage.
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Table 2.11: OLS - Real World Spouse Transfers: Men





I(A > 1) ⇤  A -24.97
(24.96)
P 69.40*** 55.21** 63.05*** 44.98
(21.16) (23.15) (23.68) (32.32)
 P 15.99 4.064 4.850 -12.49
(12.08) (18.56) (18.82) (27.71)
I(P > 1) ⇤  P 31.84
(33.41)
I( P >  Public) -17.09 -14.48 43.29
(59.55) (60.37) (101.2)
I( P <  Public) -98.46 -90.97 -115.2
(62.11) (62.19) (81.27)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P >  Public) -90.94
(126.7)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P <  Public) 25.64
(106.0)
Constant -67.00 8.548 13.38 10.78
(192.6) (198.3) (199.6) (202.6)
Observations 371 371 371 371
R-squared 0.157 0.163 0.170 0.174
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 A: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 P : Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 Public: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: Table shows OLS regression of transfers over the past week on estimated parameters. De-
pendent variable is transfers to spouse over the previous week in Kenyan Shillings. Regressions
also include controls for demographic characteristics (age, age squared, education, spouse’s educa-
tion, number of children, and whether the respondent is working) and total household per capita
non-educational expenditures over the previous week as reported by the respondent.
101













I(A > 1) ⇤  A 28.09
(20.67)
P 41.73* 37.37* 40.33* 56.41*
(21.89) (22.46) (23.32) (30.28)
 P 9.761 19.32 19.04 39.65**
(9.084) (14.59) (14.72) (17.56)
I(P > 1) ⇤  P -44.69*
(25.81)
I( P >  Public) -63.96 -65.98 -146.8**
(47.78) (48.14) (61.24)
I( P <  Public) -23.43 -27.33 -12.94
(44.63) (44.68) (53.31)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P >  Public) 196.0*
(101.6)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P <  Public) -4.684
(75.54)
Constant 218.0* 248.6* 280.9** 274.7*
(131.0) (137.0) (139.3) (139.9)
Observations 368 368 368 368
R-squared 0.118 0.122 0.129 0.144
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 A: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 P : Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 Public: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: Table shows OLS regression of transfers over the past week on estimated parameters. De-
pendent variable is transfers from spouse over the previous week in Kenyan Shillings. Regressions
also include controls for demographic characteristics (age, age squared, education, spouse’s educa-
tion, number of children, and whether the respondent is working) and total household per capita
non-educational expenditures over the previous week as reported by the respondent.
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A 1.043 0.878 0.919 0.912 1.845
(0.172) (0.405) (0.292) (2.380) (0.709)
 A 1.123 1.399** 1.347** 0.876 1.094
(0.0976) (0.213) (0.189) (0.374) (0.247)
I(A > 1) ⇤  A 0.807 0.696 0.907 0.653
(0.112) (0.238) (0.208) (0.280)
P 1.172 2.436** 0.538* 2.809 3.439*
(0.213) (0.941) (0.175) (2.597) (2.480)
 P 0.980 0.615* 0.613** 0.173 2.302
(0.151) (0.163) (0.149) (0.349) (1.318)
I(P > 1) ⇤  P 1.031 0.711 1.723* 0.896 0.223*
(0.194) (0.363) (0.539) (1.718) (0.188)
I( P >  Public) 0.916 9.320** 3.569 0.125
(0.519) (9.886) (3.148) (0.218)
I( P <  Public) 0.403* 0.766 0.392 12.58
(0.189) (0.723) (0.296) (20.98)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P >  Public) 0.820 0.177 0.261 36.17
(0.581) (0.235) (0.300) (87.75)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P <  Public) 1.819 4.794*
(1.105) (4.488)
Constant 1.616 0.000209*** 1.043 0 6.90e-07**
(1.871) (0.000573) (1.831) (1.01e-09) (4.64e-06)
Observations 371 344 371 97 344
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 A: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 P : Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 Public: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table shows odd-ratios from logit regression of an indicator
for a transfer over the previous week on the estimated parameters. Dependent variables are indicators
for transfers to spouse, gifts received, gifts given, money borrowed and money lent. Except for the
first, dependent variables do not include transfers between spouses. Regressions also include controls
for demographic characteristics (age, age squared, education, spouse’s education, number of children,
and whether the respondent is working) and total household per capita non-educational expenditures
over the previous week as reported by the respondent.
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A 0.662** 0.919 1.070 29,676 0.415
(0.120) (0.330) (0.249) (237,762) (0.364)
 A 0.804*** 0.963 0.907 4.381 0.994
(0.0668) (0.144) (0.115) (5.160) (0.283)
I(A > 1) ⇤  A 1.407** 0.927 1.146 1.815
(0.221) (0.295) (0.236) (0.695)
P 1.587** 0.940 0.699 1.22e-07 1.894
(0.359) (0.412) (0.249) (1.31e-06) (1.601)
 P 1.501*** 1.006 1.083 0.176 0.881
(0.210) (0.261) (0.251) (0.297) (0.399)
I(P > 1) ⇤  P 0.656** 1.706 1.523 4.248 0.652
(0.129) (0.576) (0.429) (11.58) (0.577)
I( P >  Public) 0.296** 1.351 0.436 240.8 0.590
(0.144) (1.323) (0.374) (1,361) (0.872)
I( P <  Public) 1.044 3.570 2.567 0.417
(0.420) (2.801) (1.510) (0.503)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P >  Public) 4.520* 0.0701 1.051 66.51
(3.498) (0.117) (1.291) (575.4)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P <  Public) 0.970 0.384 0.609
(0.536) (0.351) (0.448)
Constant 1.319 1.632 0.0643* 0 0.0642
(1.499) (2.956) (0.104) (0) (0.200)
Observations 368 368 368 206 299
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 A: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 P : Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 Public: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table shows odd-ratios from logit regression of an indicator
for a transfer over the previous week on the estimated parameters. Dependent variables are indicators
for transfers from spouse, gifts received, gifts given, money borrowed and money lent. Except for
the first, dependent variables do not include transfers between spouses. Regressions also include
controls for demographic characteristics (age, age squared, education, spouse’s education, number
of children, and whether the respondent is working) and total household per capita non-educational
expenditures over the previous week as reported by the respondent.
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Table 2.15: OLS - Real World Community Transfers: Men
Gifts
Received
Gifts Given Borrowed Lent
A -3.774 0.159 -48.70 0.717
(11.08) (6.488) (218.2) (21.96)
 A 8.509 4.985 -149.2 -5.487
(5.700) (3.339) (112.3) (11.30)
I(A > 1) ⇤  A -6.781 -2.389 -31.60 0.198
(9.231) (5.408) (181.9) (18.31)
P -4.748 -8.833 540.9** 20.61
(11.95) (7.003) (235.6) (23.71)
 P -21.48** -6.501 31.33 24.32
(10.25) (6.002) (201.9) (20.32)
I(P > 1) ⇤  P 13.69 5.127 -176.2 -36.05
(12.36) (7.239) (243.5) (24.51)
I( P >  Public) 61.21 6.339 -304.5 -68.06
(37.41) (21.92) (737.2) (74.19)
I( P <  Public) -49.62* -25.21 -120.6 107.0*
(30.06) (17.61) (592.3) (59.60)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P >  Public) -78.47* -7.560 -221.8 127.7
(46.86) (27.45) (923.5) (92.93)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P <  Public) 14.80 26.57 -463.9 -97.86
(39.22) (22.97) (772.9) (77.78)
Constant -135.0* 93.17** 203.9 264.3*
(74.92) (43.89) (1,476) (148.6)
Observations 371 371 371 371
R-squared 0.059 0.076 0.046 0.065
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 A: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 P : Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 Public: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: Table shows OLS regression of transfers over the past week on estimated parameters. Depen-
dent variables are gifts received, gifts given, money borrowed and money lent in Kenyan Shillings.
Dependent variables do not include transfers between spouses. Regressions also include controls for
demographic characteristics (age, age squared, education, spouse’s education, number of children,
and whether the respondent is working) and total household per capita non-educational expenditures
over the previous week as reported by the respondent.
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Table 2.16: OLS - Real World Community Transfers: Women
Gifts
Received
Gifts Given Borrowed Lent
A -0.576 4.698 0.466 -4.150*
(4.310) (4.636) (0.826) (2.289)
 A 0.906 -1.244 0.682* -0.698
(2.004) (2.155) (0.384) (1.064)
I(A > 1) ⇤  A 0.523 -1.539 -0.812 5.982***
(3.893) (4.187) (0.746) (2.068)
P 5.649 -13.58** 0.101 0.212
(5.705) (6.136) (1.093) (3.030)
 P 1.674 1.467 -0.539 -0.709
(3.307) (3.557) (0.633) (1.757)
I(P > 1) ⇤  P -0.865 20.41*** 0.342 -1.779
(4.861) (5.229) (0.931) (2.582)
I( P >  Public) 1.084 0.518 3.234 -2.799
(11.54) (12.41) (2.210) (6.128)
I( P <  Public) 10.32 20.25* -0.552 -7.732
(10.04) (10.80) (1.923) (5.334)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P >  Public) -9.876 -41.60** -2.360 1.137
(19.15) (20.59) (3.667) (10.17)
I(P > 1) ⇤ I( P <  Public) 18.46 -1.937 1.012 1.899
(14.23) (15.31) (2.726) (7.559)
Constant 17.40 -11.05 -1.772 10.09
(26.35) (28.34) (5.047) (14.00)
Observations 368 368 368 368
R-squared 0.063 0.113 0.033 0.055
P: Monetary Utility Weight of Spouse
A: Monetary Utility Weight of Stranger
 A: Inequity Aversion Weight - Stranger Games
 P : Inequity Aversion Weight - Secret Spouse Game
 Public: Inequity Aversion Weight - Public Spouse Games
Notes: Table shows OLS regression of transfers over the past week on estimated parameters. Depen-
dent variables are gifts received, gifts given, money borrowed and money lent in Kenyan Shillings.
Dependent variables do not include transfers between spouses. Regressions also include controls for
demographic characteristics (age, age squared, education, spouse’s education, number of children,
and whether the respondent is working) and total household per capita non-educational expenditures
over the previous week as reported by the respondent.
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2.11 Why not Log Utility?
Log utility over income is often preferred to a linear specification because we think that
income may be subject to diminishing marginal utility. It is certainly possible to amend
the model presented in this paper to accommodate log utility. The utility function and first
order conditions are then:





















I don’t prefer this specification for two reasons. First, the predictions of the log specification
of the model do not fit the data as well. Figure 2.8 below shows a scatter plot of predicted
values from the log model against the real data. It is clear they do not fit as closely as does
the linear specification.
Further, the log specification is needed only when the diminishing marginal utility of income
is strong enough to induce people to make di↵erent decisions in games over high stakes than
over low ones. This is ultimately an empirical question. Figure 2.9 quantifies how consistent
people are in their decisions across the token amounts o↵ered in the Public Spouse game.
The figure shows a histogram of the sum of the absolute di↵erences from mean giving. If
a person were to give 40% for each of the three token amounts o↵ered (5, 10, and 25), this
score would be zero. The figure shows that 26% of men and 18% of women are perfectly
consistent across the token amounts.
However, there could be reason to think that person could make slightly di↵erent decisions
across the token amounts and should not be considered inconsistent. First, suppose a person
would like to give 51% of tokens in each game. 51% is not an option in the 5, 10, or 25 token
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game. Due to rounding error, that respondent could choose 60%, 50%, and 52% in the 5,
10, and 25 token games respectively, and we might still like to call him consistent. The first
red line in the figures shows the maximum error possible due to rounding. 56% of men and
57% of women are consistent in their behavior across the stakes up to rounding error.
Finally, we might like to allow for a person to make a mistake by one token in one game
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and still be considered consistent. Suppose that a person gives 60% in each of the 10 and 25
token games, but only 40% in the 5 token game. The di↵erence between 40 and 60% in the
5 token game is only one token. We may not want to call such a small di↵erence evidence of
inconsistency and might prefer to allow for the possibility of a mistake by one token. The
second red line in the figures shows the maximum error possible due to a one token mistake.
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Notes: The figures show the sum of absolute di↵erences from mean giving in the Public Spouse game for
men and women. The first red line in the figures shows the maximum error possible due to rounding. The
second red line in the figures shows the maximum error possible due to a one token mistake.
In sum, though a log specification is possible to write and estimate, I do not prefer it for
two reasons. First, actual giving in the games is less well correlated with predictions from
a log-specification model than a linear-specification. Second, we theoretically prefer a log-
specification because the diminishing marginal utility of income may lead people to make
di↵erent decisions in high stakes games than low stakes games. However, in these games,
people play remarkably consistently across the token amounts o↵ered, thus the theoretical
motivation for the log is mitigated.
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CHAPTER III
Gender Di↵erences in Asset Reporting
3.1 Abstract
Asset tallies are frequently used to target social programs and study or control for the e↵ect
of wealth. Information about durable goods is most often taken from any adult member of
the household. However, the hypothesis that household members report identical numbers
of assets has not been tested. Using a unique dataset of asset tallies taken from husbands
and wives separately, and again from the couple jointly, I show that husbands and wives in
the Nyanza Province of Kenya do report di↵erent numbers of assets and that these di↵ering
reports have substantial impacts on poverty measures like predicted expenditures and prin-
cipal component scores. Were these asset indices used to target social programs, di↵erent
households would receive services if husbands’ reports were used instead of wives’. Compar-
ing the individual reports to the joint report shows that uncertainty, rounding, information,
and definitional errors all play a role in gender di↵erences in asset reports. Finally, the joint
report is more similar to each individual report than are husbands’ and wives’ reports to
each other, suggesting that practitioners should survey the couple together to achieve the
most consistent information about asset ownership.
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3.2 Introduction
Asset tallies are an extremely common features of household surveys. Communities and
policy makers use asset tallies to target poverty alleviation programs.1 Poverty scorecards
are increasingly used to target social programs like microfinance, and most commonly use
logit regressions of expenditures on asset indicators to generate coe cients.2 Researchers
use asset indices as proxies for household wealth, on both the right and left hand side of
regression models.3 Asset tallies are often preferred to other measures of household welfare
under the assumption that assets can be measured with less error.4 Most often, the asset
tally is taken as a part of a household survey or roster, with information being taken from
any adult member of the household.5 Implicit in this practice is the idea that because assets
are easy to observe, any household member would report the same number of assets as
any other, regardless of their relationship to the household head, characteristics, or gender.
Husbands and wives may not know or agree on how much was spent on tomatoes over the
previous week, but surely they must remember and concur on the number of cows in the
1Coady, Grody, and Hoddinott (2004) classify the use of asset indices to target social programs as a
proxy means test, and discuss case studies of its use in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Armenia, Indonesia,
and Turkey. The authors suggest that proxy means tests are/were being developed for new programs in
Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Schady and Araujo (2008) discuss
how a school-encouragement conditional cash transfer program in Ecuador used a principal component
index of household assets, educational attainment, and other household characteristics to target the program.
Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999) discuss how Mexico’s PROGRESA program was targeted, describing
an income prediction model that uses household assets and other household characteristics as predictors.
2See microfiance.com.
3See Filmer and Scott (2012) for a thorough overview.
4“There is likely to be much less recall bias or mismeasurement in questions such as whether the household
owns a television, than in recalling consumption expenditures over the past week per expenditure item”
(McKenzie 2005).
5From the Demographic Health Survey 6 Interviewer Manual: “To complete the Household Questionnaire,
you will need to find a suitable respondent. Any adult member of the household who is capable of providing
information needed to fill in the Household Questionnaire can serve as the respondent. ... Generally you
will ask a single individual in the household for the information you will need to complete the household
questionnaire. However, as appropriate, you may need to consult other members of the household for specific
information.” The Living Standards Measurement Survey records durable goods information from the “best-
informed household member” (Grosh and Glewwe (1995)). In the 2008/9 Kenyan Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS), 70% of asset tallies were collected from women. The relationship of the respondent to the
head of the household in the DHS is detailed in Table 3.1. Of the men that were surveyed, 87% were the
head of their household, while 45% of female respondents were household heads.
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front yard.
However, the hypothesis that all household members report the same number of assets
has not been tested empirically. Using 360 matched pairs of husbands and wives in Siaya
County, Kenya, I demonstrate that spouses do not report identical numbers of assets, and
that their di↵ering reports have substantial impacts on the indices and welfare rankings that
are commonly constructed from asset tallies. I focus on the reports of heads of households
and their spouses because they are the most common respondents in large surveys like the
DHS.
There are four reasons why we might expect di↵erent household members to report di↵er-
ent numbers of assets. First, husbands and wives may intentionally hide assets from one
another, and di↵ering reports may reflect truly di↵erent information sets. I will call this an
information error. Second, people may be confused about ownership in general, for exam-
ple due to animal fostering.6 Thus, di↵ering reports may reflect not di↵erent information
sets, but rather noise due to uncertainty. This type of error I will call an uncertainty error.
Importantly, if the ownership of an item is unclear, then enumerator verification of assets
will not solve the problem of uncertainty error. Third, when a respondent is uncertain, one
gender or the other may systematically round up and thus over-report some types of assets
due to experimenter demand e↵ects.7 This error I will call rounding error. Finally, husbands
and wives may not agree on the definition of an asset. In pilot work for this study, I was told
that a man will count as a bicycle anything that can be sold as a bicycle, while a woman
will count only that which can be used as a bicycle. In addition to information, uncertainty,
and rounding errors, I call this last cause of gender di↵erences in asset reports definitional
6Animal fostering is the practice of sending an animal to be cared for on a di↵erent plot by a relative or
friend. How the practice is implemented in Luoland, the location of this study, is discussed in detail in the
Section 3.3.1.
7By experimenter demand e↵ects I mean that respondents may report greater or fewer numbers of assets
because they are trying to make the enumerator feel a certain way about them. For example, a respondent
may want the enumerator to believe he is wealthy, and thus will overstate his assets. On the other hand,
a respondent may want the enumerator to believe he is poor so the enumerator will assign him to receive
program benefits, and thus will understate his assets.
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error.
To test whether husbands and wives do report di↵erent numbers of assets, asset tallies were
collected from each spouse separately during a baseline survey. Respondents were asked
how many of several types of assets the household owned, including durable consumer goods
(bicycles, motorcycles, watches, radios, TVs, stoves, and cellphones), livestock (cattle, sheep,
goats, and chickens), and grain stores (maize, beans, and rice). I first demonstrate di↵erences
in simple means and counts, showing that husbands report higher numbers of nearly every
asset in the survey, and significantly higher numbers of bicycles, motorcycles, watches, radios,
stoves, maize, and beans. To estimate the impact of gender di↵erences in asset reports on
common measures of poverty, I use a predicted expenditure model and principal components
to show that husbands’ and wives’ di↵ering reports generate markedly di↵erent asset index
scores, and di↵erent rankings of households in the sample. If a social program were to be
targeted using an asset index, di↵erent households would receive the program were the asset
report to be taken from husbands or wives.
When household-level asset tallies are aggregated to measure community-level welfare, gen-
der disparities in asset reporting could be exacerbated if certain households are more or
less likely to front a female respondent. Table 3.2 shows demographic summary statistics
for the Nyanza Province in the 2008/9 Kenyan DHS broken out into male respondents in
male-headed households and female respondents in male-headed households. If the gender of
the respondent were random, we would expect that the summary statistics would be similar
for male respondents and female respondents in male-headed households. However, when a
male-headed household fronts a female respondent, she reports more household members,
and more and younger children. She is also younger and less educated than her male re-
spondent counter-part. This pattern suggests that the gender of the respondent may not
be randomly assigned, so if the genders report assets di↵erently, aggregated statistics from
asset reports may be biased.
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That husbands and wives report di↵erent numbers of household assets leaves us with two
questions: why, and what can we do about it? Asset tallies are used primarily because they
are thought to be a more consistent measure of a household’s poverty status than other
data. Therefore, the priority is to create a consistent measure of assets. The data show
that husbands and wives apart do not give a consistent measure of assets owned. Perhaps
together they do better. In addition to the individual baseline asset tallies taken from
husbands and wives, couples in this study returned for an endline survey one week later,
and sitting together, were asked to enumerate their assets jointly. Not surprisingly, I show
that the joint asset tally is more similar to each individual’s report than are the husband
and wife’s reports to each other, both in terms of means, principal component scores, and
household rankings. Thus, practitioners should consider taking asset tallies from couples
together, rather than relying on only one spouse to report assets for the household.
Di↵erences between husbands, wives, and the joint report also open a window into why
there are gender di↵erences in asset reports. Women appear to systematically underreport
durable consumer goods (bicycles, watches, radios), while male reports more often match
the joint endline report. This is consistent with definitional error. Men overreport grain
stores (maize and beans) relative to both female and joint reports. This is an indicator
of either information errors between the couple, as men could truthfully report high grain
stores in private but report lower stores when sitting next to their wives, or rounding error, as
men could overstate their stores in their individual interviews due to experimenter demand
e↵ects. Tallies of livestock (cattle and chicken especially) show that there may be general
confusion over their numbers or ownership, with no statistically significant di↵erences in
means between men, women, and joint reports, but substantial di↵erences across reports.
This is a symptom of uncertainty error. While these patterns should not be taken as strong
evidence of the importance of any one type of error over another, they do suggest that there
may be reason to believe that husbands and wives report systematically di↵erent numbers
of assets, and thus that asset tallies taken from only one person may be no more of a reliable
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measure of household welfare than other data.
Section 3.3 describes the study setting and data collection design. Section 3.4 explores simple
di↵erences between male and female reports, both across and within couples. Section 3.5 uses
predicted expenditure models to demonstrate the e↵ect of gender di↵erences in asset reports
on household poverty scores and rankings within the community. Section 3.6 uses principal
component analysis, arguably the most prevalent statistical method used to generate asset
indices, to demonstrate further the e↵ect of gender di↵erences in reporting. Section 3.7
describes the di↵erences between individual and joint reports of assets, and explores the
implications for practitioners and researchers. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.3 Setting and Design
3.3.1 Ethnography
Though Western scholars may think that asset enumeration would be a straightforward
task, there are reasons to think that tallying items owned may be more complicated in this
region of Kenya, and perhaps in Africa more broadly. There are several reasons why asset
enumeration may be di cult or unreliable in Luoland. First, because the Luo are historically
polygamous, “husbands and wives try strikingly hard to keep their financial a↵airs separate”
(Shipton (2007)). Traditionally, livestock are exchanged at the time of a new marriage, thus
Luo men may attempt to hide their ownership of livestock or the assets that can be used to
purchase livestock from their wives. This intentional misinformation between spouses could
cause informational errors in asset reports.
Second, it is commonplace for individuals to borrow or lend livestock to relatives and friends
in a practice called “fostering.” When an animal is fostered, it is sent to stay on another’s
compound, sometimes many miles away. Fostering occurs for obvious agronomic reasons,
including to take advantage of another’s more open land for grazing, to move herds where
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labor is abundant, and to diversify the risk of disease and theft. However, animal fostering
may make ownership unclear and disputable. Fostering relationships may last for years, or
even across generations.8 Over such a period, ownership over an animal sometimes becomes
murky to the direct parties involved, and may be even less clear to the spouses and o↵spring
of the original parties. In an informal survey of 107 households in Kanyamkago sub-location
in 1981-82, Shipton reports that among animal lenders, 71 percent expected the animal
would eventually be returned. Of those receiving fostered animals, 80 percent expected to
return the animal. That neither of these percentages is equal to 100, and that they do not
match, suggests that ownership of fostered animals may not be entirely clear. Moreover,
ownership of the o↵spring of fostered animals is dictated by subtle and arguable guidelines.9
If a fostered animal dies, what number and type of animal the borrower owes the lender
may not be clear.10 Finally, if the borrower su↵ers an unexpected shock, like a raid or crop
failure, responsibilities to return the fostered animal may come into question.11 In sum,
animal fostering may cause uncertainty over the ownership of livestock living on or o↵ the
family compound, causing noise and thus uncertainty errors in asset reports.
In addition, respondents may be prone to experimenter demand e↵ects, especially when
ownership is uncertain. A respondent may over or understate an asset in an individual
interview because they believe that is what the enumerator wants to hear, or because they
would like the enumerator to have a certain impression of them. For example, a respondent
may overstate his ownership of an asset because he wants the enumerator to think him
8“Animal credits and debts, that is, are both fully heritable” (Shipton (2007)).
9“Who keeps the o↵spring of borrowed or fostered stock depends on the reason for the initial loan. In
Kanyamkago, o↵spring of a cow lent for the lender’s convenience will belong, like the milk and manure, to
the borrower - a common arrangement. But if the cow is lent for the benefit of the borrower, the o↵spring
are returned to the lender. Some borrowers and lenders agree to divide the o↵spring equally in alternation”
(Shipton (2007)).
10“Luo people like to insist that a borrowed cow must be repaid with a cow, and a bull with a bull. In a
pinch, however, elders say that a bullock or decrepit old bull will do in return for a strong bull in its prime,
and a female calf or old cow su ces in return for a milk cow in her peak. Switching the ages of animals
between loan and return is more acceptable than switching the sexes. The same applies with sheep or goats”
(Shipton (2007)).
11“Where a borrower’s harvest fails completely, he or she feels no compunction to return the loan - this is
a risk of the lender” (Shipton (2007)).
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wealthy. On the other hand, a respondent could understate his asset ownership because he
wants the enumerator to think him relatively poor and thus deserving of social assistance.
Even in situations in which the enumerator does not actually have any control over social
assistance programs, the respondent may believe he does. These enumerator demand e↵ects
together could cause rounding error.
In addition to intentional concealment, uncertainty over ownership, and experimenter de-
mand e↵ects, there is a fourth reason why men and women may report di↵erent numbers
of assets: the definition of the good. During pilot work for this project, I mentioned my
peculiar findings to a group of masters of statistics students at Maseno University. While I
was confused about how husbands and wives could report di↵erent numbers of highly visible
assets like bicycles, the students I spoke with had a simple explanation: a man counts as a
bicycle anything that can be sold as a bicycle, while a woman will only count something that
can be used as a bicycle. In sum, there are four distinct types of errors that may account for
gender di↵erences in asset reports: informational errors, uncertainty errors, rounding errors,
and definitional errors.
3.3.2 Sample Selection
The sample was drawn from five rural towns in southwestern Kenya’s Nyanza Province.
Maps of the area are shown in Figure 3.1. Two of the towns (Ugunja and Sega) are on the
main paved road that runs through all of Kenya from Mombasa to Uganda. The other three
towns (Ukwala, Sigomere, and Siaya) are on major dirt roads o↵ the main paved road. Three
of the towns (Ugunja, Siaya, and Ukwala) are former district headquarters.12 Subjects were
married (either formally or informally),13 currently living with their spouse, over the age of
12A new constitution adopted in late 2010 created administrative units known as “counties” to take the
place of the former “districts.” All towns and districts in this study now fall into Siaya county. However,
at the time of the study old district o ces were still serving many of their old o cial roles, and the towns
remained important centers of commerce and government.
13A couple is considered “married” if they are considered by the village elder to be a long-term romantic
couple. The beginning of the “marriage” is defined as the time the couple moved in together.
117
18, and available to participate in two interviews a week apart in September or October of
2011. Polygamous families were not eligible to participate.14
To identify the sample, the survey team asked local administrators (village elders) to compile
a list of all couples meeting the eligibility criteria in several villages within walking distance
of the five towns.15 The village elders were asked to record the names of both husband and
wife and a contact phone number if possible. Of the 786 couple records collected by the
village elders, 82 percent included a contact phone number. Couples were then assigned a
random number to determine the order in which they were contacted to be scheduled for
an interview, stratified by town. Couples that listed a phone number were scheduled for
interviews by phone if possible. Couples that did not have a phone number listed, or were
unable to be contacted by phone, were contacted through the village elder. Tracking lists
were distributed to the elders and they were asked to invite the selected couples to arrive
for an interview on the selected day. In total, 53 percent of the 786 couples provided by the
village elders participated in the study. 415 couples were interviewed at baseline, and 406
couples met all of the study criteria (monogamous, living together, both partners over the
age of 18). Of these, 360 had complete records.
3.3.3 Survey Design
Couples arrived at the survey site together,16 but completed their individual surveys sepa-
rately. The survey began with a questionnaire about demographics, family finances, expen-
ditures, transfers, savings and loans, and decision making in the household. The survey was
14Polygamous families were excluded because the household bargaining structures between three or more
adults are likely to be very di↵erent from the traditional model of a two adult household. In the 1999
Kenyan Census, 12% of men and 21% of women 18 years and older in Siaya District reported that they were
in polygamous unions. Fenske (2012) documents the decline of polygamy in Kenya and Africa more broadly.
15While a full census by the survey team would have been a preferable method of compiling the eligible
couple list, budget constraints were limiting.
16The study sites were a Town Council Hall, a boarding house for handicapped children, a polytechnic
university, and a small resort.
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executed in Dhuluo, the most common native language in the study area.17 Table 3.3 shows
demographic and other summary statistics from the baseline survey. The table also shows
averages for Siaya District from the 1999 Kenya Census, showing that the sample is similar
to the larger population. An English version of the survey can be found on my website18
and the Dhuluo translation is available on request.
The asset tally was included after basic demographics and an experiment check,19 and before
survey measures of household bargaining power. Translated into Dhuluo, the prompt read:
“Now I would like to ask you about the things your family owns. Please tell me about the
place where you currently stay, and the things you, your spouse, and your children own.
You should include things at your current place and another home, but be sure to tell me
about only things that YOU own.” The tally asked for the number of bicycles, motorcycles,
watches, radios, televisions, kerosene stoves, cell phones, sheep, cattle, goats, chickens, and
kilograms of maize, beans, and rice.
Couples were asked to return to the survey site exactly one week later to complete an
endline survey. The endline survey again asked about expenditures, transfers, savings and
loans, and new questions were asked about marital quality and the experiment implemented
at baseline. In addition, at the end of the individual baseline surveys, the couple was joined
together for a couple endline survey. The couple was then asked jointly about the assets in
their household. While it would have been preferable to visit the couple’s home to directly
observe their physical assets, budget constraints were limiting. However, large nationally
representative surveys also have limited resources, and may not be able to directly observe
assets either. The joint endline survey asked of both members of the couple, however, may
be a more accurate or reliable measure of household assets than an individual’s report. 309
of the 360 baseline couples have complete endline asset data.
17All subjects in the sample speak Dhuluo. The survey was forward and back translated by the study
team.
18www.umich.edu/⇠jesshoel
19The check asked if the respondent had heard about the study from anyone before arriving, and what
they knew of the procedure.
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3.4 Simple Comparisons
Table 3.4 shows reported assets for men and women, along with a comparison of reports
within couple. Columns 1 and 2 show average reports for men and women, along with
standard deviations. Column 3 shows a Welch’s t-test for di↵erences between these means.
Column 4 shows the percentage of couples that di↵er in their asset report. Column 5
shows the conditional mean di↵erence for those couples that disagree. Column 6 shows
the percentage of households in which only the man reports the asset present, while column
7 shows the percentage of households in which only the woman reports the asset present.
On average, men report more of nearly all assets, and report significantly more bicycles,
motorcycles, watches, radios, stoves, maize, and beans. More than a quarter of couples
disagree on the number of bicycles, watches, radios, stoves, phones, cattle, sheep, chickens,
maize, and beans in their homes. When they disagree, they often disagree by a substantial
amount: 1.2 bicycles (1.8 std), 73 kilograms of maize (0.7 std), 21 kilograms of beans (1.1
std), 2 cattle (1.2 std), 2.2 sheep (1.7 std), or 6.5 chickens (0.5 std) on average. In many
households, spouses disagree on whether their household even owns an asset. 14 percent of
men say they own a bicycle while their wives report no such asset; 7 percent of women report
a bicycle when their husband reports none. 12 percent of men and 7 percent of women report
owning cattle when their spouses report none. 22 percent of men and 10 percent of women
report owning maize, and 23 percent of men and 8 percent of women report owning beans
when their spouses report no grain stores.
Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show histograms of the linear di↵erence between husband and wife
reports. A positive (negative) di↵erence reflects that the husband reported more (fewer) of
the asset than did the wife. Panel c of Figure 3.2 shows the plot for reports of bicycles.
While most (66%) couples agree on the number of bicycles in couple owns, 63 (34) husbands
(wives) report one more bicycle than does their spouse. Further, some respondents report
more than one additional bicycle, with 19 husbands (5.3% of the sample) reporting 2, 3, or
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4 more bicycles than do their wives. 5 wives (1.4% of the sample) report 2 more bicycles
than do their husbands.
Panel d of Figure 3.3 shows a similar plot for reports of maize stores. 34% of (122) couples
agree exactly on the number of kilograms of maize the couples owns. 55.6% of couples
disagree by 20 kilograms or less, but more than 40% of couples disagree by more than 20
kilograms. 10% of husbands report at least 100 kilograms more maize stores than do their
wives.
Simple comparisons of asset tallies across husbands and wives reveal substantial di↵erences
in asset reports by gender. Men report more of nearly every asset in the sample, often
statistically significantly more of the asset. Some couples even disagree on the existence of
an asset in the household. In the next sections, the relationship between asset reports and
common measures of poverty is explored.
3.5 Predicted Expenditures
Asset indices constructed from predicted expenditures are sometimes used to target social
programs (Coady et al. (2004)). While direct means testing (i.e. asking a household di-
rectly about their income and expenditures) is preferable, it is not always possible because
collecting expenditure data is time consuming and expensive. It is therefore common to
collect expenditure data from only a sub-sample of a population, create an asset index from
a regression of expenditures on asset tallies, and use the predicted expenditure asset index to
assess poverty in the larger population. For example, Mark Schreiner and co-authors at mi-
crofinance.com have generated expenditure-based poverty scorecards for 50 countries, with
the stated purpose that they be used by pro-poor organizations to target social programs to
those who live on less than $1 per day. However, if the genders systematically report di↵erent
numbers of assets, poverty scorecards constructed from those reports could be biased. If one
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gender systematically over or underreports assets, they will generate systematically higher
or lower scores. Further, gendered di↵erences in reporting of both assets and expenditures
may generate di↵erent coe cients of regressions of expenditures on assets. That is, men and
women may require di↵erent scorecards.
Researchers interested in the e↵ect of expenditures or incomes on outcomes sometimes use
assets as instruments. Filmer and Scott (2012) suggest that expenditures instrumented by
assets will capture the long-term component of expenditures and di↵erence out temporary
income shocks. For example, Behrman and Knowles (1999) use assets and other household
characteristics to instrument for the long-term component of expenditures and incomes to
look at their e↵ect on school enrollment. However, if the genders report systematically di↵er-
ent numbers of assets, their use as an instrument for household expenditures is questionable.
I collected expenditure data from all men and women in my sample separately, asking them
about their own expenditures over the previous week and their spouse’s expenditures. Col-
lecting personal diaries, while likely the most accurate form of expenditure measurement,
were prohibitively expensive. Following the recommendations of Beegle et al. (2012), I used
a 7-day recall subset list of items, including 28 food items and 21 non-food items. I started
with the list of items included in their survey, and modified for the local context. The my
surveys can be found on my website.20
Di↵ering asset reports from men and women could influence the construction of a poverty
score from a predicted expenditure based asset index in three ways. First, di↵ering pat-
terns of male and female reports combined with di↵erent spending patterns could change
the coe cients in the asset index. Second, coe cients relating expenditures to assets may
not be dissimilar, but di↵ering asset reports may lead to quite di↵erent predicted household
expenditures. Finally, di↵erent predicted expenditures could cause markedly di↵erent classi-
fications of households into poverty groups, either via predicted expenditures falling beneath
20umich.edu/⇠jesshoel
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a poverty line, or via di↵ering rankings of households. Social programs are often targeted at
the poorest 10 or 20% of households, so di↵erent household rankings can have a substantial
impact on which households become beneficiaries.
A Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition can distinguish between the first and second potential prob-
lems. Table 3.5 shows OLS regressions of expenditures on asset tallies and demographics,21
and a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the contribution of di↵ering coe cients, di↵ering
endowments, and their interactions for both assets and demographics. Household expendi-
tures are the respondent’s report of both their own and their spouse’s expenditures over the
previous week, excluding education expenditures,22 and the asset report is also taken from
the respondent. The first column shows an OLS regression for all respondents pooled, with
standard errors clustered at the couple level. The second and third columns show results for
men and women separately. The final column shows stars for significantly di↵erent coe -
cients for men in women from a pooled regression with interaction terms. Standard errors
in this regression are again clustered at the couple level.
The final column of Table 3.5 shows that few coe cients are significantly di↵erent for men
and women. When a woman reports an additional kilogram of maize, it is positively corre-
lated with expenditures, while mens’ reports of maize are not significantly correlated with
expenditures. While a man’s report of an additional TV is associated with 255 KSH in addi-
tional household expenditures, a woman’s report is not significantly correlated with house-
hold expenditures. Aside from TVs, maize, and beans, there are no statistical di↵erences in
coe cients for men and women for the other 13 assets included in this model.
21OLS regressions that exclude demographics are available from the author. Models of expenditures often
examine the e↵ect of assets on log expenditures. Log expenditure regressions are available from the author.
The main text discusses linear expenditures because R2 measures are substantially higher in the linear models
than in the log models. Tobit regressions, accounting for potential left censoring of expenditures at zero,
are also available from the author. However, as only 7 of 720 observations of total expenditures are equal to
zero, the main text discusses OLS regressions.
2273% of respondents report no educational expenditures over the previous week, but because education ex-
penditures are by nature lumpy, some households report large expenditures on education. 5% of respondents
report 2000 KSH or more spent on education over the previous week, while average non-education expen-
ditures over the previous week are only 2079 KSH. To avoid outliers due to lumpy education expenditures,
education is excluded from the analysis.
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The third panel of the table confirms the idea that the di↵erences in coe cients between men
and women are small: a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition shows that di↵erences in coe cients
on assets do not statistically significantly contribute to the di↵erences between male and
female reported expenditures. The interaction between asset coe cients and asset endow-
ments are also not important to the di↵erence. However, because women report fewer assets,
asset endowments contribute -44 KSH to the di↵erence in predicted household expenditures,
and this di↵erence is significant at the 90% level.23
The e↵ect of asset reports on predicted expenditures can be seen clearly in the classification
of households above and below the poverty line, and in rankings of households by predicted
expenditures. Figure 3.5 shows a scatter plot of OLS predicted expenditures by husbands’
and wives reports’, using the gender separated regression shown in Columns 2 and 3 of
Table 3.5. The scatter plot shows that while husband’s and wive’s reports are correlated
(correlation coe cient 0.4541), they are far from perfectly correlated. The figure also shows
red lines drawn at predicted expenditures of 700 KSH per week, or $1 per day per capita.
This demonstrates that while there are some couples under the poverty line by both the
husband’s and wife’s predicted expenditures (66.4%), many are beneath the poverty line
by only one spouse’s report (24.7% by only the husband’s report, 3.7% by only the wife’s
report). Table 3.6 shows tabulations of predicted expenditures broken into less than one,
one to two, two to three, and more than three times the $1 per day per person poverty line.
Another way to compare spouse’s reports is to compare the ranking of households by hus-
bands’ predicted expenditures and wives’ predicted expenditures. Figure 3.6 shows a scatter
plot of the rankings of the 360 couples in the sample by predicted expenditures. Again the
rankings by husband’s and wife’s reports are positively correlated (correlation coe cient
0.5096) but the scatter plot reveals they are far from perfectly correlated. Table 3.7 shows
23In tables not shown here but available from the author, a linear model that excludes demographic
controls also shows that asset endowments and not asset coe cients are the main contributor to di↵erences
in predicted expenditures. Log models show more strongly that asset endowments are the most important
factor in di↵ering predicted expenditures.
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husbands’ and wives’ rank by quintile, demonstrating that while a husband with predicted
expenditures in the lowest quintile (under the red line in Figure 3.6) is most likely to have a
wife in the lowest quintile (8.1 of the 20% of the sample in the lowest quintile), a few have
wives in the highest quintile (1.4%).
Exploring the relationship between asset reports and expenditures shows that gender dif-
ferences in asset reports have substantial impacts on commonly used measures of poverty.
Though gender di↵erences do not statistically significantly impact the coe cients in an ex-
penditure prediction model, they do have impacts on whether a household is expected to
be above or below the poverty line, and even more substantial impacts on the ranking of
households within a community. If a policy maker were to target a social program to the
poorest 20% of households, she would construct a very di↵erent list from male and female
asset reports.
3.6 Principal Component Analysis
When expenditure data is not available, asset indices are often created using principal com-
ponent analysis. Popularized by Filmer and Pritchett (2001), principal component analysis
finds the linear combination of asset indicators that accounts for the greatest sample variance
of all possible linear combinations of indicators. The first principal component coe cients
are then used to derive an asset index I will call the principal component score. Principal
component derived asset indices are now widely used, including in the creation of the wealth
index in the Demographic and Health Surveys.
Asset indices derived from principal components are attractive for several reasons. Most
importantly, principal component scores require only the measurement of asset ownership
while other measures of poverty usually require the measurement of income or expenditures,
both of which are relatively expensive to gather and thought to measured with greater
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error. For example, Sahn and Stifel (2003) argue that an asset index derived from factor
analysis (a close relative of principal components) is a better predictor of child health and
nutrition when compared to expenditures, which they say were measured with greater error.
Previous studies have thus used principal component scores to control for economic status
when income or expenditure data are not available (e.g. Rao and Ibanez (2005)). Second, a
principal component score is a uni-dimensional measure of a household’s wealth. It is unwise
to regress an outcome of interest (such as rate of diarrhea disease) on assets directly (such as
access to a pit latrine) because a specific asset could have a direct impact on the outcome in
addition to its indirect impact as a proxy for wealth. By providing a uni-dimensional proxy
for household wealth, a principal component score avoids some of this bias. Researchers have
used this logic to study the e↵ect of wealth on health and education in many contexts. For
example, Bollen et al. (2002) use a principal component score to examine the e↵ect of wealth
on fertility and Filmer and Pritchett (2001) examine the relationship between wealth and
school enrollments. Third, Filmer and Pritchett (2001) argue that because the first principal
component explains the maximum variance in the asset variables, it can be thought to be
the best measure of long-run wealth. For this reason, principal component or factor analysis
scores can be used to study poverty rates across time and space (e.g. Sahn and Stifel (2000))
or inequalities within groups (e.g. McKenzie (2005)).
That the genders report di↵erent numbers of assets interferes with the logic for using principal
components in each of the three arguments o↵ered above. First, it is not clear that the
measurement error due to gendered di↵erences in reporting of assets is any less problematic
than the measurement error inherent in consumption or expenditure data. Second, if male
and female reports produce di↵erent principal component scores, then their use as a proxy
for household wealth is called into question. Finally, the propensity to survey women over
men may vary across time and space, thus if women and men report systematically di↵erent
numbers of assets, the comparison of asset indices across time and space is invalid. For
example, women in observant Muslim communities may be less likely to answer an initial
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household survey because they are not comfortable speaking with strangers.
Table 3.8 shows coe cients on each asset for the first principal component, with the analysis
run first on the pooled sample, and next on each gender separately.24 As in the expendi-
tures prediction models, the coe cients on each asset do not vary much across the genders.
However, as with predicted expenditures, di↵ering reports across genders have a substan-
tial impact on household categorization. Figure 3.7 shows a plot of husbands’ and wives’
principal component index scores. While the scores are positively correlated (correlation
coe cient 0.5160), they are far from perfectly correlated. The mismatch between husband
and wife reports are exacerbated when principal component scores are used to categorize
households into wealth categories. Figure 3.8 shows the 360 households in the sample in
rank order by their principal component score, with rank determined by either husband or
wife’s asset reports. Red lines are drawn to indicate the lowest quintile of the asset index.
Table 3.9 tallies this information numerically. While 47% of men whose asset reports put
them in the bottom quintile of the principal component index also have wives in the bottom
quintile (9.4 of the 20% in the lowest quintile), some (0.8%) have wives in the highest index
quintile. Some women in the lowest quintile have husbands in the highest quintile (1.9%).
3.7 Di↵erences between Individual and Joint Reports
At the baseline survey, each respondent was asked to tally the household’s assets separately.
At the endline survey one week later, the couple was seated together and asked to enumerate
the household’s assets. Because the endline survey was only one week later, it is unlikely
that the household accumulated assets between the baseline and endline asset tallies. Mean
expenditures on grain over the week between baseline and endline surveys was 236 KSH, 62
KSH on farming and livestock, and 14 KSH on furniture and appliances.
24McKenzie (2005) suggests that distributions of principal component scores should be checked for trun-
cation and bunching. Figure 3.11 shows that these issues are not a problem in these data.
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Not surprisingly given the results above, the joint report di↵ered from both the husband’s
and wife’s individual reports. Table 3.10 shows asset summary statistics for the joint report
compared to baseline male and female data. The first and second columns show means and
standard deviations of male and female asset reports for the couples that also have endline
data.25 The third column shows this joint report. The fourth column shows Welch’s t-tests
for di↵erences between the joint report and the men(women)’s reports. For example, the
di↵erence between mean male and joint reports of bicycles are not statistically di↵erent
(t-stat: 0.52) while mean female reports are significantly lower than mean joint reports
(t-stat: -2.91). The first row of the fifth column shows first the percentage of couples for
which the joint report matches only the husband’s:wife’s report. 19.4% of households had
a joint report of bicycles that matched the husband’s report only; 10.7% of joint reports
matched the wife’s report only. The second line of the fifth column shows the percentage
of households for which the joint report matches both:neither of the husband’s and wife’s
report. 62.5% of households had a joint, husband, and wife report of bicycles that were
identical. 7.4% of couples had a joint report that did not match either of their individual
reports. The first row of the sixth column shows the percentage of male reports that were
initially higher than the joint report (10% of men reported more bicycles in their individual
report than were reported in the joint interview) along with the conditional mean di↵erence
(of men who reported more bicycles, they reported on average 1.27 more). The first row of
the seventh column shows the same information for women (7% of women reported more
bicycles in their individual interview than were recorded in the joint report, reporting an
average or 1.05 additional bicycles). The second row of each column shows the percentage of
male (female) reports that were lower than the joint report (8% of men and 20% of women
reported fewer bicycles in their individual interviews than were recorded in the joint report)
along with the conditional mean di↵erence.
There are some goods for which male, female, and joint tallies are all quite similar. 92.2% of
25309 of the 360 baseline couples have complete endline data.
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households have matching joint, husband, and wife reports of motorcycles. 94.8% of house-
holds agree perfectly on the amount of rice stores. Reports are more than 70% consistent
for sheep, goats, and TVs.
There are other goods for which male or female reports are systematically di↵erent than
the joint report. Women report significantly fewer bicycles on average than the joint report,
while average male reports are not statistically di↵erent from the joint report. In households
with disagreement, 19.4% of the male reports match the joint report, with 20% of women
reporting less than the joint report by an average of 1.1 bicycles. Similarly, women report
significantly fewer watches and radios than the joint report suggest. With these assets also,
18.4% of the joint reports of watches and 17.2% of radios match the male report, with
20% and 18% of women reporting an average of 1.23 fewer watches and 1.22 fewer radios
respectively. These patterns are consistent with the idea that for these types of items, women
report only those items that can be used while men report items that can be sold.
There is also a set of goods that men appear to systematically overreport. Average male
baseline reports of maize and beans are significantly higher than the joint reports. Only
29.8% of households agree perfectly on their maize stores. Of those that disagree, far more
joint reports match the wife’s original report (21%) than match the husband’s original report
(11.7%). Of men whose report does not match the joint, 76% report more maize than the
joint report by an average of 68 kilograms. The pattern is similar for bean stores. Only
7.4% of male reports match the joint report, while 19.7% of wife reports match the joint
report. Of men whose report di↵ers from the joint report, 78% report more beans than
the joint report by an average of 19 kilograms. Taken together, it appears that some men
systematically overstate grain stores relative to women’s and joint reports. This could be due
to information errors, if men truthfully report their grain stores in an individual interview
but conceal some stores when asked sitting next to their wives, or rounding error if men
overstate grain stores in their individual interview due to experimenter demand e↵ects.
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For another set of goods, there does not seem to be a systematic adjustment up or down for
either gender, but there does seem to be a fair bit of confusion. Only 18.8% of households
have perfect agreement about the number of chickens in their household. The joint reports
seem to be a mix of original male reports (20.7%), original female reports (23.6%), and a
compromise between the two (36.9%). This pattern is also true for reports of cattle. While a
greater fractions of households agree on their cattle ownership outright (57%), the remaining
adjustments are an even mix of original male reports (16.2%), original female reports (12.3%),
and a compromise between the two (14.6%). While many people in the sample are adjusting
their reports, it does not appear that either men or women are systematically under or over
reporting cattle or chickens. Rather, there appears to be confusion over ownership. This
pattern fits with the idea that uncertainty over ownership could be generated by animal
fostering, and asset reports in these categories are perhaps less reliable.
Overall, however, the joint report is more similar to both male and female reports than
husbands’ and wives’ are to each other. Figure 3.9 shows scatter plots of first principal
component scores for husbands, wives, and joint asset reports, constructed from the principal
component coe cients shown in Table 3.11. The figures demonstrate that while husband
and wife principal component scores are not that strongly positively correlated (correlation
coe cient 0.517), the joint principal component score is more highly correlated with both
baseline husband report (0.7734) and baseline wife report (0.7234).
Figure 3.10 shows the same patterns when households are ranked by their principal compo-
nent scores, with husband and wife rank correlation coe cient at 0.521, husband and joint
report at 0.7486, and wife and joint report at 0.666. Further, when households are grouped
into quintiles by their principal component score rank (as is often done to target social sup-
port programs), joint ranks are more likely to categorize households similarly to either the
husband or wife rank than are husband’s and wive’s ranks to each other. Table 3.12 shows
that when husband and wife quintile categories are compared, only 38% of couples end up
in the same category by both reports. 74% of couples end up in either the same or a prox-
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imate category by both husband and wife reports. However, when joint report categories
are compared to husband reports, 49% end up in the same category and 87% end up in the
same or a proximate category. For women, these statistics are 45% and 83%. In short, asset
reports taken from the couple together are more similar to either gender’s individual report
than are husband’s and wive’s reports to each other. Practitioners should consider that if
they want an asset tally that is most similar to what an individual husband or wife would
say alone, they should collect the tally from the couple together.
3.8 Conclusion
Asset tallies are frequently used to construct poverty scores and assign social support pro-
grams, under the thought that asset tallies can be collected with less measurement error
than other measures of poverty. Information about assets is often collected from any adult
member of the household without regard to that person’s gender. However, men and women
may report di↵erent numbers of assets for several reasons. First, husbands and wives may
intentionally hide assets from one another, causing information errors in an asset tally taken
from only one individual. Second, people may be confused about ownership in general, for
example due to animal fostering, generating uncertainty error. Third, people may round up
or round down their report due to experimenter demand e↵ects. Finally, husbands and wives
may not agree on whether an item qualifies in the asset category, causing definitional errors.
Surveying matched pairs of husbands and wives in Siaya County, Kenya, I gather reports
from husbands and wives individually, and again jointly with the couple sitting next to
one another. I find that husbands and wives do not report identical numbers of assets
in their individual surveys, and that their di↵ering reports have substantial impacts on
indices generated with predicted expenditure and principal components models. Further,
the rankings of households in the sample by either the husband’s or wife’s asset report vary
greatly. If a social program were to be targeted using an asset index, di↵erent households
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would receive the program were the asset report to be taken from husbands or wives.
That husbands and wives report di↵erent numbers of household assets leaves us with two
questions: why, and what can we do about it?
Women appear to systematically underreport durable consumer goods (bicycles, watches,
radios), while male reports match the joint report. This is a symptom of definitional error.
Men overreport grain stores (maize and beans) relative to both female and joint reports. This
could be an indicator of information errors between the couple, as many men report high
grain stores in private but much lower stores when sitting next to their wives. It could also
be a symptom of rounding error if men overstate grain stores in their individual interviews
due to experimenter demand e↵ects. Tallies of livestock (cattle and chicken) show that there
may be general confusion over their numbers or ownership, with no statistically significant
di↵erences in means between men, women, and joint reports, but substantial di↵erences
across reports.
I demonstrate that the joint asset tally, taken with husbands and wives sitting together, is
more similar to each individual’s report than are the husband and wife’s reports to each other.
This pattern is true when measured by means, principal component scores, and household
rankings. Practitioners should thus consider taking asset tallies from couples together to
gather the most consistent measure of household asset ownership.
132
3.9 References
Beegle, K., De Weerdt, J., Friedman, J., and Gibson, J. (2012) “Methods of household
consumption measurement through surveys: experimental results from Tanzania.” Journal
of Development Economics, 98(1), 3-18.
Behrman, J. R., & Knowles, J. C. (1999). “Household income and child schooling in Viet-
nam.” World Bank Economic Review, 13, 211-256.
Bollen, K. A., Glanville, J. L., & Stecklov, G. (2002). “Economic status proxies in studies of
fertility in developing countries: does the measure matter?” Population Studies, 56, 81-96.
Coady, D., Grosh, M., & Hoddinott, J. (2004). Targeting of transfers in developing countries:
review of lessons. The World Bank and IFPRI.
Cohen, W., Atieno Odhiambo, E. S. (1989) Siaya, the historical anthropology of an African
landscape. London: J. Currey.
Fenske, J. (2012) “African polygamy: past and present.” Working Paper.
Filmer, D., & Pritchett, L. (2001). “Estimating wealth e↵ects without expenditure data - or
tears: with an application to educational enrollments in states of India.” Demography, 38,
115-132.
Filmer, D., & Scott, K. (2012). “Assessing asset indices.” Demography, 49(1), 359-92.
Francis, E. (2000) Making a living: changing livelihoods in rural Africa. London: Routledge.
Grosh, M. E., & Glewwe, P. (1995). “A Guide to living standards measurement study
surveys and their data sets.” LSMS Working Paper.
McKenzie, D. J. (2005). “Measuring inequality with asset indicators.” Journal of Population
Economics, 18(2), 229-260.
Rao, V., & Ibanez, A. M. (2005). “The social impact of social funds in Jamaica: a ‘partici-
patory econometric’ analysis of targeting, collective action, and participation in community-
driven development.” Journal of Development Studies, 41, 788-838.
Sahn, D. E., & Stifel, D. (2000). “Poverty comparisons over time and across countries in
Africa.” World Development, 28, 2123-2155.
Sahn, D. E., & Stifel, D. (2003). “Exploring alternative measures of welfare in the absence
of expenditure data.” Review of Income and Wealth, 49, 463-489.
Schady, N., & Araujo, M. C. (2008). “Cash transfers, conditions, and school enrollment in
Ecuador.” Economia, 8(2), 43-77.
Shipton, P. (2007) The nature of entrustment: intimacy, exchange, and the sacred in Africa.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Skoufias, E., Davis, B., & Behrman, J. R. (1999). “An evaluation of the selection of benefi-
ciary households in the education, health, and nutrition program (PROGRESA) of Mexico.”
133
International Food Policy Research Institute Working Paper.
134
3.10 Figures
Figure 3.1: Maps of Study Site











































Figure 3.2: Histograms of Linear Di↵erence in Asset Counts: Husband - Wife
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Difference: Stoves
Notes: Histograms of the linear di↵erence between husband and wives’ reports. Positive numbers indicate
that the husband reported more of the assets, while negative numbers show that the wife reported more of
the asset.
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Difference: KGs Rice
Notes: Histograms of the linear di↵erence between husband and wives’ reports. Positive numbers indicate
that the husband reported more of the assets, while negative numbers show that the wife reported more of
the asset.
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Difference: Chickens
Notes: Histograms of the linear di↵erence between husband and wives’ reports. Positive numbers indicate
that the husband reported more of the assets, while negative numbers show that the wife reported more of
the asset.
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0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Wife, KSH
Correlation is .4541483040653769
Predicted Expenditures, with demographics
Notes: Figure shows scatter plot of husband’s predicted expenditure by wife’s predicted expenditure, where
predicted expenditures are generated by an OLS regression of the respondent’s report of total household
expenditure per household member (excluding educational expenditures) on the respondent’s report of assets
in the home. Demographic controls for age, age squared, education, and an indicator for employment for the
respondent and the respondent’s spouse are included. Regressions are run for each gender separately seen
in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.5. The red lines are drawn at 700 KSH, or $1 per day per capita. Note that
while many couples fall above or below the poverty line by both the husband and wife’s report, many others
do not. Table 3.6 shows this fact numerically.
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0 100 200 300 400
Wife Rank
Predicted Expenditures with Demographics, Rank
Notes: Figure shows scatter plot of the household’s rank in the sample of 360 households by predicted expen-
ditures per household member, split by husband and wife’s reports. Predicted expenditures are generated by
OLS regression of the respondent’s report of total household expenditure per household member (excluding
educational expenditures) on the respondent’s report of assets in the home. Demographic controls for age,
age squared, education, and an indicator for employment for the respondent and the respondent’s spouse
are included. Regressions are run for each gender separately, seen in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.5. The red
lines are drawn at rank 72, showing the lowest quintile in the sample. Note that while many couples are in
the lowest quintile by both the husband and wife’s reports, many more are not. Table 3.7 shows this fact
numerically.
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Wife PC Score
Principal Component Prediction
Notes: Figure shows scatter plot of the husband’s principal component score by the wife’s principal compo-
nent score. Coe cients were calculated for the genders separately, shown in Table 3.8.
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0 100 200 300 400
Wife PC Score Rank
Principal Component Prediction, Rank
Notes: Figure shows scatter plot of the household’s rank in the sample of 360 households by principal com-
ponent score, split by husband and wife’s reports. Principal Component Score Coe cients were calculated
for the genders separately, shown in Table 3.8. The red lines show the bottom quintile. Note that while
some couples are in the lowest quintile by both the husband and wife’s report, many more are not. Table
3.9 shows this fact numerically.
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Figure 3.9: Scatter Plot of Principal Component Scores, Joint Report
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Principal Component Prediction
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Joint PC Score
Principal Component Prediction
Notes: Figure shows scatter plots of the husband’s, wife’s, and endline principal component scores. Coe -
cients were calculated for the genders and endline separately, shown in Table 3.11.
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Figure 3.10: Scatter Plot of Ranks by Principal Component Score, Joint Report
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Joint PC Score Rank
Principal Component Prediction, Rank


















0 100 200 300
Joint PC Score Rank
Principal Component Prediction, Rank
Notes: Figure shows scatter plot of the household’s rank in the sample of 309 households in the joint report sample by principal
component score, split by husband’s, wife’s, and joint reports. Principal Component Score Coe cients were calculated for the
genders and joint report separately, shown in Table 3.11. The red lines show the bottom quintile. Note that while some couples
are in the lowest quintile by both the husband and wife’s report in Panel a, many more are not. When comparing the husband’s
report to the joint report, or the wife’s report to the joint report, more couples are categorized in the lowest quintile by both
reports. Table 3.12 shows this fact numerically.
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3.11 Tables





Head 58% 87% 45%
Spouse 32% 0% 46%
Child/In-Law 7% 9% 6%
Grandchild 1% 1% 1%
Parent/In-Law 0% 0% 0%
Sibling 1% 1% 1%
Other 1% 1% 1%
Total 1314 30.67% 69.33%
Notes: Table shows the relationship of the respondent to the head of the household in
the unweighted sample in the Nyanza Province, and split by whether the respondent is
a male or female.
Table 3.2: DHS: Summary Statistics by Gender of Respondent, UNWEIGHTED
Full Male Respondent Female Respondent
Sample Male Headed Household Male Headed Household t-stat
Age of Respondent 38.47 41.61 32.18 9.16
(16.42) (16.78) (11.88)
Education of Respondent 7.18 8.33 7.43 3.45
(4.01) (4.01) (3.39)
Age of Head 43.86 43.43 41.84 1.44
(16.41) (16.55) (14.91)
Education of Head 7.37 8.34 8.57 -0.82
(4.42) (4.1) (3.94)
Number in 4.56 4.1 5.49 -8.07
Household (2.43) (2.65) (2.24)
Number of Children 2.2 1.7 2.74 -8.3
in Household (1.8) (1.8) (1.8)
Age of Youngest 4.03 4.35 2.83 4.53
In Household (4.32) (4.4) (3.54)
Notes: Table shows demographic summary statistics in DHS Kenya 2008/9, in the UNWEIGHTED sample in the
Nyanza Province. The first column shows statistics for the full sample. The second and third columns show information
for male-headed households split by the gender of the respondent of the household survey. The fourth column shows
a Welch’s t-statistic of the di↵erence between male and female respondent summary statistics.
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Table 3.3: Sample Summary Statistics by Gender of Respondent: Demographic and Finan-
cial Characteristics
Variable Men Women








Expenditures per HH member 521.7 422.8
(809) (523.6)
Number in HH 5.29 5.29
(2.17) (2.17)
N 360 360
Notes: Table shows demographic summary statistics for matched pairs of husbands and
wives in my data. Working status is positive if the respondent reported income from
work over the previous week. Expenditures are the respondent’s report of their own and
their spouse’s expenditures over the previous week, excluding educational expenditures.
Number of members in the household is the number of people who ate from the cooking
pot last night.
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Table 3.4: Sample Summary Statistics by Gender of Respondent: Asset Reports
Mean












Own House? 0.790 0.800 -0.33 9 1 4 5
(0.410) (0.400)
Iron Roof? 0.670 0.680 -0.29 13 1 6 7
(0.470) (0.470)
Bicycles 0.950 0.780 3.24 34 1.24 14 7
(0.780) (0.620)
Motorcycles 0.100 0.0500 2.25 7 1.25 5 2
(0.360) (0.220)
Cattle 1.140 0.990 1.27 37 1.97 12 7
(1.640) (1.540)
Sheep 0.650 0.510 1.45 24 2.18 7 8
(1.490) (1.060)
Goats 0.510 0.400 1.36 19 1.97 7 4
(1.190) (0.970)
Chickens 6.560 5.260 1.46 75 6.51 9 8
(9.460) (14.04)
Watches 0.610 0.500 2.14 39 1.15 17 12
(0.750) (0.620)
Radios 0.990 0.880 2.62 30 1.15 12 8
(0.620) (0.500)
TVs 0.240 0.180 1.83 16 1.05 10 5
(0.470) (0.410)
Stoves 0.470 0.390 1.93 30 1.08 16 11
(0.580) (0.530)
Phones 1.340 1.350 -0.17 32 1.25 2 7
(0.870) (0.690)
Maize (KGs) 58.29 36.74 2.72 66 72.9 22 10
(118.4) (92.43)
Beans (KGs) 9 3.660 3.79 42 21.48 23 8
(24.62) (10.50)
Rice (KGs) 0.120 0.0600 0.83 3 5.08 2 1
(1.280) (0.490)
Notes: The first and second columns show means and standard deviations for men and women
separately. The third column shows the Welch’s t-test of a di↵erence in means across genders.
The fourth column shows the percentage of couples that di↵er in their asset reports. The fifth
column shows the mean absolute di↵erence in couples that disagree. The sixth column shows the
percentage of couples in which only the man reports the asset present, while the last column shows
the percentage of couples in which only the woman reports the asset present.
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Table 3.5: OLS Regressions: Expenditures per Household Member on Assets
Pooled Men Women Di↵erence between
Men and Women
Own House? -181.3*** -220.1* -160.4*
(67.95) (117.5) (82.61)
Iron Roof? -53.60 -124.6* -16.47
(48.30) (75.38) (51.46)
Bicycles 37.07 30.30 40.68
(40.35) (61.44) (43.69)
Motorcycles -156.2* -147.8* -31.33
(92.19) (89.19) (104.3)
Cattle 79.20 92.00 53.94*
(54.55) (65.80) (29.53)
Sheep -33.36 -45.19 5.409
(33.95) (34.56) (38.62)
Goats 16.17 32.52 -5.741
(25.55) (36.35) (20.70)
Chickens -1.436 -4.479 0.0764
(1.544) (3.676) (1.812)
Watches 0.551 71.84 -30.48
(41.52) (54.02) (45.53)
Radios -18.79 -7.482 -56.71
(35.91) (59.22) (44.75)
TVs 178.2** 255.4** 15.11 *
(84.33) (127.8) (69.91)
Stoves 79.25 88.51 94.08*
(51.98) (80.77) (55.95)
Phones 76.39* 63.60 86.52*
(40.87) (63.59) (44.81)
KGs Maize 1.075** 0.136 2.166** **
(0.523) (0.311) (0.943)
KGs Beans -0.786 1.387 -4.452 *
(1.691) (1.645) (3.006)
KGs Rice 10.35 -11.94 170.7
(31.63) (19.66) (171.8)
Constant 931.4*** 1,417*** 566.1**
(299.7) (545.7) (232.3)
Observations 720 360 360
R-squared 0.197 0.215 0.345
Mean 521.7*** 422.8*** Di↵erence -98.91*
(43.82) (28.24) (52.13)
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
Asset -43.79* Asset 92.85 Asset -3.035
Endowments (24.72) Coe cients (182.4) Interactions (31.55)
Demographic -48.90 Demographic 819.9* Demographic -65.24
Endowments (116.9) Coe cients (468.9) Interactions (135.3)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 OLS regressions of the respondent’s report of their and their spouse’s
expenditures per household member over the previous week on the respondent’s report of assets in the household.
Number of household members is the number of people who ate from the cooking pot last night. Regressions include
demographic controls for age, age squared, education, and an indicator of employment, for both the respondent
and the respondent’s spouse. Expenditures include food, clothing, household items, and transportation, but exclude
educational expenses. The third column report whether the male and female coe cients are statistically di↵erent
in a pooled regression (standard errors clustered at the couple level). The lower panel shows a Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition.
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0-700 KSH 66.4 3.1 0.3 0.3 70
701-1400 KSH 23.9 3.6 0.3 0 27.8
1401-2100 KSH 0.8 0.6 0 0.3 1.7
2101+ KSH 0 0.6 0 0 0.6
Total 91.1 7.8 0.6 0.6 100
Notes: Table shows the percent of the sample in each cell, husband’s predicted expenditures
per household member by wife’s predicted expenditures per household member. 700KSH
is equivalent $1 per day per capita. Predicted expenditures were generated using OLS
regressions of the respondent’s report of total household expenditures per household member
(except educational expenditures) on the respondent’s report of asset holdings. Number of
household members is the number of people who ate from the cooking pot last night.
Demographic controls for age, age squared, education, and an indicator for employment for
both the respondent and the respondent’s spouse are included. Regressions for predicted
expenditures were run for each gender separately, shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.5.


















1st Quintile 8.1 5.6 3.6 1.4 1.4
2nd Quintile 6.7 5.6 3.1 2.8 1.9
3rd Quintile 2.5 5.3 5.8 3.6 2.8
4th Quintile 1.1 2.2 4.4 6.7 5.6
5th Quintile 1.7 1.4 3.1 5.6 8.3
Notes: Table show the percent of the sample in each category. Rank determined by pre-
dicted expenditures per household member, which were generated using OLS regressions of
the respondent’s report of total household expenditures per household member (except ed-
ucational expenditures) on the respondent’s report of asset holdings. Number of household
members is the number of people who ate from the cooking pot last night. Demographic
controls for age, age squared, education, and an indicator for employment for the respon-
dent and the respondent’s spouse were included. Regressions for predicted expenditures
were run for each gender separately, shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.5.
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Table 3.8: First Principal Component Coe cients
Asset Pooled Men Women
Own House? -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Iron Roof? 0.16 0.15 0.17
Bicycles 0.34 0.34 0.31
Motorcycles 0.18 0.20 0.13
Cattle 0.29 0.28 0.31
Sheep 0.20 0.19 0.21
Goats 0.11 0.11 0.10
Chickens 0.28 0.31 0.30
Watches 0.33 0.32 0.31
Radios 0.30 0.29 0.30
TVs 0.30 0.29 0.30
Stoves 0.25 0.26 0.23
Phones 0.28 0.29 0.24
KGs Maize 0.31 0.31 0.30
KGs Beans 0.30 0.27 0.34
KGs Rice 0.06 0.04 0.16
Notes: Table shows the first princi-
pal component coe cients for an as-
set index. The first column pools male
and female reports, while the last two
columns split the sample by gender.


















1st Quintile 9.4 5.6 2.2 1.9 0.8
2nd Quintile 4.4 5.8 4.2 3.1 2.5
3rd Quintile 2.5 4.4 6.1 4.4 2.5
4th Quintile 1.7 3.1 4.7 5.6 5.0
5th Quintile 1.9 1.1 2.8 5.0 9.2
Notes: Table shows the percent of the sample in each category. Rank determined by
principal component score, split by husband and wife’s reports. Coe cients were calculated



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.11: First Principal Component Coe cients, Joint
Assets Men Baseline Women Baseline Joint
Bicycles 0.34 0.32 0.33
Motorcycles 0.21 0.15 0.10
Cattle 0.30 0.33 0.32
Sheep 0.20 0.22 0.16
Goats 0.12 0.15 0.12
Chickens 0.32 0.31 0.26
Watches 0.31 0.30 0.32
Radios 0.28 0.29 0.30
TVs 0.27 0.26 0.26
Stoves 0.27 0.21 0.22
Phones 0.27 0.23 0.31
KGs Maize 0.33 0.31 0.34
KGs Beans 0.32 0.37 0.33
KGs Rice 0.04 0.16 0.23
Notes: Table shows the first principal components for an asset index.
The first two columns show coe cients for male and female reports
at baseline, for only the households with complete endline data. The
last column shows the index coe cient for the endline reports.
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1st Quintile 9.4 5.8 2.3 1.6 0.6
2nd Quintile 4.5 6.1 3.9 3.2 2.3
3rd Quintile 3.2 3.2 6.8 4.5 2.3
4th Quintile 1.3 3.2 4.2 5.8 5.5


















1st Quintile 12.9 4.9 0.6 1 0.3
2nd Quintile 3.6 7.1 6.5 2.3 0.6
3rd Quintile 1.9 5.5 7.4 4.2 1
4th Quintile 0.6 2.6 4.2 8.1 4.5


















1st Quintile 12 4.5 1.6 1 0.6
2nd Quintile 4.5 7.8 4.5 1.9 1.3
3rd Quintile 1.6 3.9 7.1 5.8 1.6
4th Quintile 1 2.6 4.9 6.5 5.2
5th Quintile 0.6 1.3 1.9 4.9 11.3
Notes: Table shows the percent of the sample in each category. Rank determined by first
principal component scores. Coe cients for the scores were determined for each gender and
the joint report separately, shown in Table 3.11.
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3.12 Additional Figures
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Scores for component 1
Wife PC Score
Notes: Figures show histograms of husbands’ and wives’ first principal component scores. Note the lack of
clustering or truncation.
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Notes: Figures show histograms of husbands’, wives’, and endline report first principal component scores.







Baseline: Book 1-Consent and Personal Information-Version U-Eng
IPA-Hoel Projects
Married Couple Decision Making (MCDM)
September 23, 2011
Consent
Hello, how are you? My name is [...] from IPA, which is a research organization from Busia town. Today I have visited
you so that we can talk to you about the research that we are doing. It is a research about married people in Kenya, and
how they make decisions in their home. We will talk about decisions about food, money, farming, and other household
matters. This survey will take one hour. After completing I will give you a small gift to thank you for your time and for
helping us in this survey. You will also be eligible to receive a larger cash transfer.
I will also welcome you so that you can help in the second survey next week. If you choose to be in the survey for next
week, the survey will also take about one hour and I will give you a small gift to thank you for your time and participation.
The people that we work with will talk to your spouse also. Your spouse will be interviewed while he/she is alone
today. In the second survey, we will first talk with each person alone, then later on we will talk with both of you together
in the last survey.
I will not tell anyone the things that we will talk about with you in the first private survey. I will not tell your
husband/wife what you say in the private survey. The people doing the research have taken the appropriate steps to
ensure that no private information gets out to your community. However, there is a chance that information might get
outside. In order to keep this information confidential, I will talk with you alone. I will also write your name only on the
first packet of papers, and keep it away from the others as quick as possible.
After your own private survey, we will play a few games. Most of these games will be secret. For a few, I may tell
your husband/wife how you play. I will be sure to tell you which games are secret and which games are public to your
husband/wife.
Feel free in talking with me. If there is a question that you dont want to answer, that is ok. Your answers will not
interfere with any assistance that IPA would like to give to your village or to your family. If you are not comfortable to
answer any question, you are free not to answer it. You will still receive the small gift to thank you for your time and
participation.
If you have any question about the research, you can come to our o ce in Busia and we shall connect you with Jessica
Hoel. She is a doctoral student at the University of Michigan in America and she is the director of this project. This
research will be one of the papers that will make her complete her education. Her work is supervised by David Lam, PhD.
The IPA o ce can also help you to connect with the University of Michigan Behavioral Sciences Review Board or IPA
Kenya Institutional Review Board which are seeing to it that this research is done in as good a way as possible.
We thank you very much for being in this research, however being in this research is your choice.
A.1 Respondent ID | | | | | |
A.2 Are you willing to participate? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
1
158
MCDM- Baseline-U-English: September 23, 2011
Respondent Identifying Information
A.3 Respondent ID | | | | | |
A.4 Name
First Name Middle Name Last Name
A.5 Date of Interview | | |/| | |/| | | | |
| d| d|/| m| m|/| y| y| y| y|
A.6 Time Stamp | | | : | | |






A.10 Interviewer ID/Name | | | | |
To be completed at the time of data entry
First Entry
A.11 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
A.12 Data Entry Person Name:
A.13 Comments on First Data Entry:
Second Entry
A.14 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
A.15 Data Entry Person Name:
A.16 Comments on Second Data Entry:
FO Comments page 2:
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B Personal Information
First, I’d like to begin by asking you a bit about yourself.
B.1 FO: Is the respondent male? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
B.2 How old are you in full years? IF DON’T KNOW FULL YEARS, what year were
you born?
[ ]
B.3 What is your highest level of education? (0=None, 22=ECD, 1=Class 1, 2=Class
2, 3=Class 3, 4=Class 4, 5=Class 5, 6=Class 6, 7=Class 7, 8=Class 8, 9=Form 1,
10=Form 2, 11=Form 3, 12=Form 4, 14=SOME College, University or Polytech-
nic, 15=COMPLETED College, University or Polytechnic) (USE CODEBOOK )
[ ]
B.4 What is your religion? (1=Christian, 2=Muslim, 3=Other) [ ]
B.5 What is your marital status? 1=Single, 2=Living with Partner, 3=Married, 4=In-
herited, 5=Separated, 6=Divorced, 7=Widowed, 777=Other
[ ]
B.6 IF MALE, how many wives do you have? IF FEMALE, how many wives does your
husband have?
[ ]
B.7 What is your husband/wife’s first name?
B.8 What is your husband/wife’s middle name?
B.9 What is your husband/wife’s last name?
B.10 How old were you when you first moved in with your current partner? (Age in full
years or YEAR)
[ ]
B.11 How old were you when you married your current partner? (Age in full years or
year)
[ ]
B.12 How many living children do you have with your current partner? [ ]
B.13 How many living children do you have in total? (both with current partner and
with others)
[ ]
B.14 How many living children does your spouse have in total? (both with current
partner and with others)
[ ]
B.15 How old is your oldest child with your current partner? (Age in full years or YEAR
of birth)
[ ]
B.16 How old is your oldest child? (Age in full years or YEAR of birth) [ ]
B.17 How old is your youngest child? (Age in full years or YEAR of birth) [ ]
B.18 Who lives on the compound where you stay currently? Is it only your family and
close friends or is it neighbors too? (1=family and friends, 2=neighbors too)
[ ]
B.19 Did you cook the food you ate for dinner last night? IF NO, skip to 21. (1=yes,
2=no)
[ ]
B.20 How many people ate the food you cooked for dinner last night? [ ]
B.21 Did your spouse cook the food you ate for dinner last night? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
B.22 What was the longest stretch that you were absent from the household over the
last 12 months? (0=Never absent, 1=less than 3 months, 2=more than 3 months)
[ ]
FO Comments page 3:
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C Experiment Check
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Baseline : Book 2 - Individual Survey - Version U-Eng
IPA-Hoel Projects
Married Couple Decision Making (MCDM)
September 23, 2011
Respondent Identifying Information
D.1 Respondent ID | | | | | |
D.2 Date of Interview | | |/| | |/| | | | |
| d| d|/| m| m|/| y| y| y| y|
D.3 Time Stamp | | | : | | |
D.3 Interviewer ID/Name | | | | |
To be completed at the time of data entry
First Entry
D.4 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
D.5 Data Entry Person Name:
D.6 Comments on First Data Entry:
Second Entry
D.7 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
D.8 Data Entry Person Name:
D.9 Comments on Second Data Entry:
5
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E Assets and Wealth
Now I would like to ask you about the things your family owns. Please tell me about the place where you
currently stay, and the things you, your spouse, and your children own. You should include things at your
current place and another home, but be sure to tell me about only things that YOU own.
E.1 Does your family own the house you currently stay in? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
E.2 How long have you been staying in your current home? (1=less than 3 months,
2=3-6 months, 3=6-12 months, 4=1-5 years,5=5-10 years, 6=More than 10 years)
[ ]
E.3 Does the house you sleep in now have an iron roof? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
E.4 How many of the following items do you, your spouse, and your children own?
Item Quantity Item Quantity
E.4.A Bicycle E.4.B Sheep
E.4.C Motorcycle E.4.D Cattle
E.4.E Watch E.4.F Goats
E.4.G Radio E.4.H Chickens
E.4.I TV E.4.J Maize, Whole (KGs)
E.4.K Kerosene Stove E.4.L Beans (KGs)
E.4.M Cell Phones E.4.N Rice (KGs)
F Decision Making
Now I would like to ask you about how you make decisions in your home. In every question, I would like
you to give me one of these answers. (FO: read options aloud)
(1=I decide alone, 2= We decide, but I have the final word, 3=We decide together all of us, 4=We decide, but
my spouse has the final word, 5=My spouse decides alone, 6=Someone di erent from us makes the decision,
7=Culture decides/it is just the way it is, 999=I don’t know.)
F.1 Who decides on daily expenditure in your house (let’s say what is bought from the
market or what to cook)?
[ ]
F.2 Who decides how much you can give to your parents, relatives, friends, and neigh-
bors?
[ ]
F.3 Who makes the decision on how much to use on the purchase of personal items
(such as clothes, hair, makeups, etc.)?
[ ]
F.4 Who decides how much is spent on leisure, social life, and alcohol? [ ]
F.5 Who makes the budget about how you spend in your family? (For example, how
much to spend on vegetables, rent, medicine, education, etc.)
[ ]
F.6 Who is the primary financial decision maker in your household? [ ]
F.7 Who makes decisions on how many children you should have? [ ]
F.8 What is the biggest amount of money you feel comfortable using without asking
your spouse? (If he/she says that she can use any amount without asking, write
“ANY.” If he/she says they always talk first, write 0.) (999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
F.9 If I were to ask your spouse what he/she thinks, what is the biggest amount
your spouse would be comfortable with you spending without consulting first? (If
he/she says my spouse never wants to consult, write “ANY.” But if he/she says
that my spouse always wants to consult, write 0.) (999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
FO Comments page 6:
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H Finances
Now I would like to ask you about you and your family’s general finances.
H.1 Are you paid wages or salary for work you do for your employer (NOT yourself),
either at a full or part-time job? You are requested to add casual work like working
on someone’s land in this category, but don’t add work done on your own land.
(If NO, skip to 5) (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
H.2 How much do you earn in a month from all of your employers? (999=don’t know) [ ]KSH
H.3 Have you been self employed at all over the last 30 days? For example working
on your own land, buying and selling goods, hairdressing, etc. (If NO, skip to 8)
(1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
H.4 How much did you get last month from all SELF-EMPLOYMENT after subtracting
expenses and business money? (999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
H.5 How much in total did you earn last year, both salary and personal income?
(999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
H.6 How much did your husband/wife earn last year (both salary and SELF-
EMPLOYMENT)? (999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
Get money from Spouse
H.7 How often does your spouse give you money? (1=once or twice a year, 2=once a
month, 3=twice a month, 4=once a week, 5=a few times a week, 6=once a day,
7=several times a day, 8888=Never; if NEVER, skip to 14)
[ ]
H.8 How much money did your spouse give you last? (999=don’t know) [ ]KSH
Give money to Spouse
H.9 How often do you give your spouse money? 1=once or twice a year, 2=once a
month, 3=twice a month, 4=once a week, 5=a few times a week, 6=once a day,
7=several times a day, 888=Never; if NEVER, skip to next section
[ ]
H.10 How much money did you give your spouse last? (999=don’t know) [ ]KSH
FO Comments page 13:
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Baseline: Book 3 - Games - Version U-Eng
IPA-Hoel Projects
Married Couple Decision Making (MCDM)
September 23, 2011
Respondent Identifying Information
J.1 Respondent ID | | | | | |
J.2 Date of Interview | | |/| | |/| | | | |
| d| d|/| m| m|/| y| y| y| y|
J.3 Time Stamp | | | : | | |
J.3 Interviewer ID/Name | | | | |
To be completed at the time of data entry
First Entry
J.4 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
J.5 Data Entry Person Name:
J.6 Comments on First Data Entry:
Second Entry
J.7 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
J.8 Data Entry Person Name:
J.9 Comments on Second Data Entry:
15
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K Game Recording Sheet
K.1 SECRET STRANGER - Order Number:
Number
of Caps








K.5 SECRET SPOUSE - Order Number:
Number
of Caps








K.9 PUBLIC SPOUSE - Order Number:
Number
of Caps








K.13 SPOUSE STRANGER - Order Number:
Number
of Caps








K.17 STRANGER STRANGER - Order Number:
Number
of Caps
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L Games Debrief
Thank you for participating in the games! For the final section, I would like to ask you a few questions about your
experience with the games.
L.1 Let’s think about how your spouse played his/her games. How many tokens do
you think they gave to you in the 10 token Public Spouse game? (999=Don’t
know)
[ ]
L.2 How many tokens do you think they gave to you in the 10 token Secret Spouse
game? (999=Don’t know)
[ ]
L.3 How much money do you think you will take home from the games in total?
(999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
L.4 How much money do you think your spouse will take home from the games in
total? (999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
FO Comments page 17:
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M Conclusion
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Please accept this soap as a token of our appreciation.
READ CONCLUSION SCRIPT from slip you were given at the time of treatment assignment.
About 4 out of 10 women who participated in this study will receive a 500 shilling cash transfer, while 6 out
of 10 will not receive the transfer. 4 out of 10 men will receive the transfer, while 6 out of 10 will not. A
family is only eligible for one transfer.
Please remember to come back on the same day next week for the follow-up interview. You
will receive a small gift then to thank you for your participation, and you can also pick up your winnings
from the games we played today.
M.1 Time Stamp
| | | : | | |
| h| h| : | m| m|
M.2 Did you read the conclusion script , including the bit about the cash transfer?
(1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
M.3 Did you give the respondent the gift of soap? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
M.4 Did you give the respondent a cash transfer of 500KSH? (Check with the Banker
if you are not sure if you are supposed to.) (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
M.5 Did you ask the respondent to sign the accounting sheet for their gift and/or cash
transfer? (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
M.6 Did you remind the respondent about the follow-up interview next week? (1=yes,
2=no)
[ ]
M.7 Is there anything special Jessica should know about this interview or this respon-
dent? (e.g. You don’t believe the respondent is married, the respondent was
hostile/not interested, etc.) (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
M.8 What should Jessica know?
M.9 Which language did you primarily use to conduct this survey and script?
(1=Kiswahili, 2=Kiluhya, 3=Dholuo, 4=English, 5=Other)
[ ]
M.10 In addition to the primary respondent, was anyone else present for some portion of
the interview? (0=No one, 1=Spouse of Respondent, 2=Another Adult Man from
the compound, 3=Another Adult Woman from the compount, 4=Liguru/Guide,
5=Children, 6=Other
[ ]
N Survey Quality Self-Check
N.1 There should be no blank fields; coded fields should have 888s if not applica-
ble.Have you confirmed that there are no blank fields? (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
N.2 Is the respondent ID number written on the front page of every booklet? (1=yes,
2=no)
[ ]




Note: The games were implemented with respondents by a trained native Dholuo
speaker in Dholuo in an individual interview. The scripts were written in English
with input from the field assistants, then forward and back-translated twice into
Dholuo. The scripts shown here are in English. Dholuo translations are available
on request.
INTRODUCTION TO GAMES
Thank you for your participation in the survey. Now I would like to invite you to participate
in some games. First, I will give you some instructions for the game. You should feel free
to ask me to repeat something if you dont catch it at first. After the instructions, I will ask
you a few questions to check your understanding. Its ok if you dont answer the questions
correctly at first; I will just repeat the instructions of the game.
GENERAL GAME INSTRUCTIONS
1. In these games you will have a chance to win real money. Jessica, the leader of this
project, has arranged for the money. The money you win has come from Jessicas school so
that she can complete this project.
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2. These games you will play with a partner. In some games your partner will be your
husband/wife. But in some of the games your partner will be a stranger.
3. You will make two types of decisions [hold up two fingers]; 1) secret decisions and 2)
public decisions. For the secret decision, I will not tell anyone about your choices except
Jessica, the leader of this project. For the public decision you make I will tell only your
partner and Jessica, but no one else in your village.
4. Today we will play several di↵erent games over di↵erent amounts of money. One of these
games will come true.
5. We will enter all of your games into the computer in the o ce. The computer will
randomly decide which game comes true. We will then combine your choices with the
choices of your partners, and together they will determine how much money you win.
6. You will receive your money next week when we come back for a follow up interview.
Now I would like to ask you a few questions to check your understanding of the instructions.
If you dont understand some part, I will just repeat the instruction and that will be fine.
Questions about General Game Instructions
FO Instructions: If the respondent answers correctly, say “Yes, thats right” then repeat the
correct answer. If the respondent answers incorrectly, follow the instructions given on the
line.
1. Where did the money come from? [Jessicas School; if wrong, repeat #1.]
2. Who will be your partner in these games? [My spouse or a stranger; if wrong, repeat #2.]
3. When your decision is secret, who will I tell about your choice? [No one except the leader
of this project; if wrong, repeat #3.]
4. When your decision is public who will I tell about your choices? [My partner and the
leader of this project only; if wrong, repeat #3.]
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5. Will I ever tell your village elder about your choices? [No. If wrong, say “I will sometimes
tell your partner, but I will never tell anyone else in your village about your choices.”]
6. Of the many games we play today, how many of your choices will come true? [One; if
wrong, repeat #4.]
7. How will we pick which of your games come true? [The computer will pick randomly; if
wrong, repeat #5.]
8. When will you receive your money from the game that comes true? [Next week; if wrong,
repeat #6]
Great! Now that you understand the general rules of the games, lets talk about one game
in specific.
SECRET STRANGER DECIDER GAME
(If the first:) Now lets play the first game. This game is called the Secret Stranger Decider
Game.
(If not the first:) Now lets play a di↵erent game. This game is called the Secret Stranger
Decider Game. The rules are a bit the same and a bit di↵erent from the last game.
Game Rules
1. Your partner is a stranger. I cant tell you who the stranger is and I will never tell the
stranger who you are.
2. At the end of the week we will put the names of those who participated into the computer
and will pick out one randomly to be your stranger partner.
3. Your choices in this game will be secret. I will not tell the stranger how you have played.
I will also not tell anyone else in the village how you have played.
4. In this game I will give you bottle caps that represent real money.
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5. You can keep all these bottle caps and money for yourself or you can give some or all to
the stranger.
6. The bottle caps you keep are worth ksh20 for yourself. But if you give them to the
stranger, they are worth ksh30 to the stranger. For example, if you keep 3 bottle caps, they
are worth 60 shillings to you. If you give 3 bottle caps, they are worth 90 shillings to the
stranger. You can use this sheet to help you understand the value of the bottle caps. This
column shows how much the caps are worth if you keep them and this column shows how
much the caps are worth if you give them.
7. Here are two labeled tins. This one is labeled SELF and this one is labeled STRANGER
1. Drop the bottle caps you would like to keep in the tin labeled SELF and the bottle caps
you would like to give in the tin labeled STRANGER 1.
8. Because this game is secret, the stranger will not know if you give them money, and they
will also not know if you do not give them money. Again I would like to ask you a few
questions to check your understanding of the rules of the Secret Stranger Decider Game.
Questions for Secret Stranger Game
FO Instructions: If the respondent answers correctly, say “Yes, thats right” then repeat the
correct answer. If the respondent answers incorrectly, follow the instructions given on the
line.
1. Here are 5 bottle caps. If you keep them by putting them in the SELF tin (FO: Demon-
strate), how much are they worth to you? [100ksh; if wrong, repeat #6]
2. If you give the 5 bottle caps by putting them in the STRANGER tin (FO: Demonstrate),
how much are they worth to the stranger? [150ksh; if wrong, repeat #6]
3. Who is your partner for this game? [A stranger; if wrong, repeat #1]
4. Will I tell your partner what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #3]
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5. Will I tell your husband/wife what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #3]
Ok! Now lets play the game! Here are 5 bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.
Ok. You have chosen to keep X bottle caps worth X to you and give X bottle caps worth X
to the stranger. Is that correct?
If no, “Ok, here are the 5 bottle caps again. You can make your choice as you wish.”
If yes, “Ok, lets continue. Here are 10 bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.”
FO: Repeat for other values as needed.
SECRET SPOUSE DECIDER GAME
(If the first:) Now lets play the first game. This game is called the Secret Spouse Decider
Game.
(If not the first:) Now lets play a di↵erent game. This game is called the Secret Spouse
Decider Game. The rules are a bit the same and a bit di↵erent from the last game.
Game Rules
1. Your partner in this game is your spouse.
2. Your choices in this game will be secret. I will not tell your spouse how you have played.
I will also not tell anyone else in the village how you have played.
3. In this game I will give you bottle caps that represent real money.
4. You can keep all these bottle caps and money for yourself or you can give some or all to
your spouse.
5. The bottle caps you keep are worth ksh20 for yourself. But if you give them to your
spouse, they are worth ksh30 to your spouse. For example, if you keep 2 bottle caps, they
are worth 40 shillings to you. If you give 2 bottle caps, they are worth 60 shillings to your
spouse. You can use this sheet to help you understand the value of the bottle caps. This
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column shows how much the caps are worth if you keep them and this column shows how
much the caps are worth if you give them.
6. Here are two labeled tins. This one is labeled SELF and this one is labeled SPOUSE.
Drop the bottle caps you would like to keep in the tin labeled SELF and the bottle caps you
would like to give in the tin labeled SPOUSE.
7. Because this game is secret, your spouse will not know that the money comes from you.
They will not know if you give them money, and they will also not know if you do not give
them money.
Again I would like to ask you a few questions to check your understanding of the rules of
the Secret Spouse Decider Game.
Questions for Secret Spouse Game
FO Instructions: If the respondent answers correctly, say “Yes, thats right” then repeat the
correct answer. If the respondent answers incorrectly, follow the instructions given on the
line.
1. Here are 7 bottle caps. If you keep them by putting them in the SELF tin (FO: Demon-
strate), how much are they worth to you? [140ksh; if wrong, repeat #5]
2. If you give the 7 bottle caps by putting them in the SPOUSE tin (FO: Demonstrate),
how much are they worth to your spouse? [210ksh; if wrong, repeat #5]
3. Who is your partner for this game? [Spouse; if wrong, repeat #1]
4. Will I tell your spouse what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #2]
5. Will I tell your village elder what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #2]
6. Will your spouse know how much you gave to them in this game? [No; if wrong, repeat
#7]
Ok! Now lets play the game! Here are 5 bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.
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Ok. You have chosen to keep X bottle caps worth X to you and give X bottle caps worth X
to your spouse. Is that correct?
If no, “Ok, here are the 5 bottle caps again. You can make your choice as you wish.”
If yes, “Ok, lets continue. Here are 10 bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.”
FO: Repeat for other values as needed.
PUBLIC SPOUSE DECIDER GAME
(If the first:) Now lets play the first game. This game is called the Public Spouse Decider
Game.
(If not the first:) Now lets play a di↵erent game. This game is called the Public Spouse
Decider Game. The rules are a bit the same and a bit di↵erent from the last game.
Game Rules
1. Your partner in this game is your spouse.
2. Your choices in this game will be public. I will tell your spouse how you have played.
But, I will not tell anyone else in the village how you have played.
3. In this game I will give you bottle caps that represent real money.
4. You can keep all these bottle caps and money for yourself or you can give some or all to
your spouse.
5. The bottle caps you keep are worth ksh20 for yourself. But if you give them to your
partner, they are worth ksh30 to your spouse. For example, if you keep 10 bottle caps, they
are worth 200 shillings to you. If you give 10 bottle caps, they are worth 300 shillings to
your spouse. You can use this sheet to help you understand the value of the bottle caps.
This column shows how much the caps are worth if you keep them and this column shows
how much the caps are worth if you give them.
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6. Here are two labeled tins. This one is labeled SELF and this one is labeled SPOUSE.
Drop the bottle caps you would like to keep in the tin labeled SELF and the bottle caps you
would like to give in the tin labeled SPOUSE.
Again I would like to ask you a few questions to check your understanding of the rules of
the Public Spouse Decider Game.
Questions for Public Spouse Game
FO Instructions: If the respondent answers correctly, say “Yes, thats right” then repeat the
correct answer. If the respondent answers incorrectly, follow the instructions given on the
line.
1. Here are 9 bottle caps. If you keep them by putting them in the SELF tin (FO: Demon-
strate), how much are they worth to you? [180ksh; if wrong, repeat #5]
2. If you give the 9 bottle caps by putting them in the SPOUSE tin (FO: Demonstrate),
how much are they worth to your spouse? [270ksh; if wrong, repeat #5]
3. Who is your partner for this game? [Spouse; if wrong, repeat #1]
4. Will I tell your spouse what you decided? [Yes; if wrong, repeat #2]
5. Will I tell your village elder what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #2]
Ok! Now lets play the game! Here are 5 bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.
Ok. You have chosen to keep X bottle caps worth X to you and give X bottle caps worth X
to your spouse. Is that correct?
If no, “Ok, here are the 5 bottle caps again. You can make your choice as you wish.”
If yes, “Ok, lets continue. Here are 10 bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.”
FO: Repeat for other values as needed.
SPOUSE STRANGER DECIDER GAME
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(If the first:) Now lets play the first game. This game is called the Spouse Stranger Decider
Game.
(If not the first:) Now lets play a di↵erent game. This game is called the Spouse Stranger
Decider Game. The rules are a bit the same and a bit di↵erent from the last game.
Game Rules
1. In this game, you will make decisions for other people.
2. The person giving the money is your spouse. The person receiving the money is a stranger.
3. I cant tell you who the stranger is and I will never tell the stranger who you are.
4. At the end of the week we will put the names of those who participated into the computer
and will pick out one randomly to be the stranger.
5. Your choices in this game will be secret. I will not tell your spouse how you have played.
I will also not tell anyone else in the village how you have played.
6. In this game I will give you bottle caps that represent real money.
7. You can keep all these bottle caps and money for your spouse or you can give some or all
to the stranger.
8. The bottle caps you keep are worth ksh20 for your spouse. But if you give them to the
stranger, they are worth ksh30 to the stranger. For example, if you keep 4 bottle caps, they
are worth 80 shillings to your spouse. If you give 4 bottle caps, they are worth 120 shillings
to the stranger. You can use this sheet to help you understand the value of the bottle caps.
This column shows how much the caps are worth if you keep them and this column shows
how much the caps are worth if you give them.
9. Here are two labeled tins. This one is labeled SPOUSE and this one is labeled STRANGER.
Drop the bottle caps you would like to keep in the tin labeled SPOUSE and the bottle caps
you would like to give in the tin labeled STRANGER.
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10. Because this game is secret, your spouse and the stranger will not know you made the
decision. They will not know if you give them money, and they will also not know if you do
not give them money.
Again I would like to ask you a few questions to check your understanding of the rules of
the Spouse Stranger Decider Game.
Questions for Spouse Stranger Game
FO Instructions: If the respondent answers correctly, say “Yes, thats right” then repeat the
correct answer. If the respondent answers incorrectly, follow the instructions given on the
line.
1. Here are 15 bottle caps. If you keep them for your spouse by putting them in the SPOUSE
tin (FO: Demonstrate), how much are they worth to your spouse? [300ksh; if wrong, repeat
#8]
2. If you give the 15 bottle caps by putting them in the STRANGER tin (FO: Demonstrate),
how much are they worth to the stranger? [450ksh; if wrong, repeat #8]
3. Who are the players in this game? [Your spouse and a stranger; if wrong, repeat #2]
4. Will I tell your spouse what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #5]
5. Will I tell your village elder what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #5]
6. Will your spouse know how much you kept for them in this game? [No; if wrong, repeat
#9]
Ok! Now lets play the game! Here are 5 bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.
Ok. You have chosen to keep X bottle caps worth X to your spouse and give X bottle caps
worth X to the stranger. Is that correct?
If no, “Ok, here are the 5 bottle caps again. You can make your choice as you wish.”
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If yes, “Ok, lets continue. Here are 10 bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.”
FO: Repeat for other values as needed.
STRANGER STRANGER DECIDER GAME
(If the first:) Now lets play the first game. This game is called the Stranger Stranger Decider
Game.
(If not the first:) Now lets play a di↵erent game. This game is called the Stranger Stranger
Decider Game. The rules are a bit the same and a bit di↵erent from the last game.
Game Rules
1. In this game, you will make decisions for other people.
2. The person giving the money is a stranger. The person receiving the money is also a
stranger.
3. I cant tell you who the strangers are and I will never tell the strangers who you are.
4. At the end of the week we will put the names of those who participated into the computer
and will pick out two randomly to be the strangers.
5. Your choices in this game will be secret. I will also not tell anyone else in the village how
you have played, including the strangers, your spouse, or anyone else in your village.
6. In this game I will give you bottle caps that represent real money.
7. You can keep all these bottle caps and money for STRANGER 1or you can give some or
all to STRANGER 2.
8. The bottle caps you keep are worth ksh20 for STRANGER 1. But if you give them to
STRANGER 2, they are worth ksh30 to the STRANGER 2. For example, if you keep 8
bottle caps, they are worth 160 shillings to STRANGER 1. If you give 8 bottle caps, they
are worth 240 shillings to STRANGER 2. You can use this sheet to help you understand
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the value of the bottle caps. This column shows how much the caps are worth if you keep
them and this column shows how much the caps are worth if you give them.
9. Here are two labeled tins. This one is labeled STRANGER 1 and this one is labeled
STRANGER 2. Drop the bottle caps you would like to keep in the tin labeled STRANGER
1 and the bottle caps you would like to give in the tin labeled STRANGER 2.
10. Because this game is secret, the strangers will not know how you decided. They will not
know if you choose to give them money and they will not know if you dont give them money.
Again I would like to ask you a few questions to check your understanding of the rules of
the Stranger Stranger Decider Game.
Questions for Stranger Stranger Game
FO Instructions: If the respondent answers correctly, say “Yes, thats right” then repeat the
correct answer. If the respondent answers incorrectly, follow the instructions given on the
line.
1. Here are 6 bottle caps. If you keep them for STRANGER 1 by putting them in the
STRANGER 1 tin (FO: Demonstrate), how much are they worth to STRANGER 1? [120ksh;
if wrong, repeat #8]
2. If you give the 6 bottle caps to STRANGER 2 by putting them in the STRANGER 2 in
(FO: Demonstrate), how much are they worth to STRANGER 2? [180ksh; if wrong, repeat
#8]
3. Who are the players in this game? [Two strangers; if wrong, repeat #2]
4. Will I tell the strangers what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #5]
5. Will I tell your village elder what you decided? [No; if wrong, repeat #5]
Ok! Now lets play the game! You can make your choice as you wish.
Ok. You have chosen to keep X bottle caps worth X to STRANGER 1and give X bottle
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caps worth X to STRANGER 2. Is that correct?
If no, “Ok, here are the [5] bottle caps again. You can make your choice as you wish.”
If yes, “Ok, lets continue. Here are [10] bottle caps. You can make your choice as you wish.”





Endline:Book 1-Consent -Version U-Eng
IPA-Hoel Projects
Married Couple Decision Making (MCDM)
September 23, 2011
Consent
Hello, how are you? My name is [...] from IPA, which is a research organization from Busia town. Today I have visited
you so that we can talk to you about the research that we are doing. It is a research about married people in Kenya, and
how they make decisions in their home. We will talk about decisions about food, money, farming, and other household
matters. This survey will take one hour. After completing I will give you a small gift to thank you for your time and for
helping us in this survey.
The people that we work with will talk to your spouse also. You and your spouse will first be interviewed alone. Then
we would like to speak to you both together.
I will not tell anyone the things that we will talk about with you in the first private survey. I will not tell your
husband/wife what you say in the private survey. The people doing the research have taken the appropriate steps to
ensure that no private information gets out to your community. However, there is a chance that information might get
outside. In order to keep this information confidential, I will talk with you alone. I will also write your name only on the
first packet of papers, and keep it away from the others as quick as possible.
Feel free in talking with me. If there is a question that you dont want to answer, that is ok. Your answers will not
interfere with any assistance that IPA would like to give to your village or to your family. If you are not comfortable to
answer any question, you are free not to answer it. You will still receive the small gift to thank you for your time and
participation.
If you have any question about the research, you can come to our o ce in Busia and we shall connect you with Jessica
Hoel. She is a doctoral student at the University of Michigan in America and she is the director of this project. This
research will be one of the papers that will make her complete her education. Her work is supervised by David Lam, PhD.
The IPA o ce can also help you to connect with the University of Michigan Behavioral Sciences Review Board or IPA
Kenya Institutional Review Board which are seeing to it that this research is done in as good a way as possible.
We thank you very much for being in this research, however being in this research is your choice.
A.1 Respondent ID | | | | | |
A.2 Are you willing to participate? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
1
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Respondent Identifying Information
A.3 Respondent ID | | | | | |
A.4 Name
First Name Middle Name Last Name
A.5 Date of Interview | | |/| | |/| | | | |
| d| d|/| m| m|/| y| y| y| y|
A.6 Time Stamp | | | : | | |






A.10 Interviewer ID/Name | | | | |
To be completed at the time of data entry
First Entry
A.11 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
A.12 Data Entry Person Name:
A.13 Comments on First Data Entry:
Second Entry
A.14 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
A.15 Data Entry Person Name:
A.16 Comments on Second Data Entry:
FO Comments page 2:
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B Experiment Check
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This page intentionally left blank.
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Endline: Book 2 - Individual Survey - Version U-Eng
IPA-Hoel Projects
Married Couple Decision Making (MCDM)
September 23, 2011
Respondent Identifying Information
C.1 Respondent ID | | | | | |
C.2 Date of Interview | | |/| | |/| | | | |
| d| d|/| m| m|/| y| y| y| y|
C.3 Time Stamp | | | : | | |
C.3 Interviewer ID/Name | | | | |
To be completed at the time of data entry
First Entry
C.4 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
C.5 Data Entry Person Name:
C.6 Comments on First Data Entry:
Second Entry
C.7 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
C.8 Data Entry Person Name:
C.9 Comments on Second Data Entry:
5
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F Post-Games Payout
F.1 Did you and your spouse talk about the games? IF NO, skip to question 9. (1=yes,
2=no)
[ ]
F.2 When did you first talk about it? (1=the day of the baseline, 2=within a few days
of the first visit, 3=before we came today, 777=Other)
[ ]
F.3 Who first brought up the topic of the games? (1=I did, 2=My spouse did, 9=Don’t
know/don’t remember)
[ ]
F.4 Did you and your spouse talk about how you played the Secret Spouse Decider
Game? (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
F.5 How much did you tell your spouse you gave to them in the 25 token Secret Spouse
Decider Game? (999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
F.6 Did they believe you? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
F.7 How much did your spouse tell you that they gave you in the 25 token Secret
Spouse Decider Game? (999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
F.8 How much do you think your spouse actually gave you in the 25 token Secret
Spouse Decider Game? (999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
F.9 Why did you choose to tell your spouse or not tell them about how you played the
games?
G Post-Experiment Questions
G.1 How much money did you receive last time you met with the study team?
(999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
G.2 How much money did your spouse receive last time they met with the study team?
(999=don’t know)
[ ]KSH
If answers to BOTH 1 and 2 are 0, skip to next section.
G.3 Did you and your spouse talk about how to spend the money? IF NO, skip to
question 6. (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
G.4 When did you first talk about it? (1=the day of the baseline, 2=within a few days
of the first visit, 3=before we came today, 777=Other)
[ ]
G.5 Who first brought up the topic of how to spend the money? (1=I did, 2=My
spouse did, 9=Don’t know/don’t remember)
[ ]
G.6 Who decided how the money should be spent? (1=I decided alone, 2=We made
the decision together, but I had the final word, 3=We decided together equally,
4=We decided together, but my spouse had the final word, 5=My spouse decided
alone, 6=Someone else made the decision, 7=Culture decided/it is just the way it
is, 9=Dont know.)
[ ]
G.7 Did you give any of the money away? If NO, skip to 9 (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
G.8 To who? (1=Spouse, 2=Other Compound Member 3=Boss/Employer, 4=Cus-
tomer, 5=Friend, 6=Relative (not on compound), 7=Neighbor, 8=Other)
[ ]
G.9 What did your household spend the transfer on?
G.10 Did you and your spouse quarrel about the cash transfer? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
G.11 If yes, what happened?
FO Comments page 13:
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H Marital Quality
Now I would like to talk to you about your marriage, and how you feel in your marriage. These questions
are personal. Remember that you are free to skip any question, but also remember that your answers to this
survey are completely private. I will not talk about your answers with anyone but the leader of the project.
Your name is not written on this sheet, and we will be careful to keep your information secret. May I ask
you these questions?
H.1 Is your marriage an arranged marriage? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
H.2 How did you meet your partner? (1=At school, 2=Through family/friends,
3=Around the village, 4=At work, 777=Other)
[ ]
H.3 Who first suggested a romantic relationship between you two? (1=I did, 2=My
spouse did, 3=A family member/friend did, 777=Other)
[ ]
Now, how often would you say that the following events occur between you and your mate?
(0=Never, 1=less than once a month,2=once or twice a month, 3=once or twice a week, 4=once a day,
5=more often,777=Other, 888=Not Applicable, 999=Don’t know)
H.4 Laugh together [ ]
H.5 Calmly discuss something [ ]
H.6 Work together on a project [ ]
H.7 You receive a gift from your spouse [ ]
H.8 You walk together with your spouse to attend a public event (e.g. church, a
wedding, a funeral, a baraza)
[ ]
Now, most people have disagreements in their relationships. Please indicate below the approximate extent
of agreement of disagreement between you and your partner for each item on the following list.
(0=Always Disagree, 1=Almost Always Disagree, 2=Frequently Disagree, 3=Occasionally Disagree, 4=Al-
most Always Agree, 5=Always Agree)
H.9 Conventionality (correct or proper behavior) [ ]
H.10 Religious matters [ ]
H.11 Ways of dealing with parents or in-laws [ ]
H.12 Sex relations [ ]
H.13 Aims, goals, and things believed important [ ]
H.14 Making major decisions [ ]
H.15 Household tasks [ ]
H.16 Do you and your spouse ever have disagreements about how to spend money?
(1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
H.17 Has there been a time when a disagreement about money escalated into a quarrel?
(loud verbal disagreement) (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
H.18 Has there been a time when a disagreement about money escalated into fighting?
(physical violence) (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
How often do they following things happen?
(0=All of the time, 1=Most of the time, 2=More often than not, 3=Occasionally, 4=Rarely, 5=Never)
H.19 How often do you disagree on matters pertaining to child discipline? [ ]
H.20 How often do you or your mate leave the house after a fight? [ ]
H.21 How often do you and your partner quarrel? [ ]
Thank you for participating in this survey. I will now put your survey sheet in this brown envelope away
from the papers that have your name on them.
FO Comments page 14:
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I Conclusion
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Please accept this soap as a token of our appreciation.
I would also like to give you the money you won from last week’s games. Next, our team
would like to do a short interview with you and your spouse together.
READ THE SLIP THAT IS WITH THE GAMES PAYMENT ENVELOPE.
I.1 Time Stamp
| | | : | | |
| h| h| : | m| m|
I.2 Did you read the conclusion script ? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
I.3 Did you give the respondent the gift of soap? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
I.4 Did you give the respondent their games winning envelope? (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
I.5 Did you ask the respondent to sign the accounting sheet for their gift and/or cash
transfer? (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
I.6 SKIP for Endline (1=yes, 2=no) [ ]
I.7 Is there anything special Jessica should know about this interview or this respon-
dent? (e.g. You don’t believe the respondent is married, the respondent was
hostile/not interested, etc.) (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
I.8 What should Jessica know?
I.9 Which language did you primarily use to conduct this survey and script?
(1=Kiswahili, 2=Kiluhya, 3=Dholuo, 4=English, 5=Other)
[ ]
I.10 In addition to the primary respondent, was anyone else present for some portion of
the interview? (0=No one, 1=Spouse of Respondent, 2=Another Adult Man from
the compound, 3=Another Adult Woman from the compount, 4=Liguru/Guide,
5=Children, 6=Other
[ ]
J Survey Quality Self-Check
J.1 There should be no blank fields; coded fields should have 888s if not applica-
ble.Have you confirmed that there are no blank fields? (1=yes, 2=no)
[ ]
J.2 Is the respondent ID number written on the front page of every booklet? (1=yes,
2=no)
[ ]
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Endline: Book 3 - Couple Survey - Version U-Eng
IPA-Hoel Projects
Married Couple Decision Making (MCDM)
September 23, 2011
Respondent Identifying Information
K.1 Husband ID | | | | | |
K.2 Wife ID | | | | | |
K.3 Date of Interview | | |/| | |/| | | | |
| d| d|/| m| m|/| y| y| y| y|
K.4 Time Stamp | | | : | | |
K.4 Interviewer ID/Name | | | | |
To be completed at the time of data entry
First Entry
K.5 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
K.6 Data Entry Person Name:
K.7 Comments on First Data Entry:
Second Entry
K.8 Data Entry Person ID: | | | | |
K.9 Data Entry Person Name:
K.10 Comments on Second Data Entry:
17
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L Assets and Wealth
L.1 How many of the following items do you, your spouse, and your children own?
Item Quantity Item Quantity
L.1.A Bicycle L.1.B Sheep
L.1.C Motorcycle L.1.D Cattle
L.1.E Watch L.1.F Goats
L.1.G Radio L.1.H Chickens
L.1.I TV L.1.J Maize, Whole (KGs)
L.1.K Kerosene Stove L.1.L Beans (KGs)
L.1.M Cell Phones L.1.N Rice (KGs)
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